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LAW IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY:  STATES OF 
EXCEPTION AND THE TEMPTATIONS OF 9/11 
Kim Lane Scheppele∗
INTRODUCTION 
When the two large passenger airplanes crashed into the World Trade 
Center on that September morning—as two other planes homed in on their 
Washington targets—the U.S. government hesitated for three days, and 
then declared that America was more or less at war.  The President de-
clared a state of emergency,1 while Congress issued a joint declaration au-
thorizing the President to use all “necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001.”2  These pronouncements were later followed by a series of policy 
decisions3 and legal changes4 that would enable the United States to con-
 ∗ John J. O’Brien Professor of Comparative Law and Professor of Sociology, University of Penn-
sylvania.  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Sparer Symposium at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School on Terrorism and the Constitution:  Civil Liberties in a New America on 
March 6, 2003, in a panel called “Outside the Law:  Alternatives and Challenges to Legal Systems,” of 
the Sociology of Law Section of the American Sociological Association, August 2003, Atlanta, Geor-
gia, and at a University of Pennsylvania faculty retreat in October 2003.  Participants in all of these ses-
sions were very helpful in the later reformulations of this argument.  I would like to thank the students 
in my courses on Terrorism and Democracy (spring and fall 2002 and spring 2004) for being willing to 
follow through the twists and turns of this story with me as it was evolving.  I would also like to thank 
helpful audiences at the American Association of Law Schools panel on military tribunals in Washing-
ton D.C. in January 2003, and at the Penn Law European Society meeting in Strasbourg, France in June 
2003 for their good questions and useful challenges to the general framework presented here.  Seth 
Kreimer has discussed many of these issues with me, and I have always benefited from his wise coun-
sel.  Serguei Oushakine, as always, both reminds me of why anyone should care about these things and 
prevents me from thinking about these things only in legal terms.  Since things change quickly in this 
field, I should mention that this article was finally put to bed in mid-May 2004.  What happened after 
that time is not reflected here.      
 1 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001). 
 2 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S9413-01 (2003) (enacted).  The resolution also au-
thorized the President to take similar action against all those who “harbored” such persons.  Id. 
 3 By “policy decision,” I mean reinterpreting laws already on the books to do new things.  For ex-
ample, the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000), was not altered after 9/11, but was used 
for newly aggressive purposes—to provide a legal basis to simply hold suspicious people against whom 
no criminal charges could yet be filed.  The legal cover story was that those detained were material wit-
nesses who were being held to testify before the grand jury that was convened to look into the 9/11 at-
tacks.  Before 9/11, the primary use of the material witness statute was to hold key witnesses to testify 
in criminal trials, and even then the power was used sparingly.  See the different judgments about the 
acceptability of the new interpretation before the Second Circuit resolved the conflict by ruling in favor 
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duct both a domestic and a foreign operation to combat international terror-
ism. 
Surprising as 9/11 was in its particulars to nearly all of those who 
watched it around the world, it was not at all surprising in general from the 
standpoint of political theory, which has wrestled for centuries with the 
question of what to do with a shock to a political system that is so great that 
normal rules seem no longer to apply.  Throughout the history of political 
thought, the idea of a state of exception has fascinated and repelled political 
theorists who have seen in the idea both the only way to defend a state in 
peril and the clear road to dictatorship. 
In this Article, I explore how the state of exception has been used in 
practice in American domestic and foreign policy after 9/11, against a 
backdrop of both political theory and comparative responses.  In Part I, I 
will explore the idea of the state of exception as it has been elaborated in 
modern constitutionalism, focusing on the work of Carl Schmitt and the 
collapse of the Weimar Constitution and working through the way the 
American constitutional order absorbed the idea of the state of emergency 
during the Cold War.  Schmitt, as we will see, saw the ability of a ruler to 
suspend the rule of law as the ultimate act of sovereignty.  Something like 
this idea was carried on into American policy through the idea of “national 
security,” providing both the rationale for the Cold War and the justifica-
tion for the suspension of what had been normal practice.  Though the Cold 
War ended decisively more than a decade before 9/11, the United States 
never reformulated its guiding ideas about how to manage serious threats.  
As a result, confronted with a new enemy after 9/11, the Bush administra-
tion fell back into Cold War habits, even though the present threat and the 
present world situation are very different. 
Against this background of the exception and its rationales, I next ex-
plore the specific responses of the United States to 9/11 in both domestic 
of the government.  Compare United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding 
that a person cannot be detained to secure grand jury testimony under the material witness statute), 
rev’d, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), with In re Application of the United States for a Material Witness 
Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the material witness statute does permit 
witnesses to be detained in conjunction with grand jury proceedings). 
 4 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in 
scattered titles of U.S.C.), was the major statutory change that followed immediately after 9/11, but, as 
the Congressional Research Service analysis itself noted, much of what the USA PATRIOT Act did 
was to codify decisions that federal courts had already made; specifically, decisions adverse to criminal 
defendants and to those seeking to challenge state authority.  See CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31200:  TERRORISM:  SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT (2001) [hereinafter DOYLE, TERRORISM], available at 
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/011210crs.pdf; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31377:  THE USA PATRIOT ACT:  A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002) (orga-
nizing the analysis thematically), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf; CHARLES 
DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RS21203:  THE USA PATRIOT ACT:  A 
SKETCH (2002) (providing a summary of his legal analysis), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf. 
  
May 2004] STATES OF EXCEPTION 3 
and foreign policy in Part II of this Article.  Since 9/11, the Bush admini-
stration has repeatedly invoked its ability to make exceptions to normal le-
gality to cope with the terrorist threat in domestic policy through increasing 
invocation of military rationales for its actions.  The commander-in-chief 
powers that have been invoked by the President have had the effect of un-
dermining both separation of powers and individual rights at home.  In for-
eign policy, the Bush administration acted as though 9/11 created the basis 
not only for a national state of emergency, but also an international state of 
emergency that requires other countries to make exceptions to both interna-
tional law and their constitutional orders.  The United States, as a result, 
has urged its allies to compromise their constitutional and international 
commitments to meet the new threat. 
As I will show, the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 in both do-
mestic and foreign policy is not what one would typically expect of a true 
emergency; namely, quick responses that violate the constitutional order 
followed by a progressive normalization.  Instead, the American govern-
ment (including all three branches working together) responded with much 
constitutional care right after 9/11, fully aware that the temptation would be 
to overreact.  The greater abuses have come as 9/11 recedes and executive 
policy has turned toward larger and larger constitutional exceptions, with 
the active acquiescence so far of both Congress and the courts.  The reac-
tion to 9/11 was not the declaration of a sudden emergency that has gradu-
ally abated, but instead has involved a measured immediate response fol-
lowed by ever-expanding justifications for the assertion of executive and 
unilateral power. 
Following a quick tour of American governmental responses to 9/11, I 
return in Part III to the general idea of the state of exception and ask why it 
is that America’s democratic allies, also shaken by 9/11, have generally re-
sponded so differently.  I argue that the Schmittian conception of the state 
of exception is no longer considered an acceptable frame of response for 
many of our allies, particularly those in Europe.  It was precisely the catas-
trophe of Weimar, the rise of fascism, the experience of communism, and 
the history of total wars in the twentieth century that has caused a revision 
of the theoretical conception of the state of exception among many of our 
European allies and among many new democratic governments elsewhere.  
The idea of the state of exception from which the Bush administration has 
proceeded has met sharp international criticism, precisely because the in-
ternational community has moved on from the Schmittian framework to 
which the Bush administration’s response bears strong resemblance.  Carl 
Schmitt’s justification for the state of exception—and by extension the 
Bush administration’s justification for the response to the terrorist attacks 
of 2001—presupposes a world that no longer exists, even after 9/11.  As I 
argue, many of America’s allies have seen 9/11 not as a moment when the 
rule of law should be suspended, but precisely a moment when the rule of 
law needs to be strengthened. 
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I.  THE EXCEPTION 
What is (or more precisely, what has been) the state of exception?  
Though it has gone by different names over time, the state of exception—or 
reason of state, or state of emergency, or état de siège5—has referred to the 
situation in which a state is confronted by a mortal threat and responds by 
doing things that would never be justifiable in normal times, given the 
working principles of that state.  The state of exception uses justifications 
that only work in extremis, when the state is facing a challenge so severe 
that it must violate its own principles to save itself.  But of course, the state 
of exception is dangerous precisely because it is so subject to abuse.  Who 
decides whether the situation is one that deserves to be called exceptional?  
If some principles of the state are suspended in a crisis, what prevents all of 
them from being suspended?  And how can the normal situation be restored 
when the state of exception is over? 
As both Clinton Rossiter6 and Carl Friedrich7 noted in their grand sur-
veys of the historical roots of the idea of the state of exception during the 
Cold War, such mortal threats to the political community have been around 
since the origin of complex political communities, and so both politicians 
and political theorists have always had to confront the justifiable limits of 
the normal state of governance.  Aristotle’s Politics details how an elected 
dictator was charged with restoring domestic order and fighting off aggres-
sive neighbors in ancient Greece.8  The dictatorship in Rome provided a 
way to handle severe threats to the institutions of the Republic by elaborat-
ing and following established procedures for doing so.9  For Machiavelli’s 
Prince, the self-interest that grounded his actions was never regularized in 
what a modern reader would think of as constitutional institutions.10  But in 
giving advice to the Prince who would surely face periodic crises, Machia-
velli issued prudential warnings: 
[Now in a well-ordered republic it should never be necessary to resort to extra-
constitutional measures; for although they may for the time be beneficial, yet 
the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established of disregard-
ing the laws for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under 
that pretext for evil purposes.  Thus no republic will ever be perfect if she has 
 5 For the terminological fine-tuning, see JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS:  THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY 1 n.1 (1994). 
 6 CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP:  CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES (1948). 
 7 C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE:  THE SURVIVAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER (1957). 
 8 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS:  BOOKS III AND IV (Richard Robinson trans., Clarendon Press 1995) (335-
323 B.C.). 
 9 As Rossiter notes, when a situation of emergency was imminent, consent of both the senate and 
the consuls was necessary for a dictator to be appointed to fend off the crisis.  Dictators were never 
permitted to appoint other dictators.  ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 19–20.  The terms of the dictators were 
strictly limited to six months.  Id. at 23. 
 10 FRIEDRICH, supra note 7, at 32. 
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not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency, and 
fixed rules for applying it.11
Later, Jean Bodin thought that the Prince should be accountable only to 
God and not to his fellow mortals for what was done as a matter of neces-
sity,12 which effectively reduced the normative influence of anything like 
representative government or its institutions. 
In short, while political theorists wrestled for centuries with the ques-
tion of whether emergency government was justifiable, it might be easy for 
those of us living in constitutional democracies to dismiss their analyses 
because the political and historical contexts about which they wrote were 
so different from those of the present day.  In particular, the rise of secular, 
democratic, and constitutional government seems to have created a differ-
ent dilemma of justification, precisely because executives in constitutional 
democracies are supposed to be accountable to and removable by elector-
ates, and also because modern constitutions embrace both separation of 
powers and justiciable systems of rights.  For an executive to seize power 
and suspend rights under a democratic constitutional government is an en-
tirely different matter, normatively speaking, than for a monarch (even a 
constitutional monarch) to do so.  In a modern constitutional democracy, 
the suspension of separation of powers and of substantial bodies of rights to 
cope with an emergency requires justification in terms of both the viability 
of accountable government and the long-term respect for rights in the con-
stitutional order.  Thus, while monarchies generally possess some residual 
elements of unaccountability and of extraordinary executive powers, repub-
lican government attempts to purge both.  States of emergency, then, pose 
more difficult problems of justification in republics than in monarchies. 
Written constitutions before the twentieth century did not typically at-
tempt to regulate a state of exception in detail.  The U.S. Constitution for-
bids suspension of the “[p]rivilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”13  
This is an indirect admission that there may be times when the normal rules 
do not apply and in such times, the courts may be prohibited from review-
ing the legality of detentions.  But the location of this power of suspension 
as a power of the Congress, given to it along with the power “[t]o declare 
War,”14 indicates that emergency government was never meant to be re-
served for executive action alone.  That Congress’s role in a state of emer-
gency was meant to be primary may be further supported by the Third 
Amendment, which says that quartering of troops in private homes in a 
time of war shall only be done if there is a law allowing it.15  Given that 
 11 THE DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI bk. I, discourse 34, at 203 (Luigi Ricci and E.R.P. 
Vincent trans., Modern Library, 1950) (1513). 
 12 For an elaboration, see FRIEDRICH, supra note 7, at 72–73. 
 13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 14 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 15 Id. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent 
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”). 
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laws must be passed by Congress, the Third Amendment in effect says that 
no unilateral commander-in-chief power may intrude upon the inviolability 
of the home.  In time of war, rebellion, and other emergencies, then, Con-
gress was given a strong role, almost certainly the lead role, in the process 
of emergency governance envisioned in the U.S. Constitution.  While 
emergencies may result in a temporary suspension of judicial power 
through limitation of the writ of habeas corpus, the emergency provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution do not allow suspension of congressional power.  
Instead, they seem to require that the president’s own power be subordinate 
to that of the Congress at such a time. 
European constitutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries tenta-
tively began to elaborate the idea of a constitutional state of emergency, but 
typically left all important details to statutes.  One could argue that the 
French Constitutions of 1795 and 1800 were constitutions written only for 
a time of emergency.  The Constitution of the Directorate in 1795 estab-
lished a committee of rulers with nearly unlimited powers, and the Napole-
onic Constitution of 1800 consolidated Napoleon’s power grab by pro-
claiming him, by proper name, to be the primary head of state.16  Neither of 
these were constitutions in the modern and liberal sense, ensuring separa-
tion of powers and respect for rights.  The French Constitution of 1848, 
however, included as Article 106 a general provision that said that a law 
should determine when a state of siege could be declared, but left details to 
that law.17  General framework statutes passed in France in 1849 and again 
in 1878 specified how a state of siege could be determined, what new and 
exceptional powers could be taken by the government in such a time, and 
how the state of siege would be ended.18  In much of the nineteenth century 
in Europe, however, even when constitutions did try to establish separation 
of powers and respect for the rights of citizens, they typically broke down 
under stress, and had to be rewritten when the crises were over.  The invo-
cation of emergency provisions typically spelled the end of the constitu-
tional order itself.  The periods between breakdown and reconstruction 
were simply non-constitutional moments. 
Against this background, the Weimar Constitution, written in Germany 
in the shadow of the First World War, tried harder than most constitutions 
to ensure that constitutional failure in a time of emergency did not occur.  
To that end, the constitutional drafters inserted into the text Article 48, a 
provision that defined rather precisely a constitutional state of emergency.19  
 16 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
186–93 (1995). 
 17 LA CONSTITUTION DE LA SECONDE REPUBLIQUE of 1848 [Constitution], art. 106 (Fr.). 
 18 ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 81. 
 19 Article 48 states: 
If any state fails to perform the duties imposed upon it by the federal constitution or by 
federal laws, the president may hold it to the performance thereof with the aid of the armed 
forces. 
If the public safety and order in the German Reich is materially disturbed or endangered, 
the president may take the necessary measures to restore public safety and order, intervening if 
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Article 48 gave the president extraordinary powers to cope with extraordi-
nary threats to the system, up to and including both the suspension of a par-
ticular and limited set of rights as well as the use of armed forces to quell 
domestic disturbances.  The inclusion of Article 48 in the Weimar Consti-
tution did not signal a flight of constitutional abstraction; the need to have a 
constitutional state of emergency provision was obvious to all who worked 
on the text.  With Germany in chaos after its defeat in the First World 
War,20 and with the German political scene marked by the blossoming of 
radical political parties advocating extreme remedies for extreme times,21 
some method for the defense of the new constitutional government had to 
be inserted into the new constitution.  Article 48 was adopted by a “deci-
sive majority”22 of the constitutional assembly. 
In the thirteen years that the Weimar Constitution limped along before 
being simply suspended, Article 48 was invoked more than 250 times,23 
130 times in the first few years of the constitutional order alone.24  As Ros-
siter has noted, “[l]acking the emergency competence provided in Article 
48, the rulers of republican Germany could hardly have launched their in-
fant democracy into the stormy seas of postwar Europe.”25  At the start, Ar-
ticle 48 seemed to work as planned; it repeatedly saved the new democratic 
order from being undermined by domestic extremists. 
Many of the deepest constitutional issues surrounding the use of the 
state of emergency were never solved legally or politically, however, and 
the uncertainties surrounding the legitimate use of Article 48 only magni-
fied with time.  For one thing, no German parliament in Weimar ever 
passed the general framework law that Article 48 required to regulate the 
uses of a state of emergency in more detail.  As a result, the specific types 
of crises that could trigger Article 48 were never specified, and Article 48 
was used for ever-widening types of state maladies, from civil violence at 
necessary with the aid of the armed forces.  To this end he may temporarily suspend, in whole 
or in part, the fundamental rights established by Articles 114 [personal liberty], 115 [inviolabil-
ity of dwelling places], 117 [secrecy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications], 118 
[freedom in the expression of opinion], 123 [freedom of assembly], 124 [freedom of associa-
tion] and 153 [private property]. 
The president must immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures adopted by authority 
of the first or second paragraphs of this Article.  These measures are to be revoked upon demand 
of the Reichstag. 
In cases where delay would be dangerous[,] the cabinet of a state government may for its 
own territory take provisional measures as specified in paragraph 2.  These measures are to be 
revoked on demand of the president or of the Reichstag. 
Further details will be regulated by federal law. 
WEIMAR CONST. of 1919, art. 48 (F.R.G.), translated in FREDERICK MUNDELL WATKINS, THE FAILURE 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 15 (1939). 
 20 For a dire description, see WATKINS, supra note 19, at 6–7. 
 21 Id. at 25–35. 
 22 ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 35.  For more on the history of Article 48, see id. at 33–37; WATKINS, 
supra note 19, at 13–14. 
 23 ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 33. 
 24 Id. at 38. 
 25 Id. 
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the start, to economic crises by the middle, to merely sharp political dis-
agreement by the end.  Furthermore, while at the beginning of the Repub-
lic, in the early 1920s, emergency decrees were often backed up by legisla-
tion that normalized these decrees quickly thereafter, this legislative 
validation soon went missing into the 1930s as the popular support for par-
ties that opposed the constitutional order translated into more and more ex-
tremist representatives in the parliament, who failed wherever possible to 
do what was required to maintain the constitutional system.  By the time 
the parliament was finally dissolved,26 making the executive decrees au-
thorized under Article 48 the only effective source of law, the institutions 
of the Weimar Constitution that might have prevented such a consolidation 
of power (federalism, independent courts, parliament) had all been neutral-
ized by the prior creeping use of an ever-expanding Article 48.27
The well-known story of the collapse of the Weimar Constitution is re-
counted here because it is both a cautionary tale for modern constitutional-
ists and also because the prolonged period of crisis that Weimar experi-
enced produced theoretical justifications for the state of emergency that are 
in many ways more resonant to the modern ear.  As a result, the place to 
start in thinking about theoretical justifications for states of emergency in a 
system of democratically accountable, representative, and rights-respecting 
government is with Carl Schmitt, who not only attempted to justify the 
state of exception in a constitutional democracy but who, in the end, played 
a role in the demise of the Weimar Constitution itself. 
Carl Schmitt famously begins his work Political Theology with the sen-
tence:  “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”28  By equating the 
sovereign with the capacity to define when a situation can be handled 
within normal rules and when it must be treated as an exception to normal 
governance, Schmitt takes as a defining feature of a political sovereign the 
ability to operate outside juridical “normality.”  In fact, it is precisely the 
 26 Article 25 of the Weimar Constitution allowed the president to dissolve the parliament once for 
any reason.  WATKINS, supra note 19, at 22–23.  But Article 48’s check on emergency powers indicated 
that the parliament could, by a majority vote, require the state of emergency to be lifted.  Id. at 15.  Ob-
viously, if the parliament were constitutionally dissolved under Article 25, it would not be around to 
exercise the separation-of-powers check built into Article 48. 
 27 In light of the argument to follow, it is interesting to note that one of the first commentators on 
the Weimar Constitution to notice the possibility that Article 48 could be used in this unchecked way 
was Carl Schmitt, who wrote in 1922: 
According to article 48 of the German constitution of 1919, the exception is declared by the 
president of the Reich but is under the control of parliament, the Reichstag, which can at any 
time demand its suspension.  This provision corresponds to the development and practice of the 
liberal constitutional state, which attempts to repress the question of sovereignty by a division 
and mutual control of competences. . . .  If applied without check, it would grant exceptional 
powers in the same way as article 14 of the [French] Charter of 1815, which made the monarch 
sovereign. 
CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY:  FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 11 
(George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). 
 28 Id. at 5. 
  
May 2004] STATES OF EXCEPTION 9 
 
unanticipated nature of the emergency that calls for such powers.  Accord-
ing to Schmitt: 
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out 
what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an 
extreme emergency and of how it is to be eliminated.  The precondition as well 
as the content of jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily be 
unlimited.  From the liberal constitutional point of view, there would be no ju-
risdictional competence at all.  The most guidance the constitution can provide 
is to indicate who can act in such a case.29
For Schmitt, liberal constitutions fool their citizens if it appears that 
these constitutions could have accounted for everything.  There will always 
be moments outside the constitutional range of legitimate expectation, and 
legitimate constitutional action under unanticipated and extreme threats can 
never be fully elucidated within a constitution’s terms.  This is a clear chal-
lenge to the idea that the rule of law must constrain rulers and ruled alike, 
for if the rule of law constrains the sovereign entirely, then the sovereign 
should not be able to claim exception to the rules.  But an emergency 
makes visible the incompleteness of the constitutional design because by its 
very nature, it cannot be predicted in its particulars in advance.  In practice, 
Schmitt seems to say, a liberal constitution can therefore never be com-
plete.  The ability of the sovereign to act outside the rules in the case of 
emergency, however, is precisely the signature element that constitutes 
sovereignty and it is something with which liberal constitutions cannot dis-
pense unless they are to be destroyed by the exceptional challenge. 
If the sovereign can claim exception, then the sovereign must have all 
of the lesser-included powers—for example, the power to decide when the 
situation has ceased to be “normal,” thereby justifying the declaration of 
emergency, the power to determine when the emergency is over so that the 
rule of law may be safely restored, and the power to specify which political 
actors normally protected by the rule of law lose their protection in the in-
terim.  Rather than seeing the rule of law as something that must be fol-
lowed for its own sake as a way of ensuring the integrity of the state, 
Schmitt argues that the rule of law may prevent a polity from defending it-
self in the event of a serious political crisis, and that the capacity of a ruler 
to maintain the very existence of the state may depend on that ruler not be-
ing bound by the rules.30  In fact, it is the most distinctive power of a sover-
eign—not simply an incidental and unusual capacity—that he has the 
power to suspend the law. 
Schmitt justified his view that a sovereign must possess the ability to 
determine the state of exception in a sociological31 manner: 
 29 Id. at 6–7. 
 30 Id. at 12 (“The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-
preservation, as one would say.”). 
 31 Schmitt, however, said explicitly that the exception is a juristic and not a sociological category:  
“It would be a distortion of the schematic disjunction between sociology and jurisprudence if one were 
to say that the exception has no juristic significance and is therefore ‘sociology.’” Id. at 13.  By this, he 
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Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can 
be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations.  The norm re-
quires a homogeneous medium.  This effective normal situation is not a mere 
“superficial presupposition” that a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs pre-
cisely to [the norm’s] immanent validity.  There exists no norm that is applica-
ble to chaos.  For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, 
and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actu-
ally exists. 
All law is “situational law.”32
According to this analysis, the juridical order itself requires for its 
maintenance a regular field of life, a habitus or a certain taken-for-granted 
predictability, in order for the small deviations that the juridical order con-
trols to be noticeable.  If half the population becomes murderers, then the 
law against murder is no longer a purely juridical matter.  Instead, when the 
field of life becomes so disordered that the jurist can no longer distinguish 
between the normal and the abnormal, then the sovereign must act—in 
Schmitt’s view—to restore the condition of normality necessary for any 
rule-of-law system to make sense.  The state of exception is, as a result, the 
means for restoring the order necessary for legality to exist.  The political 
moment that justifies invoking the state of exception is the moment when 
the possibility of restoring a field of order requires that the rules themselves 
do not apply to the means of restoration. 
Moreover, according to Schmitt, it is the exception that gives meaning 
to the rule in the first place, since one cannot understand a rule except by 
noting the edges of its applicability.33  The rule gains meaning from publi-
cizing what is not covered in its ambit.34  It is therefore the exception that 
defines the extent and core meaning of the rule.  Through exceptions—and 
nonexceptions—the juridical order comes to have its distinctive shape and 
character. 
A more comprehensive “state of exception” of the sort that arises in po-
litical crises implicates not just an individual rule, but the limits of the ju-
ridical field itself.  Invoking a state of exception to the juridical field as a 
whole indicates, as in the case of the individual exception, the defining lim-
its of the taken-for-granted condition.  The possibility of a state of excep-
tion existing outside the juridical field but still within the political field cre-
ates the condition for the separation of law and politics.  It opens up the 
practical reality that the rule of law may cover only part of what politics 
seems to mean that the exception is a category within jurisprudence even if recognition of its distinctive 
markers requires sociological judgment to recognize. 
 32 Id. 
 33 In many ways, this parallels the Durkheimian tradition of argument about the role of deviance in 
maintaining the boundaries of a social community.  See KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966) 
(arguing that the punishment of deviant conduct publicizes the boundaries of a community and there-
fore enables the community to better understand its moral architecture). 
 34 This point is particularly well-elaborated in the analysis of Schmitt in GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO 
SACER:  SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 15–29 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 
1998) (1995). 
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may do.  Consequently, some of what counts as politics must exist outside 
the field of law.  If, in Schmitt’s formulation, the distinctive capacity of the 
sovereign is to define the exception, then the sovereign can never be fully 
bound by law.  The broader significance of the state of exception, then, is 
to define the basic qualities of the sovereign’s responsibility, only some of 
which are legally defined. 
Schmitt’s analysis echoes some of the logical puzzles of nineteenth and 
early twentieth century legal positivism—which is not surprising since le-
gal positivists were among his main interlocutors in the theoretical debates 
he entered in the 1920s and 1930s in his native Germany.35  For legal posi-
tivists, all law is the command of the sovereign; it exists as a factual matter 
distinguishable from its normative advisability.  But if law is in fact just 
that which the sovereign commands, then what can (normatively) bind the 
sovereign?  Schmitt’s answer is broadly consistent with that of the legal 
positivists of his day:  in the end, the sovereign can only be bound by vol-
untary acceptance of his own commands.36  That meant, for Schmitt, that 
the sovereign could also exempt himself from his own commands when the 
circumstances dictated.37  What separated Schmitt from his positivist col-
leagues was his concern with the practical realities of governance over the 
abstract properties of concepts.  In the context of Weimar Germany, where 
the constitutional order lurched from one unstable government to the next 
and where the economy lurched along with it, determining the legitimate 
response to immediate crisis was more than a purely theoretical issue.  
Schmitt’s view—offered against defenders of parliamentarianism—was 
that liberal parliamentary systems would simply collapse without the deci-
sive judgments of a single sovereign who was vested with the power to 
suspend the rules in order to save them.38  In fact, before his eyes in Wei-
mar, liberal parliamentary government seemed always on the brink of fail-
ure. 
Moreover, Schmitt added that it may be the sovereign’s obligation to 
violate the normal rules of governance because the integrity and viability of 
the state itself was the sovereign’s responsibility.39  If the state were under 
mortal threat, Schmitt believed, then the sovereign had to act.40  Preserva-
tion of the possibility of an ordered life, so crucial in his analysis of the or-
dinary juridical field, had to take priority over the normal operation of that 
ordinary juridical field in times that were not ordinary.  Exceptional means, 
then, were warranted in exceptional times.  And it was the job of the sover-
eign to decide which times were exceptional. 
 35 For more on these debates, see ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE:  SCHMITT IN 
WEIMAR (forthcoming  2004) and PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRISIS OF 
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997). 
 36 SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 12. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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As it happened, the Weimar Constitution concretely lacked any guid-
ance for determining when a situation had gotten to the point of being con-
stitutionally ungovernable, and its only effective check on the power of the 
president to declare a state of emergency turned out to be relatively easy to 
undermine.  As a consequence, whenever the president believed that an 
emergency was imminent, the president could suspend many ordinary con-
stitutional rules of operation.41  While Article 48 required that the presiden-
tially declared state of emergency had to end when the lower chamber of 
the parliament so demanded, this provision interacted badly with Article 25 
of the Constitution, which allowed the president to dissolve the parliament.  
Once the president declared a state of emergency under Article 48 and dis-
solved the parliament for the same reasons under Article 25, Article 48’s 
“checks and balances provision” (that the lower house of the parliament 
could force the president to end the state of emergency) was no longer ef-
fective.  Through these absolutely constitutional mechanisms, the unconsti-
tutional state of Nazi Germany was born. 
The world viewed (and experienced) with horror what happened next.  
Nazi Germany, with Schmitt providing justificatory support for the use of 
emergency powers, attacked its neighbors, conquered much of Europe 
(with massive devastation of people and property), launched its purge of 
European Jews and Roma, created the camps, and committed genocide.  
The concrete events are rather a lot to attribute to Schmitt, but his justifica-
tion of emergency government assisted in rationalizing the early phases of 
the Nazi seizure of power precisely because he sketched a compelling por-
trait of the need and justification for the state of exception.  As Europe 
struggled to recover from the dislocation and destruction of the Second 
World War, it was not surprising that many of those who had suffered from 
the consequences of the war had second thoughts about emergency powers 
and their legitimate use.  I will return to the European story in Part III of 
this Article, but suffice it to say for now that much of the effort to avoid re-
peating these mistakes involved placing constitutional faith in strengthened 
courts, which were the least tainted political institution to emerge from un-
der the rubble of conquered and conquering states.  The solution to the 
state-of-emergency problem, as it was elaborated after the war in much of 
Europe, was to specify the legal stages of the exception in such a way that 
an unconstitutional state could never emerge through emergency provi-
sions.  For example, when the post-war German Basic Law was amended 
in 1968 to include the emergency powers that had been deliberately omitted 
when the constitution was first written, the amendment clearly specified 
that the Constitutional Court had to remain open and able to hear chal-
 41 See supra note 19 for a listing of the concrete constitutional provisions whose suspension Article 
48 authorized.  These included inviolability of both the person and private homes; secrecy of mail and 
postal communications; freedom of speech, assembly and association; and the right to private property. 
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lenges throughout any state of emergency and that the executive could not 
make a declaration of emergency alone.42
The lessons Americans learned from the horrors of World War II were 
quite different from those taken away from the war by the Europeans.  The 
difference can be seen in how American occupying forces in Germany in-
tervened in the constitutional drafting process in 1948.  Americans took the 
most substantial interest in ensuring a strengthened and unamendable fed-
eralism,43 rather than in insisting upon a different way of thinking about 
emergency powers.  The ability to subvert federalism was, in the American 
view, the primary structural weakness of the Weimar Constitution, not the 
use of emergency powers to radically increase executive powers. 
From the position of their own newly dominant role in the world after 
the war, American leaders diagnosed that they had failed in the 1930s to 
see the signs of an oncoming menace early enough.  In the immediate post-
war period in the United States, foreign policy was guided by the firm con-
viction that one should not give any benefit of the doubt to a potential en-
emy, lest one be guilty of appeasement: 
The word appeaser, easily thrown about, became the most pungent of foreign 
policy expletives, the quickest way to silence a dissenter, forestall diplomacy.  
And, of course, appeasement connoted weakness, and so suggested blindness 
and stupidity or, worse, something approaching treason.  Again and again, the 
lesson of Munich was explicitly summoned for interpreting events and shaping 
policies in the postwar years. 
So it was that “Hitler’s salami tactics” over the years became the “domino 
theory.”44
Rather than being preoccupied with how to prevent a “regime of hor-
ror,”45 which was the German constitutional challenge after the war, 
Americans were more concerned with empowering government to meet 
new threats.  Rather than finding new ways to strengthen the resilience of 
the constitutional order and to place limits on executive power, which were 
the pressing German constitutional issues, Americans were more concerned 
with expanding executive power to cope with dangers that faced the United 
States because of its newly dominant role as the only advanced industrial 
country left relatively unscathed after the war.  In this new world, as 
American policymakers quickly saw, the threats were quick to materialize 
and, sooner rather than later, the Cold War was the result. 
 42 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 80a, 115g (F.R.G.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  GERMANY 67, 87 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003). 
 43 For evidence of the American role in the drafting of the German Basic Law, see generally PETER 
MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963). 
 44 DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE:  THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STATE 198 (1977). 
 45 Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Interpretation After Regimes of Horror, in STUDIES IN LAW, 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY (Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat eds., forthcoming 2005). 
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The origins of the Cold War have been disputed often enough;46 for the 
purposes of this Article, one need only observe that the onset of the Cold 
War had substantial constitutional consequences for the United States.  The 
Cold War was not the first time that the United States had endured some-
thing like a crisis government.  But the previous crises—the Civil War, 
World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II—had been imagined 
to be of limited duration.  While they were accompanied by a serious cata-
logue of constitutional violations, such violations were eventually con-
demned as being excesses of a particular time, not affecting America’s 
normal constitutional operation or its constitutional aspirations.47  The Cold 
War was different:  it promised an indefinite future of crises and a perpet-
ual alteration of both separation of powers and individual rights.  In short, 
the Cold War ushered in an era of “permanent emergency” in which the 
constitutional sacrifices that were to be made were not clearly temporary or 
reversible. 
The constitutional effects of the Cold War have been well-documented.  
One was the rise of what Harold Koh has called the “national security con-
stitution,” which concentrated foreign affairs power almost exclusively in 
the presidency.48  In the mid-1930s the Supreme Court decision in United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. had, at least in dicta, indicated that 
the power to conduct foreign affairs lay exclusively with the president.49  
But the institutional entrenchment of that extreme understanding of presi-
dential powers in foreign policy came in the post-World War II period with 
the National Security Act of 1947.50  The National Security Act emerged 
originally as a proposal from the armed services to ward off a serious effort 
 46 The dispute roughly centers on who was more at fault for the start of the Cold War—the Soviet 
Union or the United States.  Immediate post-war American political analysts emphasized the expansion-
ist and aggressive aims of the Soviet Union as a reason for launching the United States’  new state of 
permanent war.  Later, American historians, writing in the age of Vietnam, tended to view the historical 
evidence differently, emphasizing that many domestic considerations led the United States to interpret 
signals from the Soviet Union in the most negative possible light when they might have been under-
stood as less threatening to American interests.  For more on the historiographic debate over the origins 
of the Cold War, see PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM:  THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 447–57 (1988). 
 47 Some of the major exceptions—Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus upon delegation of this 
power by Congress, the Palmer Raids, the various attempts by President Roosevelt to circumvent judi-
cial disapproval of the economic emergency measures during the Depression, the initiation of martial 
law in Hawaii during the Second World War, and the detention of Japanese-Americans during that 
war—are generally portrayed as being unusual and temporary moments in American history, at least in 
constitutional retrospect.  But not all have been legally repudiated.  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending 
Korematsu?:  Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (examining the claim 
that the U.S. government has often viewed its abrogation of individual rights during security crises as 
unnecessary in retrospect). 
 48 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67–69 (1990). 
 49 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936). 
 50 Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. ch. 15 
(2000)). 
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to merge the services at the end of the war.51  Instead, what resulted from a 
combination of bureaucratic wrangling (the services fought back against 
the merger) and the perception of an external threat (the Soviet Union 
tightened its hold over Eastern Europe) was a new unification of the com-
mand structure of the military in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the creation 
of a new body, the National Security Council, that would give foreign pol-
icy advice directly to the president.  Perhaps most importantly, a Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) was formed that was not under the command 
of the individual forces, as had been the case before, but that was instead 
directly accountable to the president.  The National Security Act reorgan-
ized the foreign policy apparatus of the United States and placed it more 
firmly in the hands of the president, out of the reach of Congress.  Though 
Congress had passed this law, Congress seemed to envision no role for it-
self in the ongoing operation of the new national security bureaucracy. 
The National Security Act was accompanied by a new view of the 
world, one that had the term “national security” at its heart.  The expression 
“national security” had not been in common use before World War II.52  
But its preeminence during and after the war signaled a new understanding 
of what the foreign policy of the United States was designed to protect.  In 
particular, it allowed a wide range of actions far afield in the world to count 
as direct threats to the United States.  As Daniel Yergin put it: 
[W]hat characterizes the concept of national security?  It postulates the interre-
latedness of so many different political, economic, and military factors that de-
velopments halfway around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct im-
pact on America’s core interests.  Virtually every development in the world is 
perceived to be potentially crucial.  An adverse turn of events anywhere endan-
gers the United States.  Problems in foreign relations are viewed as urgent and 
immediate threats.  Thus, desirable foreign policy goals are translated into is-
sues of national survival, and the range of threats becomes limitless.  The doc-
trine is characterized by expansiveness, a tendency to push the subjective 
boundaries of security outward to more and more areas, to encompass more and 
more geography and more and more problems.  It demands that the country as-
sume a posture of military preparedness; the nation must be on permanent 
alert. . . .  All of this leads to a paradox:  the growth of American power did not 
lead to a greater sense of assuredness, but rather to an enlargement of the range 
of perceived threats that must urgently be confronted.53
The idea of national security, permanently emblazoned on the signature 
legislation of the Cold War, required that the United States maintain a per-
manent army in a state of perpetual readiness because small events any-
where in the world could be signs of a mortal danger to the nation.  “Na-
tional security” was eventually filled with the realization that the primary 
enemy of the United States had weapons that could destroy the entire coun-
try—and ultimately, the whole world—on short notice.  Little wonder that 
 51 YERGIN, supra note 44, at 336–38. 
 52 Id. at 194. 
 53 Id. at 196. 
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the Supreme Court’s apparent grant of executive power in Curtiss-Wright 
was taken up with special urgency as the Cold War settled in.  A president 
could not possibly debate policy with Congress while there was an incom-
ing Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.  Nuclear missiles left no time for de-
mocratic debate. 
The edginess that produced the Cold War also produced a very large 
number of emergencies.  The newly established National Security Council 
got to work and produced Paper 68 in April 1950, an analysis that provided 
“the first comprehensive statement of a national strategy after World War 
II.”54  It predicted “an indefinite period of tension and danger.”55  The per-
petual legal state of emergency began shortly thereafter.  President Truman 
first declared a state of emergency in response to the deteriorating situation 
in Korea in December 1950,56 a state of emergency that lasted nearly a 
quarter of a century.57  Under the policy of “containment,” the United 
States saw every attempt—or possible attempt—by the Soviet Union to ex-
pand its influence as a direct threat to the United States.  As a result, the 
emergency declaration of 1950 was used to justify a number of other for-
eign actions in the fight against communism. 
Domestically, as part of the same effort, Truman announced the power 
to classify government information bearing on national security.58  This lat-
ter move made it very difficult for anyone, including Congress, to check on 
what was being done in the name of national security.  Under the cloak of 
national security secrecy, the U.S. government engaged for decades in 
abuses of rights to gather information relevant in the struggle against the 
Soviet Union and to do whatever was necessary to prepare for imminent 
war.  As the “Church Committee”—named for its chair, Senator Frank 
Church—found in the mid-1970s in its investigations into domestic surveil-
lance since World War II: 
—Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed 
in the United States by the CIA between 1953–1973, producing a CIA comput-
erized index of nearly one and one-half million names. 
—At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI 
between 1940–1966 in eight U.S. cities. 
—Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and sepa-
rate files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domes-
tic groups during the course of [the] CIA’s Operation CHAOS (1967–1973). 
—Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United States were 
obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret ar-
rangement with three United States telegraph companies. 
 54 Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1401 (1989) 
(quoting Senator Henry Jackson’s characterization of National Security Council Paper 68). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (Dec. 19, 1950). 
 57 Lobel, supra note 54, at 1401. 
 58 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 24, 1951). 
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—An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army 
intelligence files created between the mid-1960s and 1971. 
—Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created 
by the Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations 
were started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria. 
—At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of 
persons to be rounded up in the event of a “national emergency.”59
In addition, the U.S. government irradiated, without their consent, more 
than 250,000 American citizens (most, but not all, in the military) in ex-
periments to test the effects of nuclear weapons.60  In 1952, Congress ap-
propriated $775,000 to establish six detention camps under the emergency 
detention provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950, though the camps 
were not used in the end.61  McCarthyism was the extreme edge of the ac-
tive attacks on suspected communists,62 but the domestic fight against 
communists led to a systematic reinterpretation of the rights of both citi-
zens and aliens.63  The persecution of suspected communists through black-
listing, criminal prosecution, and even execution64 was accompanied by an 
alarming expansion of the surveillance powers of the U.S. government, 
surveillance that also included actions taken to disrupt groups and the per-
 59 S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. 2, at pp. 6-7 (1976) (citations omitted), microformed on CIS No. 76-
S963-2 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 60 Jill Elaine Hasday, Civil War as Paradigm:  Reestablishing the Rule of Law at the End of the 
Cold War, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 1996, at 129, 138. 
 61 The details can be found in ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN 
AMERICA:  FROM 1870 TO 1976, at 322–66 (2001). 
 62 For the history of the McCarthy period in original documents, see generally MCCARTHYISM:  THE 
GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Albert Fried ed. 1997). 
 63 I have elaborated elsewhere how this strong influence of the Soviet Union in American constitu-
tional law generated, upon closer inspection, a mixed legacy.  Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and 
Aversive Constitutionalism:  The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influences Through Negative 
Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003).  The restrictions on civil liberties evident during the domestic 
search for communists occurred at the same time as the expansion of civil liberties for African Ameri-
cans, and the two were connected.  MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE 
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).  The Truman and Eisenhower administrations, seeing the 
importance of the outcome of the Cold War in winning the hearts and minds of the about-to-be-
liberated colonies in Africa, repeatedly urged in briefs to the Supreme Court that African Americans be 
assisted in their struggle for equality.  The Soviet Union had used the lack of equal rights of blacks in 
the United States as an effective propaganda tool in its Cold War effort to win over the newly establish-
ing states.  Successive American administrations saw an important foreign policy interest in providing 
equal rights for African Americans in order to counter the Soviet threat.  Id. 
 64 The case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg has recently been revisited with the opening of the Soviet 
archive, which seems to show that Julius was in fact a spy but not responsible for the disclosure of 
atomic secrets, the specific allegation that resulted in his conviction and execution.  There is no evi-
dence to suggest that Ethel was ever a spy.  Her brother, David Greenglass, who has been the key wit-
ness against her in the trial, admitted several years ago in an interview on 60 Minutes II that he lied in 
his testimony in order to protect himself and his wife.  60 Minutes II:  The Traitor (CBS television 
broadcast, Dec. 5, 2001).  Some suggest that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover knew of Ethel’s innocence, 
but insisted that charges be pressed as a way of leveraging information from Julius, who could have 
secured her release by cooperating with the government. 
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sonal lives of their members well into the 1970s.65  Between the 1950s and 
the 1970s, Congress passed about 470 statutes that empowered the execu-
tive branch to act under emergency powers.  These statutes delegated 
“power to the executive over virtually every facet of American life.”66
Following the intense political battles over Vietnam and Watergate in 
the 1970s, when the presidency itself came into disrepute, Congress re-
claimed some of its powers in the perpetual state of emergency.  In one 
statute, Congress terminated all existing states of emergency and provided 
more stringent rules for how such emergencies should be declared in the 
future.67  But in another statute, Congress extended the reach of states of 
emergency to international economic affairs.68  The War Powers Resolution 
represented another attempt by Congress in this period to restore a role for 
the legislative branch in committing American troops abroad,69 and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was designed to provide 
some judicial check on the ability of the executive to engage in domestic 
spying on those who were thought to be part of foreign-originated plots 
without having to meet the high hurdles of the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement.70
As most observers have noted, however, all of these attempts by Con-
gress to reclaim some of its lost foreign policy powers were, and continue 
to be, quite ineffectual.71  Not only has the president asked permission of 
the Congress before committing the country to military engagements or 
foreign policy obligations only as a matter of courtesy rather than as a mat-
ter of law (and then only sometimes), but Congress has typically not at-
tempted to enforce any of its powers under the 1970s-era legislation.72  The 
 65 This campaign of domestic surveillance, often starting to root out communist influence, was 
documented by the “Church Committee,” chaired by Senator Frank Church.  The official name of the 
committee was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  See generally S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976), 
microformed on CIS No. 76-S963 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 66 Lobel, supra note 54, at 1408. 
 67 National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 101, 90 Stat. 1255, 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)). 
 68 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 202, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 
(1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)). 
 69 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–46, 1547–48 (2000)). 
 70 Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101–11, 92 Stat. 1783, 1783–96 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801–11 (2000)). 
 71 See KOH, supra note 48, at 116 (“Congress’s ambitious attempts during the post-Vietnam era to 
reassert its constitutional role in foreign policy making have met with limited success.”); Hasday, supra 
note 60, at 139 (“Congress’s dominant foreign relations strategy during the Cold War, one that ulti-
mately did more than its emergency legislation to support crisis government, was consistent acquies-
cence to presidential assertions of power.”); Lobel, supra note 54, at 1414 (describing the success of 
congressional efforts to limit executive emergency powers as “dismal”); see also Joel R. Paul, The 
Geopolitical Constitution:  Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 
(1998) (showing how the president has evaded the constitutional requirement of gaining Senate consent 
to treaties by using the parallel device of executive agreements). 
 72 It is hard to tell how much of this was congressional lethargy and how much was caused by the 
decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which struck down the legislative veto, the primary 
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Cold War state of affairs, in which the executive operated under nearly 
constant emergency powers with a quiescent Congress refusing to inter-
vene, continued.  While one might have thought that the midcourse correc-
tion of the 1970s would have ended the period of executive government, 
the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980s suggested otherwise.73
Does the experience of Weimar have anything to contribute to thinking 
about the U.S. government’s uses of emergency powers in the Cold War?  
Of course, the uses of emergency powers in Weimar Germany were very 
different from those in post-World War II United States.  While in Weimar, 
the dissolution of the parliament marked an end to separation of powers 
and a suspension of the constitutional framework altogether, the American 
government maintained its constitutional institutions through the Cold War.  
American presidents generally acted with congressional delegations of 
power, however broad and vague they might have been.  Courts reviewed 
and sometimes corrected the worst offenses;74 Congress occasionally at-
tempted to curb the executive as well.75  The overall shape of the American 
government, however, took on some of the same distinctive features of cri-
sis government that could be discerned in Weimar as many powers were 
swept into the vortex of a constantly expanding executive branch. 
In both Weimar Germany and the United States, executives gained 
great powers through declarations of states of emergency, powers that were 
used to justify both the use of force abroad and restrictions on rights at 
home.  While the emergencies in Weimar started as domestic ones, they did 
not remain domestic in their application and they had even more devastat-
ing consequences when their effects spread beyond the border.  Con-
versely, while American emergencies might have been triggered by events 
abroad during the Cold War, eventually they came home as the U.S. gov-
ernment began to realize that foreign and foreign-influenced enemies could 
not be kept outside national borders.  In short, in neither case was the state 
of emergency confined to the area which had originally triggered its appli-
cation.  In both Weimar and in the Cold War, states of emergency generally 
spread from the reasonably perceived threat to a wider and wider sphere of 
potential dangers with a smaller and smaller evidentiary base for each ex-
pansion of the threat.  Each new threat, however slight, justified changing 
provision that Congress had inserted into the 1970s reform legislation as a device for controlling the 
president. 
 73 KOH, supra note 48, at 101–16. 
 74 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down an ex-
ecutive order directing the secretary of commerce to seize and operate many of the nation’s steel mills 
to avert a strike during wartime). 
 75 See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1541–46, 1547–48 (2000)) (requiring a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a na-
tional emergency created by an attack against the United States before the president may engage the 
military in hostilities); S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976), microformed on CIS No. 76-S963 (Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(exposure of the extensive violations of civil liberties during the Cold War concluded in a number of 
recommendations for new laws curbing executive power).  While many of the Church Committee’s 
recommendations went nowhere, some became law.   See supra at notes 67-70.   
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what had been the normal rules of procedure to cope with the new form of 
danger. 
Schmitt had emphasized, for Weimar, the need for the executive to act 
unilaterally because parliamentary democracy could not sustain the deci-
siveness necessary to cope with a mortal threat to the state.  In fact, accord-
ing to Schmitt, the nature of the regime could itself be defined in terms of 
the ability of the sovereign to put the rule of law aside in order to cope with 
a serious danger.  Successful democratic governments required an illiberal 
core that could be exposed when the state was endangered.  The sovereign, 
in Schmitt’s view, had ultimate responsibility for the continuing existence 
of the state, and this was ultimately what gave the sovereign permission to 
set aside constitutional rules to act directly to cope with the threat.  As with 
Schmitt’s sovereign, American presidents could, acting in their official ca-
pacities, slip out from under constitutional constraint at nearly every turn.76  
While Schmitt imagined that this would occur because the law would sim-
ply fail to cover these actions and the sovereign would then have to step 
outside the law, the American constitutional experience was slightly differ-
ent.  The U.S. Constitution has capaciously expanded to adjust to all expan-
sions of executive power without appearing to fail.  The Constitution’s 
meaning has changed as it has been aggressively interpreted by Cold War 
executives and as both Congress and the courts ratified this new meaning 
through acquiescence.  The Weimar Constitution may have broken under 
emergency government, but the American Constitution bent. 
After the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union surprisingly re-
leased its satellites and then disbanded itself, one might have expected the 
American government to go back to the way it had been before the Cold 
War began.  At the very least, one might have expected the United States to 
rethink the extraordinarily lopsided executive government that had devel-
oped to respond to the Soviet threat.  But such was not the case.  Though 
there were calls to “reestablish[] the rule of law at the end of the Cold 
War,”77 Cold War habits had ossified into permanent traits of constitutional 
character.  The American presidency is as strong, if not stronger, than ever.  
The practical deference of courts to the political branches is nearly univer-
sal on all matters of foreign and military policy, including outsized claims 
of national security.  Congress has largely ceded its powers in the realm of 
foreign policy, providing only lax and fitful oversight.  The balance of 
powers struck during the Cold War, with a bulked-up executive, a wizened 
 76 What has gotten American presidents into serious trouble is either the authorization of private 
crimes (Richard Nixon) or the conduct of private affairs (Bill Clinton).  While presidents have been 
defeated for failing to perform adequately, it is usually weakness (Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, Jimmy 
Carter with the Iranian hostage crisis, George H.W. Bush with the economy) rather than strength that 
has defeated them.  Excesses in the use of emergency powers or emergency-like powers (Ronald 
Reagan with Iran-Contra; John F. Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis) have rarely been the source of 
general presidential disrepute. 
 77 Hasday, supra note 60, at 129. 
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Congress, their disputes only partly subject to refereeing by courts, remains 
largely intact. 
II. AMERICA AFTER 9/11  
A.  The State of Exception in Domestic Policy 
“Everything has changed,” political commentators muttered darkly, 
without specifying what “everything” was or in what direction it had 
“changed.”  “The world after 9/11” has become a specific historical mo-
ment, referred to as if it has a logic of its own.78  Those who can clearly re-
call the United States before 9/11 may compare it with the present moment 
and be shocked by the new mentalité:  the self-confident and blithely lib-
eral United States has become haunted by fear, more inward-looking, and 
less open to debate.  As I will argue, after 9/11, the Bush administration has 
declared an ever-expanding state of exception in which more and more of 
the taken-for-granted operating rules of American law have been suspended 
in the name of the war against terrorism.  This new state of exception bears 
many of the features of Cold War exceptionalism at its height. 
Terrorism was obviously not new with 9/11, nor were attacks by al 
Qaeda against Americans new on that day.  What changed was the frame-
work through which they were seen.  As pre-9/11 books on terrorism cus-
tomarily noted, nations have a choice between thinking of terrorist attacks 
as large crimes (on the model of organized crime or other criminal con-
spiracies) or as small wars (on the model of insurgent attacks).79  Under the 
Clinton administration, terrorist attacks were seen primarily as big crimes 
with a small war component.80  They were handled as a first matter by the 
 
 78 Historians are already considering what this moment means in the light of their profession: 
 
[H]ow transformative was September 11?  Would it become an iconic historical event, marking 
a transition in the history of the United States and of the world?  Or was it instead best under-
stood as an aspect of pre-existing historical trajectories?  Did it change law, politics, religion, 
and culture, or did it instead simply provide a new site for political and cultural conflicts that 
were already in play? 
. . . .  
. . . We do not have the luxury to wait for this moment to settle more firmly into historical 
memory.  Understanding September 11 and its impact is a need, and a responsibility, of our 
own. 
Mary L. Dudziak, Introduction to SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY:  A WATERSHED MOMENT? 1, 2, 8 (Mary 
L. Dudziak ed., 2003). 
 79 For perhaps the best such account, see PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA:  A 
COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1998).  It is significant that Professor Hey-
mann’s post-9/11 book, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY:  WINNING WITHOUT WAR (2003), 
gives up on the crime strategy for confronting terrorism and instead attempts to argue that in the “war” 
on terrorism, multilateral strategies and international law should guide American conduct. 
 80 As this article was in the editing stage, new information about the Clinton-era anti-terrorism tac-
tics emerged, showing that the Clinton White House had in fact been pursuing more military options 
than were apparent at the time or in the several years after 9/11.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 6:  THE MILITARY (2004), http://www.9-
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Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and ordinary criminal courts, even when 
they pertained to attacks on U.S. interests overseas.  Under the Bush ad-
ministration, terrorist attacks have been seen within the framework of not 
just a small war, but of a world war.  Along with that framework has come 
a reluctance to actively use or even to acquiesce in the jurisdiction of the 
courts,81 and a sense that the Department of Defense (“DOD”), the military, 
and the intelligence agencies patrol the front lines, even within the United 
States. 
Under the Clinton administration, the attacks on two American embas-
sies in Africa on the same day in 1998—one in Kenya and the other in 
Tanzania—were treated as both war and crime.  Several cruise missiles 
were launched on locations in Afghanistan and Sudan to get rid of what had 
been flagged as al Qaeda sites.  But the most sustained treatment of the 
embassy bombings framed them as a large criminal conspiracy.  Eventu-
ally, four defendants—including one American citizen—were tried in the 
federal District Court for the Southern District of New York in the spring 
of 2001 for plotting and participating in the attacks.  Several months of evi-
dence—including reports from FBI field officers, results of electronic 
monitoring, physical evidence obtained through searches in multiple coun-
tries, and confessions gathered in extensive interrogations abroad—resulted 
in convictions of all four defendants on all counts.82  Other trials were con-
ducted and resulted in guilty verdicts in the case of the first World Trade 
Center bombing, the plot to blow up major sites in New York City, and the 
plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of the mil-
lennium.  All were found to be al Qaeda-related conspiracies.83
11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/staff_statement_6.pdf; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 7:  INTELLIGENCE POLICY (2004), http://www.9-
11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/staff_statement_7.pdf; RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL 
ENEMIES:  INSIDE AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR (2004). 
 81 George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address in January 2004 stated the case strongly: 
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all.  They view terrorism 
more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments.  After 
the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried 
and convicted, and sent to prison.  But the matter was not settled.  The terrorists were still train-
ing and plotting in other nations, and drawing up more ambitious plans.  After the chaos and 
carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers.  The ter-
rorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got. 
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 
 82 See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The transcript of the trial 
in which the specific uses of evidence can be seen is available at Transcript available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/background.html.  
 83 The evidence presented at the trial of the so-called Millennial Bomber is laid out in Frontline:  
Trail of a Terrorist (PBS television documentary, Oct. 25, 2001) (transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/script.html).  The first World Trade Center 
bombing and the subsequent foiled plots by Ramzi Yousef, who is believed to have masterminded that 
bombing, are detailed in SIMON REEVE, THE NEW JACKALS:  RAMZI YOUSEF, OSAMA BIN LADEN AND 
THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM (1999). 
  
May 2004] STATES OF EXCEPTION 23 
 
It appeared from the Clinton administration’s antiterrorism efforts that 
it believed the ordinary criminal justice system was an effective tool for en-
suring that those who plotted against the United States and attempted to kill 
its citizens could be brought to justice on the basis of public evidence in 
normal criminal proceedings.  And the results—guilty verdicts in all 
cases—seemed to bear that belief out.  From the standpoint of Schmitt’s 
political theory, the 1990s terrorist attacks were deemed by the administra-
tion then in power to require no state of exception.  Instead, the United 
States showed itself to be aggressively unexceptional in these circum-
stances, treating these attacks on the country through normal procedures as 
a way of making a point that the terrorists could not destroy American con-
stitutional values.84  Of course, the situation was being monitored to deter-
mine if the threat rose to the level of a military response, but by and large, 
plots within the United States were thwarted using ordinary policing meth-
ods,85 and their perpetrators were put on trial throughout the 1990s. 
 84 That said, there were some elements of these al Qaeda trials that should give human rights law-
yers pause.  The confessions that were the centerpiece of the African embassy bombing trials were ob-
tained through interrogations lasting weeks in some cases, and in every case without a lawyer present.  
All of the defendants signed statements saying that they waived their right to counsel, but the only evi-
dence offered that the confessions made by two of them were voluntary or that the defendants under-
stood what they were signing came from the interrogators themselves.  Thereafter, the confessions were 
introduced into evidence through the testimony of the interrogators, who often spent days on the wit-
ness stand apparently quoting the exact words of the defendants, even though everyone admitted that no 
tape recorder was used and that the investigators only took notes detailing their conversations after the 
interrogations were over—sometimes days and weeks later.  The issue of whether the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s right to counsel applied to noncitizens interrogated abroad by U.S. officials seems to have been 
an issue of first impression in this case.  See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 181, 187–89.  In his deci-
sion, Judge Sand elaborated a modified version of the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) (holding that prosecutors may not use statements made during custodial interrogation unless the 
defendant was first advised of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel), for inter-
rogations of noncitizens conducted by U.S. officers abroad.  Id. at 188 n.16.  In addition, some of the 
searches conducted abroad that netted evidence for this trial were conducted without even superficial 
compliance with Fourth Amendment guarantees.  Whether the constitutional procedures for gathering 
evidence apply to evidence gathered abroad more generally is a controversial proposition.  See M.K.B. 
Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh:  Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 319 (2003) (discussing the changing situation of Miranda warnings after 9/11); Mark A. 
Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena:  A Critical Analysis of United States v. 
Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002) (analyzing 
and mapping out proposals for how to apply Miranda rights internationally); Roberto Iraola, Self-
Incrimination and the Non-Resident Alien, 22 PACE L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing applications of the 
self-incrimination doctrine to non-resident aliens); Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated 
Criminal Investigations Between the United States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications 
for American Constitutional Rights, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 821 (2002) (discussing the interplay between the 
United States and foreign governments on American constitutional rights); Jay Shapiro, Terrorism, the 
Constitution, and the Courts, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 189 (2002) (discussing the application of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to terrorists); Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of U.S. Law Enforce-
ment:  Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 307 (2002) (discussing the use of Ameri-
can constitutional values in dealing with foreign governments). 
 85 This may not be completely true, as ordinary criminal investigations were giving way at a rapid 
pace to national security investigations.  The number of warrants issued by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) went up sharply in the 1990s, perhaps because of an increased focus on 
terrorism investigations.  When Clinton came to power, about 500 warrants were granted annually for 
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The 9/11 attacks changed that calculation, but not immediately.  At 
first, the Bush administration’s DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (“FBI”) acted as if the normal legal model were still in play.86  Two of 
the first concrete suspects in U.S. custody in the new war on terrorism—
Zacarias Moussaoui and John Walker Lindh—were charged with crimes in 
normal criminal proceedings even though their alleged criminal activity in-
volved participation in terrorist plots.87
Moussaoui was publicly announced to have been the “twentieth hi-
jacker” on the presumption of symmetry—three of the four hijacked planes 
on 9/11 had five hijackers, but one only had four.  Moussaoui, who was ar-
rested prior to 9/11, had been originally thought by the DOJ to have been 
slotted for that fifth seat on the fourth plane.  Since the case began, it has 
become less clear that Moussaoui was a hijacker.  Instead, it seems that 
Moussaoui was probably an al Qaeda member in the United States awaiting 
instructions that never came for some further attack.88  Moreover, the 
Moussaoui case has become difficult for the DOJ because Moussaoui has 
claimed the right to interrogate other high-level al Qaeda operatives who 
are in U.S. custody, particularly Ramzi bin al-Shibh.89  Bin al-Shibh has 
publicly claimed credit for organizing the 9/11 attacks and may have said 
that Moussaoui had nothing to do with them.90  Judge Brinkema, the trial 
FISA searches.  Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 
1979–2002 [hereinafter FISA Statistics], at http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html 
(last modified May 6, 2003).  By 2000, that number had doubled to 1012.  Id.  Since no FISA warrant 
documents are public, it is impossible to say for sure what caused the increase, but given the evident 
concern in the Clinton White House with antiterrorism issues, it would not be far-fetched to suppose 
that the FISA warrant increase tracked the increased hunt for foreign terrorists inside the United States. 
 86 The FBI’s investigation procedures did not seem to change immediately after 9/11.  Later, on 
May 30, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued new guidelines for the FBI to follow in its terror-
ism investigations, which substantially lowered the showing necessary to use intrusive means of sur-
veillance in terrorism investigations.  OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., DOJ, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE 
INVESTIGATIONS (2002) [hereinafter ASHCROFT GUIDELINES], 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf. 
 87 The level of security and publicity that these cases received was, of course, far from normal.  
Likewise, the Attorney General’s statements about the heinous activities of both went beyond the nor-
mal commentary practices of the office.  Ashcroft said that Lindh’s “allegiance to those fanatics and 
terrorists never faltered, not even with the knowledge that they had murdered thousands of his country-
men.”  Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad:  Why Did the Government’s Case Against John Walker Lindh 
Collapse?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50.  Ashcroft labeled Moussaoui’s indictment a “chronicle 
of evil.”  Naftali Bendavid, PR War Rages in Terror Cases:  U.S., Defense Lawyers Battle Relentlessly 
for Public Sympathy, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2002, § 1, at 12.  In general, though, both cases started off as 
normal serious crimes.  In the end, both cases fell victim to post-9/11 particularities. 
 88 In fact, at one stage in the proceedings, Moussaoui appeared to attempt to confess to just this set 
of facts.  Transcript of Arraignment and Motions Hearing, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 
480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. Crim. 01-455-A), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/transcripts/text_moussaoui.htm. 
 89 See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Future of Terror Case Is in Judge’s Hands as Government Continues To 
Block Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A11 (describing Moussaoui’s attempts to interview bin 
al-Shibh). 
 90 Id. (“Mr. Moussaoui has insisted that he had nothing to do with the [September 11th] attacks and 
that Mr. bin al-Shibh could help prove his innocence.”). 
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judge assigned to the case, has insisted that Moussaoui have access to po-
tentially exculpatory evidence as the normal rules of criminal procedure re-
quire, but the government has insisted that national security would be com-
promised by Moussaoui’s access to bin al-Shibh’s testimony even under 
the restricted terms that Judge Brinkema approved.91  When the govern-
ment openly refused to provide Moussaoui access to exculpatory witnesses, 
Judge Brinkema dropped those charges against Moussaoui that would have 
implicated him in the 9/11 attacks and that therefore would have carried the 
death penalty.  She left in place charges that Moussaoui was a member of al 
Qaeda but ordered that no evidence of Moussaoui’s connection with 9/11 
could be presented at trial.92  This ruling was, for the most part, upheld on 
appeal.93  However, the final legal resolution is far from clear.  One possi-
bility, hinted at in the press, is that the government will use the dropped 
charges as a reason for classifying Moussaoui with the Guantánamo Bay 
detainees, eligible only for a military tribunal where such rules about ac-
cess to exculpatory evidence do not apply.94
John Walker Lindh was an American citizen captured while fighting 
with the Taliban in Afghanistan.  At first he was charged with multiple 
counts that included charges of al Qaeda membership and participation in a 
knowing attack on an American CIA officer.  The plea bargain that was 
eventually negotiated saw Lindh plead only to having fought with the Tali-
ban while carrying a gun.  Because Lindh was an American citizen, he was 
initially handled through ordinary criminal procedure and his father, a law-
yer clever about both the legal and political options available at the time, 
organized a vigorous legal defense that called the government’s bluff about 
the concrete evidence they had against Lindh.  Virtually all of the evidence 
 91 Judge Brinkema never required that bin al-Shibh be present in court, but instead ruled that Mous-
saoui’s right to compel witnesses on his behalf was satisfied if U.S. officials asked bin al-Shibh the 
relevant questions in whatever location they deemed appropriate.  United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. 
Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part and vacated in part, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261 
(4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004).  Since the government refused to do even this, the judge dropped all 9/11-
related charges against Moussaoui.  Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (No. Crim. 01-455-A), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss82903ord.pdf .     
 92 Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 487. 
 93 United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004).  The Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Brinkema’s conclusion that Moussaoui should be 
granted access to exculpatory witnesses, but remanded the case to the district court to “craft substitu-
tions under certain guidelines.”  Id. at *21.  Specifically, the court instructed defense counsel to identify 
the portions of summarized deposition testimony that Moussaoui wants to admit into evidence and per-
mitted the government to argue for the inclusion of additional portions “in the interest of complete-
ness.”  Id.  The court was clear, however, that the government is not to “attempt to use the substitutions 
to bolster its own case by offering what it considers to be inculpatory statements” and that the substitu-
tions “may be admitted only by Moussaoui.”  Id. 
 94 The rules of evidence that will be in use at the military tribunals indicate at section 8:  “The Ac-
cused may obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused’s defense, to the extent necessary and rea-
sonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer.”  This access may be limited in order to safe-
guard “protected information” and to protect state secrets.  DOD, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1 
(2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/dod032102milcomord1.pdf. 
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consisted of Lindh’s own statements, gathered in conditions that were ar-
guably coercive.  The battle in an ordinary criminal courtroom might have 
found (not certainly, but perhaps) that Lindh’s self-incriminating state-
ments were excludable because of the government’s own misconduct in 
acquiring them.  The government refused, for example, to provide Lindh 
with needed medical assistance until he told investigators what he knew 
and also refused to notify him that his father had hired a lawyer on his be-
half.95  Had these failures been judged to constitute coercion in producing 
the incriminating statements, the government’s case would have been sub-
stantially weakened.  Even if the statements were ruled admissible in the 
end, the government’s handling of Lindh looked bad, and there was televi-
sion footage plus an internal leak from the DOJ as proof.96  Seeing the 
weakness of their position, the DOJ bargained, a sure sign of business as 
usual in the criminal justice system. 
So far, the handling of Moussaoui and Lindh through criminal indict-
ment and conviction generally has shown the government’s commitment to 
using ordinary criminal process where it can, just as the Clinton administra-
tion had done.  But there were two early signs even in these cases that the 
previous status quo for handling terrorists was changing.  One came in mat-
ters of jurisdiction.  While almost all of the Clinton-era terrorism cases 
were handled in the Southern District of New York, which by then had de-
veloped both the security apparatus and the expertise in investigating and 
prosecuting al Qaeda-related crimes, the new cases were brought in a far 
more conservative federal jurisdiction, the Eastern District of Virginia.  
The Southern District of New York could have been used as a venue since 
it included the World Trade Center and was the location of the primary 
grand jury that was convened after 9/11 to investigate the attacks.  But the 
DOJ decided instead to hold the trials in the district of the Pentagon at-
tacks, where it could be expected that any random jury would have in it a 
number of military families and other federal civil servants who were no 
doubt thought to be more sympathetic to the government’s position than 
New York liberals.  Moreover, appeals from the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia go to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, widely thought to be the 
most conservative federal circuit court.97  The jurisdictional changes did 
not signal a breakdown of the normal rules; complex federal cases often 
 95 A DOJ lawyer, Jennifer Radack, went public with the information that she and others in the DOJ 
had given the advice to the FBI agents interrogating Lindh in Afghanistan that Lindh had to be told of 
counsel hired on his behalf and had to be given the right to have counsel present if he so desired.  
Mayer, supra note 87, at 58–59. 
 96 Radack, the whistle-blowing DOJ lawyer, has since been dismissed and alleges that her future 
employment has been blocked by government officials trying to retaliate against her.  All Things Con-
sidered:  Lindh Whistle-Blower Sees Smear Campaign (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 20, 2004). 
 97 Given the split within American legal conservatism between social conservatives who tend to be 
deferential to authority and libertarian conservatives who are not, a conservative federal court did not 
necessarily guarantee that the Bush administration would prevail in its “state of exception” arguments.  
But it was a surer bet than the more ideologically diverse Second Circuit that the Southern District of 
New York appeals would have reached. 
  
May 2004] STATES OF EXCEPTION 27 
 
present a legitimate choice of venue.  But they did signal that the previous 
standard operating procedures were under challenge from within the DOJ 
and that there had been a conscious decision not to follow Clinton-era prac-
tice by locating the trials in New York. 
The other early warning signal that the handling of terrorism suspects 
was changing came in the controversy over whether John Walker Lindh 
should have been able to consult with the lawyer his father had hired for 
him when Lindh was interrogated in Afghanistan.  In Clinton-era practice, 
the DOJ’s position had apparently been that suspects interrogated abroad 
did have the right to counsel and had to be given Miranda warnings 
(though in practice counsel turned out not to be available).98  The African 
embassy bombings trial prominently featured confessions on the part of 
two of the four defendants, confessions made without a lawyer present.  
But in those cases, there was no evidence that counsel had been alerted to 
the suspects’ detention and were trying to reach them.  Moreover, the Afri-
can embassy bombing defendants questioned abroad were not U.S. citizens 
and had never before set foot in the United States, making their only con-
nection with the United States the fact that they would be tried there.  Even 
that was sufficient for Judge Sand to rule that Miranda warnings had to be 
given and that counsel had to be offered, consistent with local availability.  
Though the judge ruled that the part of the confession that one of the de-
fendants made before the Miranda warning was given was inadmissible, 
the bulk of the confession, which was made after the defendant had signed 
away his claims to see counsel, was admissible.99  One might imagine that 
since John Walker Lindh was a U.S. citizen with counsel ready to provide 
legal advice, the full Miranda protocol would have been required without 
adjustment in his case.  Both alternative explanations for the counsel-less 
interrogation that Lindh endured—that either the agents in the field did not 
get the information that Lindh had counsel or that the DOJ knew but ex-
plicitly blocked this information from getting to Lindh100—foreshadowed 
some of the hardball tactics that were to come in denying counsel to those 
suspected of involvement with terrorism post-9/11.101  Arguably, the non-
 98 The Clinton-era practice can be seen most clearly in the testimony of the FBI agents John Anticev 
and Stephen Gaudin in the embassy bombings trial, United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).  See also Transcript, supra note 82. According to these agents, each of the foreign 
defendants had been informed of their right to counsel, told that there was no counsel that was practi-
cally available to them when interrogated abroad, and then given the option of either going forward 
with the interrogation or refusing to talk.  The potentially coercive part of these interrogations could be 
seen when suspects were told that if they refused to talk to American officials, they would be ques-
tioned instead by local officials, whose sense of proper interrogation protocol might be, to say the least, 
less polite.  Not surprisingly, the suspects agreed to talk to the FBI agents.  See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 
2d at 173-81. 
 99 Id. at 194. 
 100 For evidence of the latter position, see Mayer, supra note 87, at 50. 
 101 Counsel has been routinely denied to those suspected of being enemy combatants, both at 
Guantánamo and within the United States.  Moreover, those rounded up after 9/11 in a preventive de-
tention sweep were routinely denied access to counsel in practical terms, according to the report of the 
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American suspects in the embassy bombings case were given more consti-
tutional protection than John Walker Lindh was given, even though, as later 
reports seem to indicate, Lindh had less clear involvement with the terror-
ists than had the embassy bombing suspects. 
The normal rules of operating procedure for treating terrorists as crimi-
nals broke down altogether after 9/11 in a general round-up of terrorism 
suspects, most of whom were Muslim men from countries where al Qaeda 
was active.  Overtly pretextual reasons were used for detaining suspects for 
whom there was very little (and often no) concrete evidence of their in-
volvement with terrorism but whose suspiciousness to federal officials 
made them targets of investigation anyway.102  As then-Assistant Attorney 
General Michael Chertoff was quoted as saying, the policy of the DOJ in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was that “we have to hold these people un-
til we find out what is going on.”103  Within weeks after the terrorist at-
tacks, it appears that at least 1200 men104 were rounded up and detained, in 
many cases for many months.105  No serious terrorism charge was brought 
against any of them—all were eventually absolved of direct involvement in 
9/11-related activities (at least as far as has been made public).106  But 
many of the detainees were deported on the basis of immigration viola-
tions, some being quite minor (though it is hard to tell for sure since most 
Office of the Inspector General.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (“OIG”), DOJ, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES:  A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 130-142 (2003) [hereinafter 
OIG REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. 
 102 For the most thorough evidence to date on the detention of non-Americans after 9/11, see the OIG 
REPORT, id., required by Congress under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), which painted a damning portrait of the pretextual rea-
sons for extended detentions of terrorism suspects who were later cleared. 
 103 See OIG REPORT, supra note 101, at 39 (quoting Alice Fisher, head of immigration issues for the 
Criminal Division of the DOJ).  Michael Chertoff has since been confirmed to a seat on the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
 104 The exact figures are not known because the government stopped counting at 1200, after the 
ever-increasing number had caused much interest from the press.  According to the OIG Report, “the 
Public Affairs Office stopped reporting the cumulative totals after the number reached approximately 
1,200, because the statistics became confusing.”  Id. at 1 n.2.  The actual totals will probably never be 
known. 
 105 The OIG Report indicates that, of the 762 detainees who entered the OIG’s purview in this report 
because they were involved with the immigration system, 89 were held for at least three months, 53 
were held for at least four months,  33 were held for at least five months, and another 18 were held for 
more than six months.  But 130 of the 762 cases were coded as having “missing values” because the 
Inspector General’s office was not able to determine how long the men in question had been confined.  
Id. at 52 tbl.3. 
 106 The fact that so many were deported is probably a sign that they were not considered dangerous.  
It is hard to imagine that the U.S. government would be convinced that someone was involved with ter-
rorism and then would send them off to plot from afar.  But the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen 
deported by the United States to Syria where he claims he was tortured for information, presents an-
other possibility of what may have happened with the deportees.  Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV-00249-DGT (E.D.N.Y. 2004), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/ArarComplaint.pdf. 
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of the deportation hearings were closed upon the insistence of the DOJ).107  
Other 9/11 detainees were charged with crimes unrelated to terrorism, 
though the maximum sentences in some of the minor crimes were less than 
the length of time that the suspect was held in custody awaiting resolution 
of these cases.108  Still others were held as “material witnesses” to testify 
before the grand jury convened after 9/11 to hear terrorism-related evi-
dence, though not all of them actually testified in the end.109
In the meantime, the DOJ’s own Office of the Inspector General found 
credible evidence that some of the 9/11 domestic detainees had been beaten 
while in custody, and that normal rules about access to counsel, bond hear-
ings, and notification of family members were honored primarily in the 
breach.110  In the post-9/11 roundup of Muslim men, the average length of 
detention was eighty days, and more than 25% of the detainees were held 
for more than three months.111  Even after deportation orders were given, 
many of the detainees were still held in U.S. custody to allow investiga-
 107 The DOJ took the view that all hearings of the 9/11 detainees were to be summarily closed to the 
public and to the press since national security information might be released.  This claim met different 
fates in different circuits.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the DOJ argument, insisting that 
each hearing had to be presumptively open until such time as the government could demonstrate that 
the release of a specific piece of national-security sensitive information warranted the closure of the 
hearing.  See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).  But the Third Circuit came 
out the other way, upholding the government’s claim to close all hearings without having to make an 
individualized showing.  See N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. de-
nied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). 
 108 E.g., United States v. Oulai, No. 02-00046-CR-J-20-TE (M.D. Fla. 2002) (unreported decision), 
aff’d, 88 Fed. Appx. 384 (11th Cir. 2003) (unpublished table decision).  Tony Oulai was a Roman 
Catholic from West Africa who had been detained trying to board a flight in the United States with 
flight manuals, “Arabic language materials,” and a stun gun in his checked luggage.  He admitted the 
flight materials and stun gun, but claimed that the foreign language material in question was a French 
Bible.  He was held first as a material witness in the terrorism investigation, then detained on immigra-
tion charges which turned out to be unfounded, and finally was jailed because he had allegedly lied to 
immigration officials who questioned him during his detention.  By the time motions were being filed 
prior to trial on this offense, he had already been held for eight months even though the maximum sen-
tence for the crime with which he was charged was six months.  Also, the crime for which he was even-
tually convicted—lying to immigration officials—would arguably not have occurred if he had not been 
detained in harsh conditions in the first place.  For the details of this case, see Amy Goldstein, ‘I Want 
to Go Home’:  Detainee Tony Oulai Awaits End of 4-Month Legal Limbo, WASH. POST,  Jan. 26, 2002, 
at A1; Amy Goldstein, No Longer a Suspect, But Still a Detainee:  U.S. Won’t Release or Deport Pris-
oner, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A1; Amy Goldstein, No Longer Material Witness, West African 
Still Detained, WASH. POST,  Feb. 15, 2002, at A17; and Jim Schoettler, September Detainee Cleared of 
Terrorist Activity:  Visitor Still Faces Charge, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Apr. 2, 2002. 
 109 The use of material witness warrants for grand jury proceedings was sharply contested and pro-
duced within a few months of each other conflicting district court opinions in the same district on the 
question of whether material witnesses could be detained indefinitely in conjunction with a grand jury 
proceeding.  The Second Circuit resolved the conflict by ruling in favor of the government’s position 
that the material witness statute could be used in this way.  Compare United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. 
Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that an innocent person cannot be detained to secure grand jury 
testimony under the material witness statute), rev’d, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), with In Re Application 
of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
the material witness statutes does apply to grand jury witnesses). 
 110 OIG REPORT, supra note 101, at 111-85. 
 111 Id. at 51. 
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tions to continue.112  The result was, in practice, a regime of preventive de-
tention—the holding of suspects in terrorism investigations without terror-
ism charges and without a sufficient showing of evidence to legally justify 
the detentions on that basis.113  Knowing that such a system of pure preven-
tive detention would not be constitutionally permissible for long in the 
United States, the DOJ adopted a policy of “preventive prosecution”114 in 
which those suspected of involvement in terrorism would be charged with 
whatever violation was ready at hand, such as credit card fraud or “spitting 
on the sidewalk.”115  The fig leaf of legality in the post-9/11 context grew 
primarily from the insincere assertion that terrorism suspects were really 
being held for other criminal or administrative investigations, most com-
monly for immigration violations.  In the war on terrorism, the real reason 
for holding the suspects was often not explicitly charged; instead, the rea-
sons presented to judges for detention were invented to simply hold the 
suspects in prison until such time as the government deemed them safe to 
release.116
The next departure from previously normal standards came with the de-
velopment of new guidelines for surveillance and investigation of terror-
ism-related activities.  While the USA PATRIOT Act has gotten much of 
the attention in the public criticism of the Bush administration’s approach 
 112 According to the OIG Report, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) had produced a memoran-
dum opinion in which it determined that the ninety-day period within which removal of a deportable 
alien should be accomplished was not mandatory if the alien’s continued detention was “supported by 
purposes related to the proper implementation of immigration laws.”  Id. at 106. The memorandum 
concluded that the detainees were held properly because they were still not yet cleared for terrorist con-
nections, a proper purpose under the immigration laws.  As a result, the ninety-day period for removal 
could be indefinitely extended, according to the OLC.  Id. 
 113 Id. at 91–110. 
 114 The term and the policy were explained by Viet Dinh in his presentation at the annual meeting of 
the Association of American Law Schools in Atlanta, Ga. on January 3, 2004. Confirmed in email mes-
sage to author 24 May 2004.    In his Leventhal Lecture before the DC Bar, Dinh further detailed the 
importance of prevention strategies after 9/11.   Viet Dinh, “Ordered Liberty in an Age of International 
Terrorism.”  Harold Leventhal Lecture, 7 June 2002.  Available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/sections/administrative_law_and_agency_practice/dinh.cfm . 
 115  Shortly after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that aggressive prosecution of minor 
offenses would in fact be his policy: 
 
  Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for spitting on the sidewalk 
if it would help in the battle against organized crime. It will be the policy of this Department of Jus-
tice to use same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war against terror. Let the terrorists 
among us be warned: If you overstay your visas, even by one day, we will arrest you. If you violate a 
local law, we will hope that you will and work to make sure that you are put in jail and be kept in 
custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial 
advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life 
and enhance security for America. 
 
Morning Edition:  President Bush, Tom Ridge and John Ashcroft on Ways to Right Terrorism (NPR 
radio broadcast,, Oct 25, 2001). 
 116 What I have not been able to figure out, however, is whether judges presiding over criminal pro-
ceedings on charges of credit card fraud or perjury, for example, were told about the suspicions of ter-
rorist activities before or during the trial, or at sentencing time. 
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to the 9/11 investigations, much of what the USA PATRIOT Act contained 
was nothing particularly new, even though it might be justifiably described 
as disturbing.117  Moreover, the new powers were generally attached to sun-
set provisions that expire at the end of 2005.  As the Federalist Society 
White Paper on the criminal procedure provisions of the USA PATRIOT 
Act put it, “[t]he criminal procedure and related sections of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 generally do not ‘push the envelope’ of constitu-
tional limits.”118  The Act did, however, codify practices that had previ-
ously been fixed only in court decisions, which makes these practices 
harder to change after the crisis has passed.  Further, some of the provisions 
were both new and alarming. 
The USA PATRIOT Act codified the cramped understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure provision as it had been developed 
in successive judicial retreats from Warren Court precedents—that only 
nonconsensual,119 particularly intrusive120 searches required full-scale 
“probable cause” warrants under the Fourth Amendment.121  Other searches 
 117 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of 
U.S.C.).  By pointing out that many of the USA PATRIOT Act’s provisions constituted nothing new, I 
do not mean to imply that they are not serious.  But after the high point of the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure jurisprudence, the tendency of American courts had been to restrict rights granted to criminal 
defendants, particularly with respect to defendants’ rights in the course of criminal investigations.  As a 
result, many of the “rights” that the USA PATRIOT Act appeared to limit had already been scaled back 
by courts.  Just as the National Security Act represented “nothing new” in placing control of foreign 
affairs directly into the hands of the president after a particularly hardball interpretation of United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), so the USA PATRIOT Act did little new, legally 
speaking, in consolidating the growing set of already defendant-hostile federal court decisions. 
 118 KENT SCHEIDEGGER ET AL., FEDERALIST SOCIETY WHITE PAPER ON THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 
2001:  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SECTIONS, 2001 FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD. 17, 
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/TerrorCrimPro.pdf. 
 119 “Nonconsensual” is defined in this area of constitutional criminal procedure as surveillance with-
out the consent of any of the parties to the interactions.  So, if one person agrees to wear a microphone 
in order to record the conversation of another person, the recording is considered “consensual” even if 
the bugged party didn’t agree to it.  Such surveillance did not require a probable cause warrant in nor-
mal criminal investigatory practice before 9/11. 
 120 “Particularly intrusive” searches are those that involve physically entering a private dwelling or 
recording conversations in a nonconsensual manner, or otherwise (for example, virtually) monitoring a 
person’s activities in private places.  Observing someone in public, gaining access to information about 
a person through means available to the general public, or gathering information with the consent of 
someone who does have legitimate access to the information did not require a warrant before 9/11. 
 121 The USA PATRIOT Act authorized the approval of “roving searches” in which a court in Juris-
diction X is now empowered to authorize a wiretap on all of the phones of a particular target, even the 
phones that were not in Jurisdiction X.  This provision was urged to streamline the prior process in 
which separate warrants were required in each jurisdiction where there was a target phone.  See USA 
PATRIOT Act § 216 (regarding trap and trace orders).  The principle of roving searches was extended 
to physical searches in Section 219 and to email content in Section 220. 
For a particularly helpful review of the circumstances under which warrants were not required for 
search, detention and arrest under federal criminal procedure before the USA PATRIOT Act, see Theo-
dore P. Metzler et al., Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:  Warrantless Searches and Sei-
zures, 89 GEO. L.J. 1084 (2001). 
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(including examining private databases,122 monitoring public places, and 
interviewing friends and acquaintances) did not require probable cause 
warrants even before the USA PATRIOT Act went into effect, and the 
USA PATRIOT Act could be seen as simply consolidating these judicial 
understandings.  Some, though significantly not all, courts had previously 
agreed that “sneak and peek” searches (in which the target of the search 
would not be notified immediately that such a search had occurred) were 
not violations of Fourth Amendment search standards before such a provi-
sion was included in the USA PATRIOT Act.123
 122 For example, prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, it had not been clear whether tele-
phone and electronic communications (cable and Internet) providers had to notify their customers when 
law enforcement officers asked for personally identifiable information.  Now it is clear that law en-
forcement may require communications providers to keep such information secret from the targets of 
the investigation.  This provision does not sunset.  The USA PATRIOT Act still allows cable operators 
to keep private video subscription records.  DOYLE, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 11.  Service providers 
were already under obligation to assist law enforcement when asked.  Id. at 19. 
 123 The circuits were divided on this issue before Congress wrote the USA PATRIOT Act.  The 
Fourth Circuit had already ruled that delayed notification of searches and seizures of intangible evi-
dence were not violations of the Fourth Amendment.  See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th 
Cir. 2000).  But the Ninth Circuit had said that they were unconstitutional.  See United States v. Freitas, 
800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).  The Second Circuit took a position somewhere in between, declining to 
address the constitutional question by locating the disclosure requirement in Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).  In a related 
context, the Supreme Court has held in the “knock and announce” situation that police do not have to 
announce their entry into a dwelling beforehand if “it would inhibit the effective investigation of the 
crime.”  See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).  More recently, the Court held that a 
fifteen- to twenty-second pause between the knock and announcement and a forcible entry passes con-
stitutional muster if the police believe that evidence may be destroyed with a longer delay.  See United 
States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2003).  If the Court would countenance police knocking down the 
door without announcing themselves first or waiting only the briefest time after doing so, it seems hard 
to imagine that the Court would require the police to announce surreptitious searches in the absence of 
the target contemporaneously with the search.  The “sneak and peek” provision of the USA PATRIOT 
Act does not sunset. 
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FISA124 had already allowed senior FBI officials to gain access to the 
 124 FISA was passed in 1978 as a way of regularizing American spying on foreign spies.  Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101-11, 92 Stat. 1783, 1783-96 (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–11 (2000)).  But the reach of FISA includes all those who are “agents 
of foreign powers.”  A “foreign power” is, significantly, not limited to governments.  As defined in 
FISA, a “foreign power” is: 
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United 
States; 
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons; 
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be di-
rected and controlled by such foreign government or governments; 
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor; 
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; 
or 
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. 
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2000). 
Part 5 is of particular concern since any foreign-based political organization—Amnesty Interna-
tional, the Human Rights Committee of the International Bar Association, or the Catholic Church, for 
example—could easily count as a foreign power under this definition. 
An “agent of a foreign power” is defined in FISA as: 
(1) any person other than a United States person, who— 
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of 
a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) [see above—this is a reference to terrorist 
groups]; 
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activi-
ties in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circum-
stances of such person’s presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage 
in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any per-
son in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in 
such activities; or 
(2) any person who— 
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a 
foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of 
the United States; 
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, know-
ingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign 
power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of 
the United States; 
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in prepa-
ration therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; 
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf 
of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent 
identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or 
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in subpara-
graph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). 
Id. § 1801(b). 
For the purposes of FISA, a “United States person” includes citizens, permanent resident aliens, or-
ganizations consisting primarily of U.S. natural persons, and U.S.-registered corporations.  § 1801(i).  
As a result, there are laxer standards for spying on those who are not U.S. persons; only their connec-
tion to a “foreign power” has to be established.  For U.S. persons, evidence of some criminal activity 
seems to be required, though § 1801(b)(2)(E) seems to allow the nexus between the individual and 
criminal activity to consist only of “aiding or abetting” a crime.  All parts of the statute pertaining to 
U.S. persons require specific knowledge.  For more on FISA, see the Federation of American Scientists’ 
Intelligence Resource Project’s listing of primary documents.  Fed’n of American Scientists, Intelli-
gence Resource Project:  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, at 
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records of common carriers, public accommodation providers, physical 
storage facility operators, and vehicle rental agencies in their surveillance 
of foreign agents before the USA PATRIOT Act.125  The USA PATRIOT 
Act extended the range of objects that could be sought to include “any tan-
gible things (including books, records, papers, documents and other 
items).”126  It also extends the number of officials who may ask for such re-
cords.127  The more radical extension of the FISA search provision is that 
items that are sought need not directly relate to an identified “foreign 
agent,” but may be sought in conjunction with any investigation into inter-
national terrorism more generally.128  All that the government must demon-
strate in these cases, then, is that the information might be relevant to a ter-
rorism investigation in general, not that it implicates a particular person 
who is the target of the FISA warrant.  And the government may then insist 
that the person or organization on whom the warrant is served not reveal 
that the information was ever sought.129  In another change, FISA warrants 
previously had to specify the precise locations where the surveillance 
would be carried out; under the USA PATRIOT Act, so-called “roving 
warrants” are permitted, broadening all FISA warrants to include any loca-
tion (including locations not named in advance) where the target is likely to 
be.130  Such warrants were also extended from having a 90-day limit to hav-
ing a 120-day limit.131  Nonetheless, all of these provisions broadening the 
timing and locations of valid FISA warrants and the set of objects to which 
they may apply are set to sunset at the end of 2005 unless they are re-
newed.132
To my mind, the most worrisome novel aspect of the USA PATRIOT 
Act involves the changes the Act made to the threshold standard for getting 
a FISA warrant in the first place.  Before the USA PATRIOT Act, a FISA 
warrant could only be issued upon a government showing that national se-
curity surveillance was “the purpose” of the search.  This limited FISA 
warrants to instances where the government could assert to the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that the surveillance was under-
taken exclusively for national security purposes.133
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ (last modified May 6, 2004).  See also infra notes 164–175 and 
accompanying text. 
 125 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1810 (2000). 
 126 USA PATRIOT Act § 215.  This provision sunsets through Section 224. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id.  Unlike in the “sneak and peek” provisions, where the target of the search has to be notified 
eventually, even if with a delay, the FISA provisions require perpetual secrecy. 
 130 Id. § 206.  This provision sunsets through Section 224. 
 131 Id. § 207.  This provision sunsets through Section 224. 
 132 The sunset provision of the USA PATRIOT Act is contained in Section 224. 
 133 As Peter Swire notes in a forthcoming article, one way that this assertion was to be accomplished 
was through the range of signatures that had to appear on the warrant.  FISA warrants in their original 
form under the 1978 legislation had to contain the signatures not only of the lawyer who drafted the 
warrant, but also those of the head of the intelligence agency and the Attorney General personally.  
These signatures would reassure the FISA judge that the purpose of the surveillance was what it 
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The USA PATRIOT Act, significantly, changed this standard so that 
the government need only assert that “a significant purpose” of the re-
quested surveillance is national security.134  This implies that there may be 
other purposes for surveillance, such as gathering information for criminal 
investigations.  While a number of courts had previously admitted in crimi-
nal trials evidence collected under the lower probable cause standards at-
tached to FISA surveillance even before the USA PATRIOT Act was 
passed,135 there was still a meaningful distinction within the DOJ’s investi-
gatory structure between criminal investigations and national security in-
vestigations.  Peter Swire explains that this distinction (also known as “the 
wall”) originated with FISA and was policed by the head of the Office of 
Intelligence Policy and Review (“OIPR”) within the DOJ.  Under OIPR’s 
strict review, intelligence information was occasionally passed on to the 
criminal investigation side for use in trials, and courts had allowed such 
evidence to be admitted upon a showing that the information had been 
originally collected for bona fide national security purposes in the first 
place.  As Swire puts it, “there has always been a gate in the wall.”136  Still, 
there was a wall.  Once the standard for issuing FISA warrants was 
changed by the USA PATRIOT Act, it was only a matter of time before the 
wall collapsed. 
Another clear novelty of the USA PATRIOT Act came in allowing in-
formation gathered in the course of a grand jury proceeding to be shared 
with intelligence services if it relates to the possibility of foreign attack or 
concerns foreign agents that may be spying or planning assaults on U.S. in-
terests.137  Before the Act, grand jury information could only be shared out-
side the grand jury room for law enforcement purposes.138
Changes were also made by the USA PATRIOT Act in the area of im-
migration law.  The attorney general was given broader powers to detain 
aliens without charges--specifically, upon a showing that he has “reason-
able grounds to believe” that those detained are engaged in activity that 
claimed to be, and not an attempt to obtain evidence for criminal investigations through this less rigor-
ous channel.  Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author). 
 134 USA PATRIOT Act § 218. 
 135 In virtually all published opinions in this area, courts seemed always to admit evidence gathered 
under FISA warrants, though they were divided on what the relevant test was to admit this evidence.  
Some courts indicated that the original FISA warrant had to indicate that seeking foreign intelligence 
information was the purpose of the search (where “the” purpose implied the “only” purpose).  United 
States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77–78 (2d Cir. 1984).  Other courts indicated that evidence collected 
under a FISA warrant was admissible in a criminal trial when foreign intelligence gathering was the 
“primary purpose” for the warrant.  United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074–76 (4th Cir. 1987).  
The “primary purpose” test was first articulated in a pre-FISA case, United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 
629 F.2d 908, 915–16 (4th Cir. 1980).  The USA PATRIOT Act significantly changed the relevant test 
to “significant purpose.”  USA PATRIOT Act § 218. 
 136 Swire, supra note 133 (manuscript at 20). 
 137 USA PATRIOT Act § 203. 
 138 DOYLE, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 7. 
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threatens national security.139  The USA PATRIOT Act limits such deten-
tions to seven days.  But Attorney General John Ashcroft adopted an emer-
gency interim rule for detaining aliens on less than probable cause for “an 
additional reasonable period of time.”140  Given the lengths of time that the 
9/11 detainees were held without being charged,141 one might guess that the 
government has been operating on the Attorney General’s rule rather than 
under the USA PATRIOT Act’s more restrictive provisions. 
Probably the biggest changes in preexisting law (at least so far as the 
non-security-cleared can tell) came in the area of investigatory methods au-
thorized not by the USA PATRIOT Act, but instead by the curious legal 
device known as the “Attorney General Guidelines.”142  It may come as a 
surprise to those who have never tracked the technical legal basis of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation that it has never had a charter statute—one 
that sets up the institution in law, explains its mission and generally regu-
lates the contours of  its mandate.  Instead, the FBI, located within the DOJ, 
is regulated piecemeal through statutes that provide legal requirements for 
particular methods of investigation (e.g., procedures to follow before wire-
taps can be authorized are given by statute).143  But no statute governs the 
overall shape of investigations and when investigatory tools short of war-
rant-triggering searches can be used.  Instead, these matters are governed 
by guidelines of the attorney general.144  These guidelines do not have to 
pass a notice-and-comment procedure, and do not exist as formal federal 
regulations at all.  Any attorney general can modify them at will without 
using even the procedure required for the modification of ordinary federal 
rules.145
 139 USA PATRIOT Act § 412. 
 140 Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 287). 
 141 The OIG Report indicates that about 16% of the detainees in the Fall 2001 roundup were held for 
more than ten days without being served with an NTA (notice to appear), which signals the start of the 
charging process.  (For 15% of those detained, there is missing data.)  See OIG REPORT, supra note 
101, at 30 tbl.1. 
 142 On the Attorney General’s Guidelines generally, see John T. Elliff, The Attorney General’s 
Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1984), and the set of primary documents 
posted on the Electronic Privacy Information Center website at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fbi/. 
 143 For example, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20 (2000)), regulates electronic 
searches. 
 144 The practice began with Attorney General Edward Levi after the Church Committee had exposed 
the excesses of the FBI’s surveillance programs.   See Elliff, supra note 142.   
 145 They are not, for example, in the Federal Register, and getting copies of the guidelines in effect 
before the emergence of the Internet was exceedingly difficult.  In the comparisons that follow, I com-
pare Ashcroft’s guidelines with the most recent version that had been used by the DOJ before 9/11, 
which were guidelines last amended by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh in 1989.  OFFICE OF THE 
ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DOJ, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS (1989) [hereinaf-
ter THORNBURGH GUIDELINES], http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/generalcrimea.htm.  As one 
might imagine, Reagan-era guidelines were already substantially more law-and-order oriented than the 
first regulations written under the tenure of Edward J. Levi in the aftermath of the Church Commission 
Report.  But that comparison is beyond the scope of this article. 
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In May 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a new version of these 
little-noticed guidelines and in so doing made, in my view, even more sub-
stantial changes in the normal operating procedure of the FBI in domestic 
surveillance and investigation than the USA PATRIOT Act did.  Ashcroft’s 
guidelines lowered the threshold of suspicion at which agents were allowed 
to use informants and undercover activities to find out more, indicating that 
only mail openings and nonconsensual electronic surveillance were cate-
gorically prohibited at the “preliminary inquiry” stage.  Now such intrusive 
techniques can be used whenever there is “information or an allegation 
which indicates the possibility of criminal activity.”146  Whereas earlier 
guidelines required that an FBI agent go through a series of stages, from 
checking leads, to initiating a preliminary inquiry, to launching a full inves-
tigation, the current guidelines allow agents to move to the full investiga-
tion level without going through the earlier stages.147  The guidelines make 
explicit the point that “[p]reventing future criminal activity, as well as solv-
ing and prosecuting crimes that have already occurred, is an explicitly au-
thorized objective of general crimes investigations”148 and that the standard 
for launching a full investigation is a “reasonable indication” that a crime 
“has been, is being, or will be committed.”149  To drive the point home, the 
Ashcroft guidelines note, as had earlier guidelines, that “[t]he ‘reasonable 
indication’ threshold for undertaking such an investigation is substantially 
lower than probable cause.”150  The previous guidelines then went on to 
say:  “However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances 
indicating a past, current, or impending violation.  There must be an objec-
tive, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insuffi-
cient.”151  The Ashcroft guidelines have dropped that cautionary language.  
In fact, more aggressive investigations seem to be actively encouraged in 
the post-9/11 version: 
The conduct of preliminary inquiries and investigations may present 
choices between the use of investigative methods which are more or less intru-
sive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of individuals and po-
tential damage to reputation.  Inquiries and investigations shall be conducted 
with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation permit.  It is recognized, 
however, that the choice of techniques is a matter of judgment.  The FBI shall 
not hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines, even 
 146 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 1.  The previous guidelines indicated that these allega-
tions had to be in writing, a requirement that has apparently been dropped.  See THORNBURGH 
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at pt. II(B)(2). 
 147 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 2. 
 148 Id.  The previous guidelines added at this point:  “With respect to criminal activity that may occur 
in the future but does not yet involve current criminal conspiracy or attempt, particular care is necessary 
to assure that there exist facts and circumstances amounting to a reasonable indication that a crime will 
occur.”  THORNBURGH GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at pt. II(C)(2).  This sentence has been dropped 
from the current guidelines. 
 149 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 2. 
 150 Id. 
 151 THORNBURGH GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at pt. II(C)(1). 
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if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of a 
crime or the strength of the information indicating its commission or potential 
future commission.  This point is to be particularly observed in the investiga-
tion of terrorist crimes and in the investigation of enterprises that engage in ter-
rorism.152
In addition to changing the level of aggressiveness with which terror-
ism-related investigations may be initiated, the new guidelines greatly in-
creased the amount of information that may be retained from these investi-
gations by establishing a “database that identifies all preliminary inquiries 
and investigations conducted pursuant to these Guidelines and that permits 
the prompt retrieval of information concerning the status (open or closed) 
and subjects of all such inquiries and investigations.”153  Such a database 
appears to be new.  Moreover, in addition to this database of FBI-generated 
information, another even more sweeping database is authorized by the 
guidelines, a database that tracks all information that can be discovered 
about suspected terrorists: 
[The database is authorized to contain] pertinent information from any source 
permitted by law, including information derived from past or ongoing investi-
gative activities; other information collected or provided by governmental enti-
ties, such as foreign intelligence information and lookout list information; pub-
licly available information, whether obtained directly or through services or 
resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such in-
formation; and information voluntarily provided by private entities.154
 152 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 7. 
 153 Id. at 21. 
 154 Id. at 21–22.  “Private entities” may sound innocuous enough, but there are private groups which 
collect information on their own that the government either would  be restricted by federal law in col-
lecting or would have to clear a great many hurdles to gather.  The private groups can get this informa-
tion without such bureaucratic delays and now can provide it on their own initiative to the government, 
which can then add it to the governmental databases. 
The scope of such “private investigations” can be quite breathtaking, causing them to raise serious 
questions about whether the legal frameworks put in place to regulate the FBI, flexible as they are, are 
being evaded.  As Steven Emerson, head of the Investigative Project, a group specializing in private 
investigations of Islamist terrorism, has revealed: 
People in law enforcement would regularly come to me with new data, records, and documents.  
The most disturbing were the calls I would get from federal law-enforcement agents who had in-
formation and wanted to follow up, but were being prevented by their superiors who weren’t in-
terested in these things.  More and more, these disgruntled agents turned to us with information 
that they weren’t allowed to pursue themselves. 
Our operations became more sophisticated and far-reaching.  One of the unexplored moun-
tains of evidence we inherited, for example, was the trial exhibits from the first World Trade 
Center bombing.  Included were the records of thousands of phone calls made by the suspects to 
the Middle East and other parts of the world.  We knew the individuals who were placing the 
calls, but we couldn’t tell who had received them.  Yet it was obvious that this was the key to 
investigating how far the network of international terrorism had extended. 
We divided the list of calls up country by country.  Then, we engaged a number of Arabic 
speakers and started making cold calls.  Every night at midnight—when the tolls were low and it 
was daylight on the other side of the world—we would begin dialing numbers in the Middle 
East.  When someone picked up we would engage him in random, nondescript conversation.  
“How are you?  How are things going?  I’m calling from the U.S.  Do you want to know what’s 
happening here?”  One way or another we tried to get them to talk to us. 
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In addition to creating new databases for storing information about ter-
rorist suspects and terrorism investigations, the guidelines also indicate that 
the FBI will be authorized (in a change of policy) to “visit any place and 
attend any event that is open to the public,” as well as “to conduct online 
search activity and to access online sites and forums on the same terms and 
conditions as members of the public generally.”155  These practices had 
been explicitly disallowed under the previous guidelines because under-
cover infiltration of political groups had previously led to shocking abuses. 
What is disturbing about the Ashcroft guidelines in the context of a dis-
cussion about emergency powers is how unaccountable they are to any-
thing resembling a democratic process.  The attorney general can change 
policy quite radically on just his own say-so without either congressional 
approval or even a rule-making process that requires public input.  And 
More than 49 out of 50 calls would be a dead end.  The person answering would hang up or 
wouldn’t have any idea of what we were talking about.  But that one in fifty proved to be a 
treasure trove of information.  At one point we ended up talking to the son of blind Sheikh Omar 
Abdel Rahman, the infamous Jersey City imam who plotted a day of terror for Manhattan.  An-
other time we reached the spiritual leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Little by little it be-
came obvious that all these groups were coordinating their effort in a worldwide network. 
Then one day the phone rang, and we hit an absolute gold mine.  The caller was a brave 
Sudanese who was a member of the Republican Brotherhood, a group opposed to Dr. Hassan al-
Turabi’s fundamentalist regime in Sudan.  He was now working as a plumber in Brooklyn.  He 
was in the basement of a building and had just come across scores of boxes of old records that 
appeared to be the property of Alkhifa Refugee Center, also known as the Office of Services for 
the Mujahideen, the predecessor to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda international network.  The re-
cords had apparently been moved there after the World Trade Center bombing from Alkhifa 
headquarters at the Al-Farooq Mosque on Atlantic Avenue.  He wondered if we would be inter-
ested.  
We immediately contacted the FBI in New York and Washington.  To our utter amaze-
ment, they said they couldn’t do anything about it.  The field agents were very interested but 
when they ran it up to their superiors, they were told it wouldn’t fly.  We even smuggled out a 
few pages to pique their interest but the superiors would not budge.  Then we got word that the 
documents were about to be moved or perhaps even destroyed in about five days. 
So we decided to pull off our own covert operation.  Our Sudanese contact went into the 
building at midnight to do his job carrying several large toolboxes.  He then immediately emp-
tied the toolboxes and filled them with documents.  We met him at the rear of the building in a 
rented van.  We grabbed the toolboxes, each containing about 4,000–5,000 documents, and 
raced off to a Kinko’s in Manhattan where we spent all night feverishly photocopying the mate-
rial.  Then we would race back to the building by 6:00 A.M. and return them to the plumber so 
he could put them back before the building owners showed up for work.  We did this for three 
straight nights. 
The papers contained financial records, address books, information about the fabrication of 
passports, and countless other materials showing the Alkhifa Refugee Center’s involvement in 
the worldwide jihad movement.  When we returned to the building the fourth night, however, 
our contact didn’t show up.  We waited and waited but by 7:00 A.M. we were very fearful that 
something had happened to him.  We left and found out later that something had triggered the 
building owners’ suspicion and they had caught him.  While we were waiting outside he was be-
ing questioned and threatened in the basement.  He is a tough guy, however, and somehow got 
out of it.  We ended up keeping the original records instead of copies.  Altogether, we only re-
trieved about one-quarter of the information that was there, but it was great material.  We got 
thousands of leads.  Nonetheless, I still think it would have been much better had the FBI gone 
in. 
STEVEN EMERSON, AMERICAN JIHAD:  THE TERRORISTS LIVING AMONG US 19–22 (2002). 
 155 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 22. 
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given the secrecy surrounding the authorized investigations, it will be diffi-
cult for anyone illegally surveilled to challenge the practices until visible 
damage has been done.  Since the guidelines were issued, Attorney General 
Ashcroft shows every sign of expanding his powers as far as he can. 
Under these new guidelines, Ashcroft pushed the envelope of prior 
practice by seeking FISA156 warrants in cases where the clear intent of the 
FBI was to engage simultaneously in foreign intelligence collection and 
criminal investigation.  The USA PATRIOT Act had officially changed the 
standard for obtaining FISA warrants from a showing that foreign intelli-
gence was “the purpose” of the surveillance or search to a showing that 
foreign intelligence was “a significant purpose” of the investigation.157  The 
tricky part, legally speaking, came when FISA warrants were requested in 
order to spy not just on non-resident aliens, who have little protection under 
FISA, but also on American citizens and green-card holders, who have 
more.  When FISA was first passed, Congress had inserted a special protec-
tion that required the government to “minimize”158 the amount of personal 
information gathered and retained on “United States person[s]”159 who 
were the targets of FISA warrants.  This provision was not amended by the 
USA PATRIOT Act.  But Attorney General Ashcroft wanted to increase 
the amount of information gathered and retained under FISA on U.S. per-
sons for use in criminal investigations related to terrorism.  In fact, his 
memo on the subject indicated that he took the view that the “significant 
purpose” standard newly introduced to FISA through the USA PATRIOT 
Act “allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as 
long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose remains.”160  He indicated 
that requests for FISA warrants could originate with the criminal investiga-
tion side of the DOJ rather than the intelligence investigation side.161
While the question of who gets to request a FISA warrant may sound 
like an arcane organizational matter within the DOJ, it is a distinction of 
constitutional importance.  The Fourth Amendment applies in full to war-
rants sought for ordinary criminal searches and surveillance, and the spe-
 156 For the details of FISA warrants, see supra note 124. 
 157 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291. 
 158 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4) (2000). 
 159 § 1801(i).  This is the term of art used in FISA to refer primarily to American citizens and green-
card holders. 
 160 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, to Director, FBI, et al., at pt. I (Mar. 6, 
2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html.  The memo indicates that “[t]he 
Criminal Division and OIPR [Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] shall have access to all infor-
mation developed in full field FI [foreign intelligence] and FCI [foreign counterintelligence] investiga-
tions,” id. at pt. II.A., which meant that there were, in essence, no minimization procedures that would 
consistently redact information about American citizens or green-card holders who came under foreign 
intelligence surveillance.  While the previous rule was that information would stay within foreign intel-
ligence investigations unless there were special permission to share it with the criminal side, the new 
rule implies that all information will be shared unless there are special reasons not to. 
 161 “Correspondingly, the Attorney General can most effectively direct and control such FI and FCI 
investigations only if all relevant DOJ components are free to offer advice and make recommendations, 
both strategic and tactical, about the conduct and goals of the investigations.”  Id. at pt. I. 
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cific grounds for getting those warrants is given in Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.162  For Title III surveillance 
warrants, the standard is that probable cause be shown that a crime has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed before such a warrant shall be 
given.163  FISA warrants also have a probable cause standard, but the only 
probable cause that must be shown in the case of “non-U.S. persons” is that 
the target of the warrant is an agent of a foreign power,164 both an easier 
and a different thing to prove.  But even though Title III and FISA warrants 
both authorize intrusive surveillance, FISA warrants are easier to get in the 
first place and more powerful when gotten.  FISA warrants are authorized 
for longer periods of time, require no notice to the surveilled party, and al-
low all records of the surveillance to be kept secret, even if the information 
is later introduced at trial.165  If all criminal investigations in the terrorism 
field can proceed with FISA warrants instead of Title III warrants, then the 
Fourth Amendment has been effectively bypassed.  By indicating that the 
DOJ would share all information between the criminal side and the intelli-
gence investigation side of the department, Ashcroft was proposing to 
eliminate altogether the Fourth Amendment requirements that might oth-
erwise apply to terrorism-related searches and surveillance. 
And the changes do not just affect aliens.  The FISA statute requires 
that the information collected and stored on U.S. persons be “minimized,” 
which is to say that when citizens and green-card holders are under surveil-
lance, a narrower range of information can be collected in the first place 
and this narrower range of information is subject to stricter rules about re-
tention and distribution than would be the case if non-U.S. persons were 
under surveillance.  As part of his newly aggressive posture post-9/11, 
Ashcroft proposed new “minimization procedures” to apply to U.S. persons 
in the context of specific applications for FISA warrants before the FISC.166 
But the court balked at approving these minimization procedures, even 
though the court approved the warrants themselves.  This was significant, 
because in its nearly twenty-five years of operation, there is no evidence 
that the FISC had ever refused to approve the full request of the DOJ.167  
 162 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20 (2000)). 
 163 § 802, 82 Stat. at 218 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000)). 
 164 For a more detailed contrast between Fourth Amendment and FISA warrants, see Swire, supra 
note 133.  For U.S. persons, an additional showing that the target knowingly engage in potentially 
criminal activity is also required.   50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).   
 165 Id. 
 166 The FISC, which was set up by Congress in FISA, is an Article III court staffed with district court 
judges who are empowered to approve FISA warrant requests.  50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000). 
 167 Though the warrants themselves and everything they produce is secret, under the terms of FISA, 
the FISC must report on the number of warrant requests and the number of warrants granted each year.  
50 U.S.C. § 1807.  These reports are publicly available, and it is from these reports that we can see that 
the FISC has never rejected a warrant request.  For FISC statistics, see FISA Statistics, supra note 85.  
The secrecy surrounding FISA warrants is otherwise so complete that any details of the warrant re-
quests to this court are secret not just at the moment when they are made, but perpetually.  Even when 
parts of a FISA wiretap are used against a defendant in a criminal case, the defendant may not be al-
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Convening an unprecedented en banc panel of all the FISC judges, the 
court ruled that the Ashcroft request went too far and that the proposed 
unlimited information sharing between those who were authorized to con-
duct intelligence investigations and those who were authorized to conduct 
criminal investigations within the DOJ violated FISA with respect to U.S. 
persons,168 Though the court might have gone further to say that the 
Ashcroft practices violated the U.S. Constitution by circumventing the 
Fourth Amendment altogether, the court refrained from dealing with the 
constitutional issues.169
Though the specific warrants requested were in fact issued (with some 
modifications pertaining to proposed minimization standards),170 the DOJ 
fought the FISC’s judgment on the new minimization procedures by ap-
pealing to the never-before-convened Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (“FISCOR”)171 for a further ruling.  FISCOR, in a deci-
sion far more sweeping than the decision below, ruled that the USA 
PATRIOT Act had changed the ground rules for sharing information be-
tween intelligence and criminal investigations and that the DOJ could 
therefore get FISA warrants to investigate even U.S. persons regardless of 
whether the search or surveillance was used for intelligence purposes or 
criminal investigation purposes.172  As long as the search or surveillance 
gathered information that could be used for intelligence purposes, criminal 
investigation could even be the primary motive for the information.173
With this substantial victory, there is no reason for the DOJ to go the 
more onerous Fourth Amendment route to gather information in interna-
tional terrorism investigations.  As a result, the Fourth Amendment “prob-
able cause” standard has been replaced by the FISA “probable cause” stan-
dard, which requires only probable cause that the non-U.S. person to be 
investigated is an agent of a foreign power, not necessarily that they have 
committed or are about to commit a crime.  And even though a FISA war-
rant still requires demonstration of some connection to a criminal activity 
in the case of U.S. persons, Ashcroft’s statement that he intends to throw 
the book at potential terrorism suspects for “spitting on the sidewalk,” indi-
lowed to see the raw material from which quotations were selected or even to see the original in a for-
eign language when all that is introduced in court is the translation.  For a more detailed explanation, 
see Swire, supra note 133 (manuscript at 31). 
 168 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 
625 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
 169 Id. at 615 (noting that the constitutional issues are not addressed). 
 170 Under the terms of FISA, an appeal can only be made from denial of a warrant request.  50 
U.S.C. § 1803(b).  Because the warrant requests in this case were modified before being granted, the 
DOJ appealed the modification even though the warrant was granted.  This might have raised questions 
about whether the decision below could in fact be appealed, but the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review was not deterred from ruling because of this minor point. 
 171 The FISCOR is another special court created by FISA.  See § 1803(b). 
 172 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 173 Id. at 731 (noting that the prosecutor’s ability to advise the FBI in intelligence investigations 
should not be limited). 
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cates that the criminal nexus can be quite minimal.  As a result, FISA can 
be used quite widely to substitute for the traditional Title III, Fourth-
Amendment-based warrant, even for U.S. citizens and green-card holders.    
The impact of this extraordinary change on the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to terrorism investigations was itself deliberately minimized 
by the FISCOR in the rather stunning statement: 
Our case may well involve the most serious threat our country faces.  Even 
without taking into account the President’s inherent constitutional authority to 
conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, we think the procedures 
and government showings required under FISA, if they do not meet the mini-
mum Fourth Amendment warrant standards, certainly come close.  We, there-
fore, believe firmly . . . that FISA as amended is constitutional because the sur-
veillances it authorizes are reasonable.174
As the court slipped from requiring that a statute actually meet the tests that 
the Constitution sets to being satisfied if the statute “comes close,” the 
statutory requirement that there be minimization procedures to redact in-
formation gathered about American citizens and green-card holders also 
seemed to disappear.  The FISCOR decision breathtakingly permitted both 
the protections for U.S. persons Congress had put into the Act (and had not 
amended with the USA PATRIOT Act) and the more general requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment to vanish amid the claims that the country is un-
der serious threat.  When this decision was issued in November 2002, more 
than a year after the terrorist attacks, the state of emergency became firmly 
entrenched.175
The changed trigger mechanisms for when investigations may be per-
formed, who has to approve them, how much judicial oversight they re-
quire, and what can be done with the evidence collected are all, in my view, 
bigger changes in existing law than those made directly under the USA 
PATRIOT Act.  They have also moved the United States further and fur-
ther away from what had been established as the normal operating rules for 
domestic criminal and intelligence investigations.  Though the Constitution 
does not seem to contemplate any situation in which the Fourth Amend-
ment might be suspended in a time of crisis, the Fourth Amendment has ef-
fectively been suspended for the purposes of terrorism-related investiga-
tions. 
Finally, there has been the very serious move away from anything re-
sembling normal procedure in the case of the two U.S. citizens who have 
been detained indefinitely without charges, without counsel, and with al-
most no constitutional review.  According to the government, Yaser Hamdi 
was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, taken to the special detain-
ees’ camp at Guantánamo Bay, and then discovered to be a U.S. citizen.176  
 174 Id. at 746 (emphasis added). 
 175 Proceedings before the FISA courts are ex parte proceedings, so there is no knowledgeable losing 
party who could appeal this decision.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000). 
 176 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003) 
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He was removed from Guantánamo, taken to the U.S. mainland, and put in 
a military jail as an “enemy combatant” without access to counsel and, as 
far as the courts have been concerned thus far, without the ability to require 
the government to put forward more than a small amount of evidence to 
justify his indefinite detention.177  The government has presented as evi-
dence only a second-hand declaration by a political appointee in the DOD 
to the effect that Hamdi was indeed captured on the battlefield and has been 
classified by the President as an enemy combatant.178  While at a trial this 
evidence would be considered multiple hearsay and would not be admissi-
ble, this declaration was enough to satisfy the Fourth Circuit, which ap-
proved Hamdi’s indefinite detention without counsel, formal charges, or 
trial.179  The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and heard argu-
ments on this case.180
The other case of a domestic “enemy combatant” involves José Padilla, 
an American citizen of Puerto Rican descent who was born in New York 
and convicted of murder in Chicago.181  While in prison, Padilla apparently 
converted to Islam, and upon his release, sought to join al Qaeda, according 
to the government’s statement.  Padilla flew to Pakistan and crossed over 
into Afghanistan where he allegedly volunteered his services to al Qaeda, 
although it is not clear from the government’s statements in the matter 
 177 The Fourth Circuit upheld the government’s detention of Hamdi but limited its holding almost 
entirely to its asserted facts: 
Because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater 
of conflict, we hold that the submitted declaration is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude 
that the Commander in Chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the war powers 
entrusted to him by the U.S. Constitution.  No further factual inquiry is necessary or proper, and 
we remand the case with directions to dismiss the [habeas] petition. 
Id. at 459. 
As critics of the decision have noted, one reason why the evidence against Hamdi is “undisputed” is 
that he was never allowed to meet with a lawyer or to put forward evidence on his own behalf. 
 178 The “Mobbs Declaration,” named after Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy, listed only bare bones facts against Hamdi without indicating sources and with-
out providing vital context.  A summary of what the Mobbs Declaration said in Hamdi can be found in 
the petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court filed by Hamdi’s lawyer, Frank Dunham, who has 
never met his client.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-
6696), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums100103pet.pdf. 
 179 On this, even the normally deferential Fourth Circuit almost balked.  As the court said: 
We did not order the petition [for habeas review] dismissed outright, however, noting our reluc-
tance to “embrac[e] [the] sweeping proposition . . . that, with no meaningful judicial review, any 
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without 
charges or counsel on the government’s say-so.”  Rather, we sanctioned a limited and deferen-
tial inquiry into Hamdi’s status, noting “that if Hamdi is indeed an ‘enemy combatant’ who was 
captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government’s present detention of him is a lawful 
one.” 
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)) (alterations in 
original). 
 180 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.).  The Court heard oral arguments on Wednes-
day, April 28, 2004, but as of the time I write, no decision has been issued.   
 181 For the only facts we know about Padilla’s case, see Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special 
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 2 (Aug. 27, 2002), 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702mobbs.pdf. 
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whether, or for what purposes, his offer was taken up.182  Upon his return to 
the United States, Padilla was arrested at O’Hare Airport in Chicago, and 
flown to New York City to appear as a material witness before the grand 
jury convened there.183  But before he could testify, he was taken into mili-
tary custody and removed from New York.  His lawyer first learned about 
Padilla’s disappearance when she went to meet with him and found that he 
was no longer held in New York.   
Donna Newman, Padilla’s court-appointed lawyer under the material 
witness warrant, started a long fight in which she attempted to figure out 
where her client had been taken.  Once she determined that Padilla had 
been sent to a military brig and declared an enemy combatant by President 
Bush, she began a legal battle to have his case reviewed by the federal 
courts on a habeas petition.  The DOJ, however, took the position that 
Padilla was not entitled to see his lawyer, that he could be held indefinitely 
as an enemy combatant in a military jail without charges or without any 
means of communication with the outside world, and that he was in general 
beyond the reach of the ordinary legal system.  The DOJ argued that habeas 
review was simply not available to those whom the President had deemed 
enemy combatants.184
Since Padilla was not captured on the battlefield, his case has received 
different treatment in the courts from that of Hamdi.  Padilla’s case was 
heard in the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York 
because his original detention was in New York, so the direct conflict with 
the rulings from the Eastern District of Virginia were also muted.  Judge 
Michael Mukasey held that Padilla was entitled to challenge his detention 
on a habeas petition but, unlike Hamdi, Padilla was also entitled to meet 
with his lawyer and prepare a defense.185  Unfortunately for Padilla, how-
ever, the judge also ruled that the government could hold him upon the 
showing of only “some evidence” that he was an enemy combatant.186  
“Some evidence” is a far cry from the level of proof that would normally 
be required for long-term detention if this case were treated within the 
normal criminal justice system.  Furthermore, it has been unclear how 
Padilla could successfully show that the government had failed to meet this 
low standard.  Even with this government-friendly ruling, the DOJ chal-
lenged Mukasey’s decision, refusing to allow Padilla’s lawyer access to 
 182 Here, too, the only evidence presented by the government to justify indefinite detention without 
the right to counsel is yet another hearsay upon hearsay declaration by Michael Mobbs.  See id. 
 183 Id. at 4. 
 184 For the government’s argument, see the Respondents’ Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the 
Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla v. Bush (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM)), 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702grsp.pdf, as well as the government’s 
brief on the merits in the case before the Supreme Court, Brief for Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
(2004) (No. 03-1027), 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/192/Padilla_BriefForThePetit
ioner.pdf. 
 185 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 186 Id. at 608. 
  
46 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 6:5 
 
him,187 and, having obtained certification from Judge Mukasey, the gov-
ernment launched an interlocutory appeal of Judge Mukasey’s decision to 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The Second Circuit made an even more forceful decision on Padilla’s 
behalf.188  Ruling that Padilla had the right to consult with counsel (all three 
judges on the panel agreed on this), the two-judge majority held that the 
President had no authority to detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant 
on American soil, absent explicit authorization of Congress.189  Aware of 
the seriousness of the situation, the court reframed the legal question as one 
about separation and sharing of powers,190 rather than about presidential 
power, taken alone.  The court took particular note of the Non-Detention 
Act, which specifies that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise de-
tained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress,”191 and 
indicated that the President had no power, even under the Commander-in-
Chief Clause of the Constitution, to detain an American citizen on Ameri-
can soil without the express authorization of Congress.192  The Joint Reso-
lution passed by Congress in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 failed to pro-
vide such explicit authorization, the court held, ordering Padilla released 
from military custody within thirty days.193  But Padilla has not yet been 
released, pending a determination by the Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari in his case.194
The domestic enemy combatant cases have generated a great deal of 
criticism, from human rights organizations195 to the American Bar Associa-
 187 Padilla v. Bush was adhered to, on reconsideration, by Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), application granted, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which found that because 
the petitioner was not apprehended on the battlefield, counsel for petitioner had to be able to meet with 
him to develop the facts of the case; otherwise the court could not assess whether the petitioner had 
been detained arbitrarily. 
 188 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 189 Id. at 720. 
 190 The opinion states: 
As this Court sits only a short distance from where the World Trade Center once stood, we 
are as keenly aware as anyone of the threat al Qaeda poses to our country and of the responsi-
bilities the President and law enforcement officials bear for protecting the nation.  But presiden-
tial authority does not exist in a vacuum, and this case involves not whether those responsibili-
ties should be aggressively pursued, but whether the President is obligated, in the circumstances 
presented here, to share them with Congress. 
Id. at 699. 
 191 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). 
 192 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 720. 
 193 The government filed a motion to stay the decision until the case could be heard by the Supreme 
Court.  See Affirmation in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Stay the Mandate, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 
352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-2235(L.) and 03-2438(Con.)), 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padrums11604staymot.pdf.  Oral argument was held on 
Wednesday, April 28, 2004, but as of the time I write, no decision has been issued.   
 194 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.) (granting certiorari). 
 195 See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, USA:  One Year in Detention Without Charge 
(June 9, 2003), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510852003; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
WORLD REPORT 2002:  UNITED STATES, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/us.html (last visited May 3, 
2004). 
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tion.196  The cases have generated an unusual number of amicus briefs in 
the Supreme Court.197  Even those who have otherwise taken the view that 
the war on terrorism requires exceptional means have found that the enemy 
combatant cases go too far.  Instead of altering the usual rules of criminal 
procedure, the enemy combatant cases infringe on more fundamental struc-
tural principles of American constitutional government, like the separation 
of powers which requires independent judicial review of executive action, 
especially as it pertains to the treatment of individual citizens and the basic 
right of personal liberty. 
Since 9/11 there has been a steady erosion of normality in the govern-
ment’s response to terrorism.  While one may have expected the sharpest 
violations of the state of normality to come right after the attacks in a kind 
of emotional reaction to the shock of the event, the trajectory has actually 
been quite different.  Instead of declining over time, the number of efforts 
to claim exception—to argue that unusual times call for unusual meas-
ures—has in fact increased over time as the shock of 9/11 fades. 
Perhaps most pronounced is the Bush administration’s increasing effort 
to avoid regular judicial procedures at all by trying to bring the war on ter-
rorism entirely within the executive branch and minimizing the influence of 
both Congress and the courts.  While the earliest 9/11-related cases were in 
fact brought in the federal courts under regular criminal procedure (United 
States v. Moussaoui198 and United States v. Lindh199), the post-9/11 
roundup cases have been handled on a different model.  They were proc-
essed primarily through administrative law courts,200 rather than through 
regular Article III courts, because they were assimilated, often pretextually, 
into the system of immigration control rather than the system of crime con-
trol.  As 2002 progressed, the Attorney General guidelines were promul-
gated, changing the ground rules for terrorism investigations quite radi-
cally.201  From all an outsider can see, the DOJ’s methods for handling 
 196 See AM. BAR ASSOC., TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, REVISED REPORT 
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2003), 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/abarpt21003cmbtnts.pdf. 
 197 An archive of the amicus briefs in the Hamdi and Padilla cases can be found in collections main-
tained by the law firm Jenner & Block.  See U.S. Supreme Court Brief Resource Center:  Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, at http://www.jenner.com/hamdi (last visited May 3, 2004); U.S. Supreme Court Brief Re-
source Center:  Rumsfeld v. Padilla, at http://www.jenner.com/padilla (last visited May 3, 2004). 
 198 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 199  227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 200 Administrative law judges do not have the same formal guarantees of independence as their Arti-
cle III counterparts.  In general, also, administrative proceedings, like deportation hearings, have been 
deemed by regular court decisions prior to 9/11 not to require the full constitutional criminal procedure 
protections that would be mandated in a criminal trial.  To take one particularly relevant example, since 
the mid-1990s (as a result of the anti-terrorism laws passed after the Oklahoma City bombing), immi-
gration hearings can use “secret evidence” that the defendant and his/her lawyer cannot see, but that is 
only shown to the judge.  This serious abridgment of the Confrontation Clause would clearly not be 
tolerated in an ordinary criminal case. 
 201 See supra notes 144–155 and accompanying text. 
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terrorism investigations have gotten more extreme and more “exceptional” 
the further we get from 9/11. 
There is also a sign that terrorism investigations have been increasingly 
using methods that no longer require regular Fourth Amendment judicial 
warrants.  Instead, the DOJ has indicated that it prefers to go to the FISC,202 
which proceeds on the basis of evidence that never has to be revealed and 
which has never in its twenty-five-year history refused to grant a warrant 
when asked.203  In addition, despite being required to do so by the USA 
PATRIOT Act,204 the DOJ has reported only grudgingly on its use of USA 
PATRIOT Act provisions to the Congress.205  And the minimal information 
given so far has not enabled the Congress to engage in reasonable oversight 
of the terrorism investigations, as both Republican and Democratic mem-
bers of Congress have noted.206
The avoidance of separation of powers constraints in the domestic war 
on terrorism has reached its height with the claimed presidential power to 
label suspect individuals as enemy combatants who are immune from legal 
process altogether.  The “enemy combatant” label has dispensed with the 
need to provide substantial evidence to hold a suspect in custody, according 
to the Bush administration—and this pertains not only to aliens, but also to 
American citizens.  But the ability of the president to designate “enemy 
combatants” is given neither directly by the Constitution nor by statute.  It 
has been asserted on the basis of the constitutional commander-in-chief 
power to conduct wars as the president sees fit.  The arguments in these 
cases have so far revealed that the President is willing to provide little more 
than general assertions about the alleged enemy’s activities.  And the ex-
ecutive branch has denied that the courts even have jurisdiction to hear 
 202 By now, Title III warrants account for only 25% of the total warrants obtained at the federal level.  
FISA warrants constitute 75% of electronic surveillance orders.  Compare FISA Statistics, supra note 
85, with ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2001 WIRETAP REPORT 15-17 tbl. 2 (2002), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap01/table201.pdf. 
 203 For the FISC review statistics, see FISA Statistics, supra note 85. 
 204 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391 (instructing the In-
spector General to prepare reports on civil liberties abuses). 
 205 The fourth such report was issued by the Inspector General (“IG”) of the DOJ on January 27, 
2004. But the report provides few specifics compared with the more in-depth report done on the 9/11 
detainees.  In particular, the IG seems to have ruled almost all complaints out of his jurisdiction because 
they do not involve actions by DOJ employees.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DOJ, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0401a/final.pdf.  But in a world where at least some of the most im-
portant information in the war on terrorism is collected privately, see, e.g., supra note 167, it may well 
be that information that would come into government hands in violation of the civil liberties of citizens 
and residents of the United States would not involve DOJ employees. 
 206 As one contemporary news story noted: 
Many lawmakers said Ashcroft continues to be guarded or unresponsive when presented 
with questions from Congress about the department’s use of the broad new surveillance and in-
vestigative powers given to them by the post-Sept. 11, 2001, USA Patriot Act, despite recent re-
ports that have raised questions about the treatment of immigrant detainees, the increased use of 
wiretap surveillance, and the use of Patriot Act provisions for non-terrorist crimes. 
Emily Pierce, Ashcroft Rapped Over Oversight, ROLL CALL, June 9, 2003, at 1. 
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these cases.207  The government has neither to bring charges, nor to present 
evidence in a public forum, nor to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the detained person has done what the government believes the detainee 
has done.  The “enemy combatant” label is the logical endpoint of a proc-
ess in which the rule of law has been progressively undermined by asser-
tions of executive power to determine when the rules no longer apply.  
Though the courts have so far shown some substantial nervousness about 
the breadth of the President’s claims in the enemy combatant cases and the 
Second Circuit has held that the President flatly does not have this power, 
the Bush administration has persisted in insisting that it alone can safeguard 
the nation by determining unilaterally how to fight the “war” on terrorism. 
B.  The State of Exception in Foreign Policy 
Having sketched the contours of the U.S. government’s post-9/11 do-
mestic policy on terrorism, it should not be surprising to find roughly the 
same general outlines in U.S. foreign policy.208  At first, the deviations 
from rule-of-law-based practice were minor, but the invocations of the state 
of exception, justifying a release from the rules, have increased as 9/11 re-
cedes into the distance. 
The most visible foreign policy response of the U.S. government right 
after 9/11 was to look for a military target against which to retaliate.  But al 
Qaeda was not a country, and military doctrine typically operates with 
countries as targets.  The language that had been inserted into the congres-
sional joint resolution authorizing the President to take all “necessary and 
appropriate force” against those who attacked the United States also in-
cluded language that extended the authorized use of force to those who 
“harbored” the attackers.209  The “harboring” language gave the Bush ad-
ministration domestic permission to launch its military attack against Af-
ghanistan, where the Taliban government had given explicit protection to 
the al Qaeda forces still there.  Furthermore, Afghanistan had clearly served 
as the physical headquarters of al Qaeda until just before the attacks. 
Much of world opinion was on the side of the United States as it prose-
cuted a war against the battered and impoverished country of Afghani-
stan.210  Many allies offered to fight alongside the United States.211  The in-
 207 Calling the President’s judgment in the matter of enemy combatants a “quintessentially military 
judgment,” the government argued that the military was better able to handle these cases than Article III 
courts.  Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 16, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 
03-6696), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums120303gopp.pdf. 
 208 I should note that I will only discuss those aspects of foreign policy that are visible to someone 
who does not have a security clearance.  There were no doubt other major changes—such as alterations 
in the CIA’s rules of engagement or in clandestine collaboration among security services or even an 
increase in extraordinary renditions, much of which would be outside the public eye. 
 209 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S9413-01 (2001) (enacted). 
 210 See Robin Wright, Coalition of Exceptional Depth is Forming, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A3 
(describing the wide support among nations for the war in Afghanistan).  But see Ewen MacAskill et 
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ternational press offered relatively little criticism, while occasionally won-
dering whether it was either humane or worthwhile to bomb a country 
where little was left from previous wars.212  Understood as a reaction of 
self-defense in response to a prior military attack, however, the U.S. war 
against the Taliban government and their al Qaeda friends was widely 
thought to be justified,213 even if the U.N. Security Council’s blessing had 
not been explicitly sought as international law required.214  While the U.S. 
military was nervous about invading a country that had never been success-
fully conquered, they were convinced in the end by the support from vari-
ous allies who made the task easier.  For example, the Russians gave per-
mission to the United States to base its troops in former Soviet military 
bases in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.  President Musharraf 
of Pakistan (a country that had been subject to U.S. sanctions since May 
1998 for having tested a nuclear weapon) was brought back into the pro-
United States fold when he pledged his substantial support for the war 
against Afghanistan.215  Since their own government had supported the 
Taliban and had in fact been crucial in helping it come to power, the Paki-
al., Cracks Appear in Coalition, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 15, 2001, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0,1300,552410,00.html. 
 211 On September 11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”) indicated that its eighteen 
(at that time) members would provide “assistance and support” to the United States.  Press Release, 
NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 11, 2001), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm.  On September 12, NATO invoked Article 5 of its 
charter for the first time in its history, declaring that a member state had been attacked from abroad and 
that the mutual defense pact would therefore be activated.  Press Release, NATO, Statement by the 
North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.  This was 
confirmed in detail with a further finding on October 12 that the attacks had been carried out by al 
Qaeda, harbored by the Taliban government in Afghanistan.  Update, NATO, Invocation of Article 5 
Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm. 
 212 Soviet Invasion, TIMES (London), Oct. 5, 2001 (“If ever there was a place that could do without 
another war, it is Afghanistan; on the other hand, Afghanistan is already so soaked in blood and bullets 
that perhaps a just war, fought cleverly, for honest aims, might yet rescue it from its own history.”), 
available at 2001 WL 4935167. 
 213 See, for example, the open letter signed by a number of prominent American intellectuals that 
supported the attack.  Statement, David Blankenhorn et al., Pre-emption, Iraq, and Just War:  A State-
ment of Principles (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.americanvalues.org/html/1b___pre-emption.html.  
Richard Falk defended the limited use of force in Afghanistan in RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR 
WAR (2003), but seems to have recanted.  See Richard Falk, Letter to the Editor, NATION, Nov. 26, 
2001, at 60. 
 214 The United States probably could have gotten Security Council backing for its attack on Afghani-
stan but it failed to do so and thus acted, strictly speaking, in violation of the U.N. Charter.  See Jona-
than I. Charney, Editorial Comments, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 836 (2001). 
 215 The United States had slapped sanctions on both India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests, and 
sanctions against both came off together.  See Stephen Collinson, Bush Administration Moves Towards 
Lifting India-Pakistan Sanctions, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 22, 2001, 2001 WL 25018917.  The 
fact that President Musharraf seized power in a military coup had resulted in additional sanctions 
against Pakistan.  For the long history of military coups and the attempts of the Pakistani Supreme 
Court to develop an informed and detailed jurisprudence of emergency, see Tayyab Mahmud, Praetori-
anism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings:  Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns 
in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225. 
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stanis were thought crucial to bringing the Taliban down.  In any event, the 
war in Afghanistan went far more quickly than pundits had predicted as the 
Taliban government rather rapidly collapsed.  Al Qaeda’s top leadership, 
however, went underground and was not captured during the war. 
No sooner had the main fighting in Afghanistan stopped, however, 
when the United States started to claim a new state of exception against 
well-understood rules of international law.  This turned out to be more con-
troversial than taking military action against Afghanistan without a Secu-
rity Council resolution had been.  Confronted with many detainees captured 
on the battlefield by the various local militias that the United States had 
pressed into assistance, the U.S. government made a decision to take direct 
control of some of the captives for interrogation.  The government, how-
ever, did this without giving the detainees the protection that international 
law accorded them under the Geneva Conventions by providing access to a 
“competent tribunal” to establish their status.216  Many of the detainees 
 216 The treatment of prisoners of war is generally covered in the Third Geneva Convention, and the 
“competent tribunal” requirement is contained in Article 5.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
(entered into force Feb 2, 1956) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].  The legal advisor to the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, writing in a personal and not an institutional capacity, urged that 
the treatment of at least some “unlawful combatants” is covered in the Fourth Geneva Convention.  
Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of ‘Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,  INT’L REV. RED CROSS, at 
45 (March 2003), 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5LPHBV/$File/irrc_849_Dorman.pdf.  But the view 
that there are no gaps in international humanitarian law and that all persons caught in a conflict situation 
are protected in one way or another under the Geneva Conventions is commonplace.  The Bush admini-
stration, asserting that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to “enemy combatants” (not a term in use 
in international law) never attempted to fully justify its exceptions to the Geneva Conventions in legal 
terms.  In one press conference, (former) White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said that neither al 
Qaeda nor the Taliban captives would automatically get Geneva Convention protections, noting that 
such things depended on whether those captured fought by carrying weapons openly and whether they 
wore uniforms. But then, under more persistent questioning, Fleischer seemed to admit that the deten-
tions were made subject to no law in particular.  A reporter, exasperated at not getting a straight answer 
about whether the detainees were covered by the Geneva Convention or not, asked, “There's no interna-
tional convention or there's no law on which we're detaining them, it's basically, they're dangerous, they 
want to kill Americans, and we're going to keep them in detention.”  And Fleischer seemed to grant the 
point in his answer:  “Keith, put it this way: There's a war in Afghanistan. These people did not stop 
fighting; it was either be killed or be captured. These people were captured.” See Press Briefing by Press 
Secretary, The White House (Jan. 9, 2002).   This was, obviously, was far from the sort of compelling 
legal analysis that one generally expects a government to undertake when it is going to make exception 
to a widely agreed upon international convention.  The White House eventually issued a fact sheet 
summarizing the status of Guantánamo detainees under the Geneva Convention on February 7, 2002, 
indicating that the Taliban detainees would in fact be accorded POW status.  See Press Release, The 
White House, Fact Sheet:  Status of Detainees at Guantánamo, (Feb. 7, 2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In 
Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1 (reporting that the 
shift in position had been strongly urged by European allies and had been advocated by Secretary of 
State Colin Powell).  The international objections to U.S. conduct in the matter of the detainees are not 
to the possibility that a particular detainee would eventually be found guilty of war crimes (though as 
we will see, the specific form of the military tribunals has caused an international outcry).  The objec-
tions are instead that the United States never held individualized review of particular cases to determine 
whether those detained were combatants (and if so, for which party) or civilians. 
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were taken to a hastily constructed camp located in the American military 
base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, halfway around the world. 
Why Guantánamo Bay?  It appears that this location was chosen be-
cause Guantánamo had been previously determined by a number of Ameri-
can courts to be an area that was explicitly not U.S. sovereign territory even 
though the United States had effective and sole control there.217  The ab-
sence of U.S. sovereignty meant that American federal courts were quite 
likely to claim they were largely powerless for jurisdictional reasons to re-
view what occurred there. 
Bird v. United States218 was a pre-9/11 case outside the terrorism con-
text, but it gives the most complete historical account of the special situa-
tion at Guantánamo and its juridical implications.  The base had been 
leased from Cuba in 1903 in order “to enable the United States to maintain 
the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for 
its own defense.”219  The treaty was renewed in 1934 and while “the current 
government in Cuba may not recognize these treaties, the 1903 agreement 
does remain in effect.”220  The treaty was still valid because it explicitly 
specifies that it can be terminated only by mutual agreement or by unilat-
eral abandonment by the United States, neither of which had happened.221  
In response to the argument that the United States had effective sovereignty 
over the territory even though the legal sovereign may have officially been 
another state, Judge Arterton noted that the 1903 treaty explicitly specified 
that Cuba has ultimate sovereignty over Guantánamo and this was what 
was crucial.222  Guantánamo, then, was deemed foreign territory and as a 
result federal courts had no jurisdiction over what the U.S. government did 
there.223  Successive executive branch opinions had held the same.224
 217 E.g., Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).  In that case, Cuban 
refugees sought admission to the United States once they got to Guantánamo and were denied access to 
U.S. courts with the statement, “we . . . reject the argument that our leased military bases abroad which 
continue under the sovereignty of foreign nations, hostile or friendly, are ‘functional[ly] equivalent’ to 
being land borders or ports of entry of the United States or otherwise within the United States.” Id. at 
1425 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 218 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996). 
 219 Id. at 340 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16–23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, 
T.S. 418). 
 220 Id. at 341 (footnote omitted). 
 221 The U.S. government sends annual rent checks of $4,085 to the Cuban government which has not 
cashed these checks since the year after Fidel Castro came to power.  Id. at 341 n.6 (referencing Jim 
Wolf, U.S. Pays Cuba $4,085 Yearly for Leased Guantánamo Base, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 25, 
1994, 1994 WL 6673251). 
 222 Id. at 342 (“[T]he leased land is subject to the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba.”). 
 223 See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Interestingly, 
both United States citizens and aliens alike, charged with the commission of crimes on Guantánamo 
Bay, are prosecuted under United States laws.”), cert. granted and vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v. 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993) (mem.).  This case found that certain Haitian detainees 
could be “screened in” to the United States from Guantánamo to pursue their claims for refugee status, 
but the reasoning relied on their refugee status, not on a general claim about the sovereign status of 
Guantánamo. 
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Given this strong authority, then, the Bush administration located Tali-
ban and al Qaeda detainees at Guantánamo, a place that they could rea-
sonably have expected would not trigger the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  In 
an early challenge that arose within American domestic courts to the deten-
tions, Rasul v. Bush, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that Guantánamo was, in-
deed, not part of the sovereign territory of the United States.225  In fact, the 
proposition had been so well established that plaintiffs did not even seek to 
question Guantánamo’s ultimate status.226  Instead, plaintiffs claimed that 
the United States exercised de facto sovereignty at Guantánamo, and that 
this was sufficient for the application both of the Foreign Tort Claims Act 
(on which a group of Kuwaiti detainees were basing their claim) as well as 
for grounds to request a habeas writ (which two British detainees were 
seeking).227  Judge Kollar-Kotelly dismissed both claims, rejecting the de 
facto sovereignty test urged by the plaintiffs, citing the Bird case.228
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.229  Family mem-
bers who had been permitted to proceed as the next friends of the detain-
ees230 challenged Guantánamo’s status more directly, but the court held that 
 224 See 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 536, 537 (1929) (analyzing Guantánamo’s status in the context of a review 
of other military bases); 6 Op Off. Legal Counsel 236, 238 (1982) (finding that the station at 
Guantánamo is not a “possession” of the United States).  See the more detailed discussion of the status 
of Guantánamo in Gerald L. Neuman, Surveying Law and Borders: Anomalous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 
1197, 1228-1234 (1996). 
 225 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 226 See id. at 69 (“It is undisputed, even by the parties, that Guantánamo Bay is not part of the sover-
eign territory of the United States.”). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 71 (arguing that Guantánamo was outside the sovereign territory of the United States and 
those detained were aliens).  That meant, according to Judge Kollar-Kotelly, that the relevant precedent 
on the habeas claim was Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  In Eisentrager, the Supreme 
Court denied habeas to German nationals first captured and convicted of war crimes by an American 
military tribunal convened in China and then imprisoned in Germany under U.S. military occupation, at 
the end of World War II.  Id. at 790.  Even though the United States had functional military control in 
Germany, such functional control did not give U.S. courts jurisdiction in the Eisentrager case.  Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly argued that it was the same at Guantánamo.  Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“Eisentrager 
is applicable to the aliens . . . at Guantánamo Bay.”).  There were, as a result, no grounds on which to 
extend a writ of habeas corpus.  Aliens detained abroad and held abroad could not access American 
courts simply because their captors were the U.S. military.  The Foreign Tort Claims Act claim was 
rejected as being a habeas petition in disguise.  Id. at 62. 
 229 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534 
(2003) (mem.).  Al Odah affirmed the district court judgment in Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 
2002).  The Supreme Court consolidated Al Odah and Rasul  and granted certiorari limited to the ques-
tion:  “Whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the deten-
tion of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.”  Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.); Al Odah v. United 
States, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.).    
 230 The Guantánamo detainees have been held without being able to consult with counsel or meet 
with family members.  Some of the detainees are allowed to exchange letters with family members, but 
such letters (and the ones back from family members) pass through military screening.  In the U.S.-
court cases consolidated in the Al Odah ruling, family members were bringing the habeas petitions as 
next friends because the detainees were not able to approach the court themselves.  The court permitted 
the family members to be designated as next friends.  Id. at 1138. 
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determinations of sovereignty were “for the legislative and executive de-
partments” to make and no such determination had been made here.231  As 
a result, Guantánamo was not U.S. sovereign territory because no law made 
it so.232  Instead, the court emphasized the similarity between the 
Guantánamo detainees and the petitioning prisoners in Johnson v. Eisen-
trager.233  In Eisentrager, petitioners were Germans captured in China after 
the German surrender at the end of the Second World War and accused of 
continuing to spy on Americans despite the end of hostilities.  The Ger-
mans were detained, tried by military commission, sentenced to prison, and 
taken to Germany to serve their sentences in that occupied country, from 
which they brought a habeas action in U.S. court.  The Supreme Court held, 
according to the Al Odah court, that no habeas writ could issue because the 
prisoners were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, even 
though the prison where they were held was entirely within the functional 
control of American authorities at the time.234  Eisentrager so closed the 
door on habeas petitions from Guantánamo in the court’s view that it noted, 
“[w]e cannot see why, or how, the writ [of habeas corpus] may be made 
available to aliens abroad when basic constitutional protections are not.  
This much is at the heart of Eisentrager.”235
The detainees petitioned the Supreme Court to hear their case, a petition 
which the Court agreed to hear.236  The petitioners and the government in-
clude in their briefs sharply different readings of Eisentrager.  Petitioners 
assert that Eisentrager is a wholly different case from the present one, in-
volving prisoners of war from an enemy state who had in fact been con-
victed of violating the laws in a military tribunal authorized by Congress.  
By contrast, petitioners claim, the Guantánamo detainees are from friendly 
states (Britain and Kuwait) and they have been neither charged nor con-
victed in any legal process.  While the Eisentrager petitioners asked to be 
released, the Guantánamo detainees want only to have their status deter-
mined by an independent tribunal.237  The government asserts that Eisen-
trager is on all fours with the present case:  aliens captured abroad and held 
abroad with no substantial connection to the United States do not have the 
writ available to them.238  As I write, no opinion has yet been forthcoming. 
 231 Id. at 1143 (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948)). 
 232 Id. at 1143–44. 
 233 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 234 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1139.   
 235 Id. at 1141. 
 236 See supra note 229 (explaining the Supreme Court’s consolidation of both detainees’ petitions).   
Oral argument was held on April 20, 2004, but as I write, the opinion had not yet been issued. 
 237 See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Rasul v. Bush (2003) (No. 03-334), available at 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/77/petitioners_brief_on_meri
ts2.pdf; Brief for Petitioners, Al Odah v. United States (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), available at 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/78/Brief_For_Petitioners.pdf. 
 238 Brief for the Respondents, Al Odah v. United States (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), available at 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/170/respondent_brief.pdf. 
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Thus far, there has been no possibility for anyone to assert on behalf of 
these prisoners that they were wrongly detained because the Geneva Con-
ventions have no enforcement mechanism, save for the reciprocal self-
interest of those engaged in hostilities and the power that the armies and the 
domestic courts of the hostile parties choose to give the treaties.  While the 
U.S. military generally accords the Geneva Conventions substantial weight 
in its own internal regulations,239 the Supreme Court in Eisentrager explic-
itly held that the Geneva Conventions gave rise to no private rights of ac-
tion in U.S. courts.  The effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions generally 
relies on the calculation that if one side treats the other side’s POWs well, 
then their POWs will be treated well in return.  The Geneva Conventions, 
according to the Eisentrager court, place “responsibility for observance and 
enforcement of these rights . . . upon political and military authorities.”240
As it turned out, it was impossible to challenge the U.S. detentions in 
foreign courts as well.  In The Queen on the Application of Abbasi v. Secre-
tary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,241 family members of 
some British nationals being held at Guantánamo attempted to get the Brit-
ish courts to order the foreign secretary to intervene on their behalf to have 
the detainees’ status clarified, consistent with the Third Geneva Conven-
tion.  The solicitors for Feroz Ali Abbasi, one of the detainees, and his 
mother had attempted to approach the U.S. government directly through the 
American Embassy in London but had received word that Abbasi and oth-
ers detained at Guantánamo were “enemy combatants” and would be held 
for the duration of the war without legal process.  They sued to get the Brit-
ish government to intervene. 
The Court of Appeal ultimately ruled against Abbasi on the grounds 
that the court had no authority to order the foreign secretary to act in any 
particular way with respect to a matter within the scope of the British gov-
ernment’s foreign policy.  But the judgment is particularly interesting for 
the harsh terms in which it treats American claims that the detainees have 
no legal status cognizable by any court.  Calling the Guantánamo detention 
a “legal black hole,” the court made much of the fact that the United States 
had failed to comply with the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war be-
cause it had not allowed those who were detained to have a hearing on their 
status.  Instead, the United States had asserted that the detainees were, by 
the definition of the conflict in which they had been captured, necessarily 
“enemy combatants” not subject to prisoner-of-war protections. 
 239 The amicus brief filed by the National Institute for Military Justice in the Guantánamo cases be-
fore the Supreme Court discusses the regulations of the American military and the way in which those 
regulations incorporate the Geneva Convention requirements for treatment of prisoners of war.  Brief of 
Amicus Curiae National Institute of Military Justice, Rasul v. Bush (2003) (Nos. 03-334 and 03-343), 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/92/amicuscuriae_national_in
stitute_of_military_justice.pdf. 
 240 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950). 
 241 [2002] All E.R. (D) 70 (Nov.) (Eng. C.A.), 2002 WL 31452052. 
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With its tone fairly dripping with disdain for the American position, the 
Court of Appeal noted that the status of “enemy combatant,” on which the 
Bush administration relied, was not a conception recognizable in interna-
tional law.  Instead, the term appeared only in Ex Parte Quirin,242 an 
American case approving the trial before a military commission of foreign 
nationals who had entered U.S. territory to commit sabotage.  As the Court 
of Appeal pointed out, however, even on the Quirin standard, it was impos-
sible to determine whether the status of enemy combatant in fact applied to 
Abbasi because the circumstances of his capture had never been reviewed 
by any court.  While expressing hope that American courts might find ju-
risdiction to review the Guantánamo cases, the Court of Appeal nonetheless 
found that British courts could do nothing within their own jurisdiction to 
compel the British government to intervene in the matter. 
The Abbasi case is notable because it reflects a view expressed by a 
number of the United States’ allies abroad:  not only that the Geneva Con-
ventions should be followed in the war on terrorism, but also that all de-
tainees should be able to have the bases for their detention reviewed by an 
independent court to assess whether in fact the detention is warranted.  The 
protection that habeas review is supposed to offer those in U.S. detention 
has been generalized as a principle of international law, both in the Geneva 
Conventions and generally in other human rights bodies, such as the Inter-
American Commission, which condemned the U.S. position on 
Guantánamo,243 and the European Court of Human Rights which, while 
having no jurisdiction over Guantánamo, has a substantial jurisprudence 
under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ensuring 
access to court review of all detentions.244  Thus, when the Bush admini-
stration put the Guantánamo detainees into a position where their deten-
tions could not be reviewed, they created an exceptional state that has been 
roundly condemned.245
The condemnation has only increased as the Bush administration has 
made public its plans to constitute specialized tribunals exclusively to try 
the post-9/11 captives who have been held in Guantánamo.  These military 
tribunals were announced in a military order by President Bush shortly af-
 242 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 
 243 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights took “precautionary measures” against the 
United States in its session of March 12, 2002.  Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (De-
tainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2002); see also Response of the 
United States to Request for Precautionary Measures—Detainees in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 41 I.L.M. 
1015 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2002). 
 244 The European Court of Human Rights has a lot of experience in this area, largely in reviewing 
British legal strategy in Northern Ireland during the “troubles,” specifying rule-of-law guarantees even 
for those suspected of terrorism.  See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 
(1988) (holding that even terrorism suspects could not be held without review and without charges for 
as long as four days). 
 245 For example, two British law lords have explicitly condemned the detentions.  Robert Verkaik, 
Another Law Lord Criticises Detentions at Guantánamo Bay, INDEP. (London), Jan. 28, 2004, at 2, 
2004 WL 67162485. 
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ter the 9/11 attacks.246  At the start, the order indicated that such proceed-
ings were to be limited to non-citizens and that they were to be run by the 
U.S. military with procedural rules that were not the equal of those in nor-
mal American courts or in ordinary courts martial, for that matter.  As the 
rules have been elaborated,247 they have been simultaneously better and 
worse than the critics feared.  They are better because they require a judg-
ment of guilt only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Also, they start 
with the presumption of innocence and require unanimous verdicts before a 
death penalty can be imposed.248
Nonetheless, the tribunals have been at least as bad as critics feared be-
cause all aspects of the procedure are controlled by the secretary of defense 
or the secretary’s designee, the appointing authority (“AA”).249 The AA 
approves all charges to be brought and supervises the procedure (including 
security clearances) for qualifying any private defense counsel that the de-
fendant may hire at his own cost.  All judges on the tribunal and all staff 
members—including the prosecutor—are appointed by the AA.  The de-
fendant is assigned (by the AA) to a military counsel, who is the only one 
on the defense team allowed to see all of the evidence against the defen-
dant.  Evidence does not have to be offered orally250 and the defendant has 
no right to confront witnesses against him.251  Instead, indirect (hearsay) 
evidence may be admitted252 and the defendant himself may not be allowed 
to learn all the evidence against him if it is national-security sensitive.253  
While the defendant has some right to call witnesses, such rights are lim-
 246 See Military Order of November 13, 2001:  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
 247 The more specific framework was provided by DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION 
ORDER NO. 1 (2002), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mco1.pdf [hereinafter DOD 
ORDER].  Later, in a series of eight Military Commission Instructions dated April 30, 2003, the DOD 
published detailed rules of procedure.  All of these documents can be found at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html, along with a ninth Military Commission Instruc-
tion dated December 26, 2003. 
 248 The general international acceptance that the death penalty is an inhumane punishment also hurts 
the tribunals in international public opinion.  For example, the European Convention on Human Rights 
requires the forty-six signatory states to forswear use of the death penalty.  For more on the European 
attitude toward punishment generally, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 200–03 (2003). 
 249 The AA’s powers are given in the DOD Order.  DOD ORDER, supra note 247. 
 250 The procedures specify that witnesses may appear in person, “by telephone, by audiovisual 
means, or other means,” id. § 6(D)(2)(a), a list which does not exclude evidence given in writing.  In 
fact, the rules explicitly note that evidence given by unsworn or sworn written statements is admissible.  
Id. § 6(D)(3). 
 251 Id. § 6(D)(2)(c).  The rules indicate that witnesses who appear before the commission would be 
subject to direct and cross-examination but are silent about what opportunities for challenging testi-
mony would be given to those witnesses who are permitted by the earlier passage to testify through 
means other than in-person appearance before the commission.  Id. 
 252 Id. § 6(D)(1).  The rules state that evidence is admissible if it “would have probative value to a 
reasonable person,” a standard that does not exclude the introduction of hearsay.  Id. 
 253 Id. § 6(D)(5) (providing for the protection of information that discloses sources or methods or 
affects national security).  Secret information may be deleted from documents available to both the de-
fense and the defense’s personal lawyer.  Id. § 6(D)(5)(b)(i).  The AA-appointed defense lawyer may 
still see this information.  Id. 
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ited to those witnesses whose presence will not disclose national-security 
sensitive secrets and all witnesses called by the defense must be approved 
by the presiding judge.254  At the end of the proceedings, the AA reviews 
the transcript and signs off on the verdict before it is final, unless the presi-
dent of the United States chooses to review the record for ultimate ap-
proval.255  There is no appeal to anyone outside the DOD, except the presi-
dent of the United States, who was the one to designate which individuals 
could be tried before the military tribunals in the first place. 
Such procedures have not only elicited a great deal of domestic criti-
cism,256 but they have generated perhaps even more protests from outside 
the United States.257  Under the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war 
may only be tried by a tribunal exhibiting “the essential guarantees of inde-
pendence and impartiality,”258 which the proposed military tribunals fail to 
do because they are under the direct control of the president and defense 
secretary.259  When President Bush finally designated a few of the 
Guantánamo detainees for possible trial before the military commissions, 
the British Prime Minister Tony Blair immediately asked that the two Brit-
ish detainees in that first set not be subjected to this procedure.260  The Aus-
tralian Prime Minister, John Howard, learning that there was an Australian 
citizen in that first military tribunals list, asked also for his national to be 
exempted.261  The Bush administration promised to negotiate the proce-
dures to be used in the case of nationals of U.S. allies, but it is unclear just 
what such promises mean.  In spring 2004, charges were brought against 
 254 Id. § 5(H) (“The Accused may obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused’s defense, to the 
extent necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer.”). 
 255 Id. § 6(H) (providing for post-commission review of the proceedings by the AA and the secretary 
of defense or, in some cases, the president).  There is no other appeal allowed.  Id. 
 256 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, American Bar Ass’n, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2002) (condemning the Bush administration’s use of 
military tribunals), http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf. 
 257 See, e.g., Sandro Contenta, Detained Britons Won’t Face Death Penalty For Now, TORONTO 
STAR, July 20, 2003, at F3 (discussing the critical reaction in the United Kingdom to the tribunal proce-
dures), 2003 WL 59323921. 
 258 Third Geneva Convention, art. 84, supra note 216, 6 U.S.T. at 3364–65. 
 259 For critical analyses of the military tribunal rules, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (formerly LAWYERS 
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS), TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER:  A GUIDE TO THE FINAL RULES FOR 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2003), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/a_guide_to_the_final_rules.pdf, and HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
BRIEFING PAPER ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2003), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/military-
commissions.pdf. 
 260 Hamish MacDonell & Fraser Nelson, Blair the Showman’s Ultimate Performance, SCOTSMAN, 
July 19, 2003, at 3, 2003 WL 63935338.
 261 Australian national David Hicks has since been assigned a military defense lawyer though he has 
not yet been charged.  His lawyer has criticized the Guantánamo tribunals and has joined a brief to the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the Al Odah case.  Marian Wilkinson & Jonathan Pearlman, Military Trial Only 
Option for Hicks, Says Ruddock, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 23, 2004, at 6, 2004 WL 55403140.  
For the brief, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Military Attorneys Assigned to the Defense in the Office of 
Military Commissions, Al Odah v. United States (2003) (No. 03-343), 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/91/AmicusCuriae_Military_
Attorneys.pdf. 
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two Guantánamo detainees, one of whom is alleged to be a bodyguard and 
driver for Osama bin Laden262 and the other an associate of bin Laden who 
made a video glorifying the attack on the USS Cole.263
But however much international protest U.S. actions have caused to 
date, nothing equals the international opposition mounted against the war in 
Iraq—opposition which, as I write a year later, is still a fresh wound.  Here 
again, the United States essentially declared a state of exception from the 
normal rules in play for the declaration of war, in which only the justifica-
tion of imminent self-defense works to exempt a state from first going 
through the U.N. Security Council procedures.264  While the United States 
and its staunch ally Britain had started to go down the Security Council 
road toward seeking a U.N. authorization of a military intervention with a 
resolution on point, in the end the impossibility of getting such a resolution 
meant that the United States and Britain had to go it nearly alone, without 
such authorization.  France, Germany, and Russia—two with Security 
Council vetoes and the third on the council at the time—opposed the war; 
mass populations all over Europe and in the Middle East opposed it too, 
along with substantial numbers in the United States.265  Nonetheless, the 
United States and the United Kingdom went forward, claiming that Saddam 
Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that might fall into the hands of 
terrorists, even though the proof they presented did not convince even the 
countries that had recently authorized the weapons inspections.266
Much of the international community felt that either the U.N. proce-
dures should be followed or that the war should not be launched.  For the 
U.N. to fail to support the war in a second resolution and for the war to be 
launched anyway signaled to many that the United States had become law-
less in international affairs.267  (Never mind that getting Security Council 
resolutions before going to war had not been common practice since the 
middle of the twentieth century, despite their endorsement by the U.N. 
 262 See Charge:  Conspiracy, United States v. Al Qosi, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040224AlQosi.pdf. 
 263 See Charge:  Conspiracy, United States v. Al Bahlul, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040224AlBahlul.pdf. 
 264 The U.N. Charter requires a state to bring its grievances to the Security Council instead of 
launching a war on its own.  A war is legitimate only if the U.N. agrees with the grievances and agrees 
to sponsor an international military operation against the offender.  U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.  The only 
exception to this is for immediate self-defense.  Id. at ch. VII, art. 51. 
 265 On February 16, 2003, about five million people around the world demonstrated against the start 
of the Iraq war.  See Peter Conradi, Demos Follow Sun Around the Globe, SUNDAY TIMES (London), 
Feb. 16, 2003, at 2 (describing anti-war protests in Iraq, New York City, and throughout Europe). 
 266 Judy Dempsey, Anti-War Axis:  Three Capitals Stand Firm on Opposing Strike, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Mar. 15, 2003, at 2. 
 267 The Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State failed to produce a formal justification for the 
war.  For a review of the variety of opinions expressed on this subject by experts in the American Jour-
nal of International Law symposium on the legality of the Iraq war, see Lori Fisler Damrosch & Ber-
nard H. Oxman, Editors’ Introduction:  Agora:  Future Implications of The Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 553 (2003). 
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Charter.)268  The arguments for the need to follow international law rang 
out even in places that have not had a history of supporting international 
law themselves.269
Moreover, the pressure that the United States put on its allies amounted 
to trying to force them into a state of exception under their own laws.  The 
United States pressed hard on Turkey, which had a fragile new moderate 
Islamist government, a history of military intervention in civilian govern-
ment, and a historical stake in fighting Kurdish nationalism.  When the ci-
vilian government refused to permit the United States to base its troops in 
Turkey for an attack on Northern Iraq, the Turkish military made noise as if 
it wanted to undermine the civilian government with a decision to the con-
trary.270  Furthermore, the United States did not discourage this, but pressed 
as hard as possible for it (to the point of cutting off aid) right up until the 
war started.271  With other allies—the Philippines and Germany, for exam-
ple—whose constitutions forbid foreign military commitments, the United 
States pressed hard to get them to support a military engagement that their 
own governments would be constitutionally forbidden from entering into 
on their own.272  Russia, which started out as a strong supporter of the U.S. 
 268 There is an interesting story to be told here about how the U.N. Security Council procedures 
came to be normalized, despite having not been actually used very many times before this conflict.  The 
Security Council had been paralyzed during the Cold War because any military venture the United 
States was likely to support would have been vetoed by the Soviet Union and vice versa.  But even after 
the end of the Cold War, the United States had bypassed the Security Council in the 1990s.  For exam-
ple, the United States considered support from NATO to be sufficient international cover for the opera-
tion in Kosovo, and there had been much more muted criticism on that occasion.  Even though the Se-
curity Council procedure has been used very rarely in the way it seems to have been envisioned, by the 
time of the Iraq war in spring 2003, nearly all the parties who spoke about the legitimacy of the war did 
so as if it required such a resolution from the Security Council.  As a result, the failure of the United 
States and Britain to win support from the Security Council for a second resolution on Iraq was then 
met with strong protests that military action without such a resolution was clearly illegitimate.  Giving 
some acknowledgment to this argument, the United States and Britain used the fact that there had been 
a prior resolution, ordering Saddam Hussein to let in weapons inspectors and to cooperate with them or 
face “consequences,” as a basis for justifying their eventual initiation of war.  The resort to the first 
resolution for legitimacy was an indirect affirmation of the position that the Security Council did need 
to authorize a war that was not conducted for immediate self-defense.  As a result, the Iraq war may 
have established for the first time the widespread recognition that Security Council resolutions are in 
fact needed for a state to legitimately go to war. 
 269 During the lead-up to the Iraq War, I was living in Moscow, where television reports and the 
daily print media were full of arguments about the need to follow international law.  Russia, like the 
United States, had shown mostly disdain for international law during the Cold War. 
 270 Karl Vick, After Calls on Turkey, U.S. Put on Hold:  Heeding Public Opposition, Ankara Delays 
Decision on Use of Bases Against Iraq, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2003, at A14 (discussing concerns about 
Turkish opinion regarding the war in Iraq). 
 271 See Andrew Buncombe, Iraq Crisis:  U.S. Flexes Economic Muscle To Ensure Diplomatic Suc-
cess, INDEP. (London), Feb. 25, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 14682283.  When Turkey backed out later, the 
United States cut off all aid. 
 272 See, for example, Articles 25 and 26 of the German Constitution: 
Article 25 (International law and Federal law) 
The general rules of international law are an integral part of federal law.  They shall take prece-
dence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal terri-
tory. 
Article 26 (Prohibition of preparations for a war of aggression) 
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war on terrorism, looked at the United States’ Iraqi strategy in conjunction 
with the other military efforts in the war on terrorism and thought that it too 
might be an eventual target of U.S. aggression.273  This turned the Russian 
population firmly, and the Russian government tepidly (at the very least), 
against the war and against new American military campaigns, even though 
they were done in the name of the war on terrorism. 
Suffice it to say that many of the United States’ allies, no less than its 
enemies, were pushed hard to violate both international agreements and 
their own domestic constitutional provisions in order to be “with us” in-
stead of “with the terrorists.”  The price that allies paid for not supporting 
the U.S. war on terrorism came either in financial terms (aid was cut to 
Turkey and Russia and trade restrictions were threatened with France and 
Germany) or in military terms (Russia believed itself to be surrounded and 
Germany was threatened with a pull-out of American bases there).  Those 
who supported the United States, even at the cost of their own constitu-
tional compliance, were generally rewarded for the use of the state of ex-
ception in their own countries.  For example, in Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf 
rammed through a package of constitutional amendments making himself 
president, extending his term of office, and increasing the formal role of the  
military in government without protest from the United States.274
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with the intent of disturbing the peaceful relations between 
nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, are unconstitutional.  They shall be made 
a punishable offense. 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 25-26 (F.R.G.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  GERMANY (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003).  The Federal Constitutional Court 
ruled in a decision on July 12, 1994 that German troops could serve with peacekeeping forces author-
ized by the United Nations without violating this constitutional provision.  Judgment of July 12, 1994, 
90 BVerfGE 286 (F.R.G.). 
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also references international law: 
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally ac-
cepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of 
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. 
PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 2, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  
PHILIPPINES (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Supp. 1986). 
 273 This view was never stated directly by the Kremlin but it appeared with surprising frequency in 
the Russian media.  There is some evidence of the view, however:  when Russia gave permission to the 
United States to base its military in the Central Asian states and to use former Soviet military bases to 
do so, the permission was conditioned on the promise that the troops’ presence would be temporary.  
But now the United States is building permanent bases in these states.  In addition, the United States has 
dispatched special forces trainers to Georgia, on Russia’s border with Chechnya, and has been using 
military air surveillance (some allegedly have broken into Russian airspace) to keep track of what is 
going on in Chechnya.  The United States is now talking about moving its European bases farther “for-
ward” to get closer to the troublesome Middle East, but putting military bases in Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Poland also brings the U.S. military closer to Russia.  As a result, many Russians have gotten 
prickly over what they see as an attempt by the United States to use the war on terrorism as an excuse to 
surround its former adversary with military bases.  See Seth Mydans, Free of Marx, But Now in the 
Grip of a Dynasty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at A4 (describing political transitions in Russia and the 
“potentially explosive” issue of U.S. military presence). 
 274 See David Rohde, Musharraf Redraws Constitution, Blocking Promise of Democracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at A1 (discussing Musharraf’s political maneuvers after pledging support to the 
United States); Karl Vick, Pakistani Leader Accused of Trying to Grab Power; Restructuring Plan Is 
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In the foreign policy sphere, then, we can see the same sort of progres-
sion from the small exceptions to legality right after 9/11 to increasingly 
large violations conducted with impunity that have become more blatant 
and more common as 9/11 has receded.  While the Bush administration 
seems to have entered the war on terrorism after 9/11 with relative caution, 
this quickly broke down as first the Geneva Conventions and then the U.N. 
Convention itself were breached against strong opposition.  The United 
States has also been urging other countries to break their treaty obligations 
as well as their own constitutions to enter the war on terrorism on the terms 
set by the United States.  Sometimes it even appears as though the Bush 
administration would not mind bringing down the international system as a 
by-product of its war on terrorism, since the international system acts as a 
limitation to an endless state of exception. 
III.  POST-SCHMITT, POST-9/11 
With this rather breathless tour of post-9/11 legal developments in 
mind, what is to be said about the idea of the state of exception?  As I noted 
before, the state of exception according to Carl Schmitt is not just about 
governance in unusual times; it is one of the defining characteristics of 
sovereignty at all times and, as a result, it is the power whose exercise de-
fines the very character of the sovereign.275  At a superficial level, the qual-
ity of President Bush’s presidency does seem to have been radically af-
fected by the events of 9/11 and the need to respond to them.  Political 
commentary in the wake of 9/11 has frequently noted how the attacks gave 
George W. Bush a rationale for his presidency, a missionary project that 
has defined his entire term of office.276  Bush’s invocation of national secu-
rity rationales has meant that he has not needed to otherwise justify or ex-
plain his course of action, except to say that, based on information that 
cannot be widely shared, he understands that he must do what he proposes.  
At this most obvious level, the use of exceptional powers to meet excep-
tional situations has in fact defined the specific quality of this administra-
tion. 
But the state of exception in Schmitt’s terms goes deeper than this.  
Schmitt is interested not only in the effects of using emergency powers on a 
current head of state’s reputation or the mission a leader has when there is a 
sudden need to meet a sudden threat.  Schmitt is also interested in the char-
acter of regimes, of the possible limits to the rule of law (or the very idea of 
normality) that must be acknowledged if a threat is to be met.  For Schmitt, 
it is the exception, not the state of normality, that defines what normal 
Broadly Condemned, WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A18 (discussing Musharraf’s plan to replace Paki-
stan’s parliamentary system). 
 275 SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 12. 
 276 Patrick E. Tyler, A Reminder of a Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at A1 (discussing the at-
tacks as a defining moment of Bush’s presidency). 
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means.277  The exception, then, has transformative powers over the very na-
ture of the state.  In this sense, I think, the Bush administration’s use of ex-
ceptional logics has failed because the world in which the Bush administra-
tion acts is not the early twentieth century world that Schmitt took as his 
backdrop, a world of national and fragmented power.  Even though the 
Bush administration has been able to do virtually everything it has wanted 
to in the war on terrorism, it has not succeeded in justifying what it has 
done to an international public or, increasingly, to substantial segments of 
the American public either. 
Americans, beaten down in their constitutional expectations by the 
permanent changes brought about during the Cold War, have become used 
to the logic of the exception.  The American presidency is supposed to take 
the lead in responding to threats, and virtually all other constitutional 
checks on his power are temporarily suspended—or work with a substantial 
bias in favor of approving emergency-justified presidential action while it 
is still deemed necessary.  As I argued earlier, the American response to 
World War II and its aftermath was immediately tied up with defending the 
state against foreign threats that the Soviet Union posed and thus, the 
United States has rarely gone through a substantial questioning of the limits 
of emergency powers.278  Instead, the American constitutional order has 
learned to live with them. 
Nonetheless, a number of America’s European allies have taken a dif-
ferent trajectory since the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Both in new constitu-
tions that have been written and in the elaboration of international law, 
states of emergency have been filled up with more legal content, rather than 
with overt exceptions to legality.279  States of emergency, as a result, are 
 277 SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 13. 
 278 The 1970s debates around the findings of the Church Committee and the subsequent enactment of 
a statute ending existing states of emergency and putting eventual expiration dates on new ones were 
rare exceptions.  See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)). 
 279 The legal content is defined in a variety of different ways.  While Germany’s new post-war con-
stitution deliberately did not contain a provision for a state of emergency at all out of fear it would be 
used, Article 16 of the French Constitution of 1958 gave emergency powers almost exclusively to the 
president, in contrast with the shared-powers approach that had characterized the previous regime of 
legally regulated états de siege.  Even so, there are official roles for the National Assembly and the 
Constitutional Council to play in the state of emergency:   
When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its 
territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are threatened in a grave and imme-
diate manner and when the regular functioning of the constitutional governmental authorities is 
interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures commanded by these circu 
stances, after official consultation with the Premier, the Presidents of the assemblies and the 
Constitutional Council. 
He shall inform the nation of these measures in a message. 
These measures must be prompted by the desire to ensure to the constitutional governmen-
tal authorities, in the shortest possible time, the means of fulfilling their assigned functions.  The 
Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures. 
Parliament shall meet by right.  
The National Assembly may not be dissolved during the exercise of emergency powers by 
the President. 
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moments that call for an even stricter application of law than might usually 
be the case, even as particular legal restrictions are loosened.280
FR. CONST. art. 16, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  FRANCE (Gisbert 
H. Flanz ed., Supp. 1999). 
 280 The German constitution stands as a model for how a state of emergency may be legally regu-
lated.   When Germany eventually amended its constitution in 1968 to give definite legal shape to its 
understanding of the “state of defense,” it added an extraordinary amount of detail to the precise proce-
dures that had to be followed in this exceptional state.  As a result, the German state of defense is at 
least as much under the rule of law as normal governance is:   
Article 80a (State of tension) 
(1) Where this Basic Law or a federal law on defence, including the protection of the civilian 
population, stipulates that legal provisions may only be applied in accordance with this Ar-
ticle, their application shall, except when a state of defence exists, be admissible only after 
the Bundestag has determined that a state of tension (Spannungsfall) exists or if it has spe-
cifically approved such application.  In respect of the cases mentioned in the first sentence 
of paragraph (5) and the second sentence of paragraph (6) of Article 12a, such determination 
of a state of tension and such specific approval shall require a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast.  
(2) Any measures taken by virtue of legal provisions enacted under paragraph (1) of this Article 
shall be revoked whenever the Bundestag so requests.  
(3) In derogation of paragraph (1) of this Article, the application of such legal provisions shall 
also be admissible by virtue of, and in accordance with, a decision taken with the consent of 
the Federal Government by an international organ within the framework of a treaty of alli-
ance.  Any measures taken pursuant to this paragraph shall be revoked whenever the 
Bundestag so requests with the majority of its members. 
. . . . 
 
Article 115a (Determination of a state of defence) 
(1) The determination that the federal territory is being attacked by armed force or that such an 
attack is directly imminent (state of defence) shall be made by the Bundestag with the con-
sent of the Bundesrat.  Such determination shall be made at the request of the Federal Gov-
ernment and shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least 
the majority of the members of the Bundestag. 
(2) If the situation imperatively calls for immediate action and if insurmountable obstacles pre-
vent the timely meeting of the Bundestag, or if there is no quorum in the Bundestag, the 
Joint Committee shall make this determination with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, 
which shall include at least the majority of its members. 
(3) The determination shall be promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette by the Federal President 
pursuant to Article 82.  If this cannot be done in time, the promulgation shall be effected in 
another manner; it shall subsequently be printed in the Federal Law Gazette as soon as cir-
cumstances permit. 
(4) If the Federal territory is being attacked by armed force and if the competent organs of the 
Federation are not in a position at once to make the determination provided for in the first 
sentence of paragraph (1) of this Article, such determination shall be deemed to have been 
made and promulgated at the time the attack began.  The Federal President shall announce 
such time as soon as circumstances permit. 
(5) When the determination of the existence of a state of defence has been promulgated and if 
the federal territory is being attacked by armed force, the Federal President may, with the 
consent of the Bundestag, issue internationally valid declarations regarding the existence of 
such state of defence subject to the conditions mentioned in paragraph (2) of this Article, the 
Joint Committee shall thereupon deputize for the Bundestag. 
 
Article 115b (Power of command during state of defence) 
Upon the promulgation of a state of defence, the power of command over the Armed 
Forces shall pass to the Federal Chancellor. 
 
Article 115c (Legislative compliance of the Federation during state of defence) 
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(1) The Federation shall have the right to exercise concurrent legislation even in matters belong-
ing to the legislative competence of the Laender by enacting laws to be applicable upon the 
occurrence of a state of defence.  Such laws shall require the consent of the Bundesrat.   
(2) Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of defence to the extent 
required by conditions obtaining while such state of defence exists, may make provision for: 
1. preliminary compensation to be made in the event of expropriations, thus diverging from 
the second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 14; 
2. deprivations of liberty for a period not exceeding four days, if no judge has been able to 
act within the period applying in normal times, thus diverging from the third sentence of 
paragraph (2) and the first sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 104. 
(3) Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of defence to the extent 
required for averting an existing or directly imminent attack, may, subject to the consent of 
the Bundesrat, regulate the administration and the fiscal system of the Federation and the 
Laender in divergence from Sections VIII, VIIIa and X, provided that the viability of the 
Laender, communes and associations of communes is safeguarded, particularly in fiscal 
matters. 
(4) Federal laws enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) or subparagraph (1) of paragraph (2) of this 
Article may, for the purpose of preparing for their execution, be applied even prior to the 
occurrence of a state of defence. 
 
Article 115d (Shortened procedure in the case of urgent bills during state of defence) 
 (1) While a state of defence exists, the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article shall 
apply in respect of federal legislation, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (2) of 
Article 76, the second sentence of paragraph (1) and paragraphs (2) to (4) of Article 77, Ar-
ticle 78, and paragraph (1) of Article 82. 
(2) Bills submitted as urgent by the Federal Government shall be forwarded to the Bundesrat at 
the same time as they are submitted to the Bundestag.  The Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
shall debate such bills in common without delay.  In so far as the consent of the Bundesrat is 
necessary, the majority of its votes shall be required for any such bill to become a law.  De-
tails shall be regulated by rules of procedure adopted by the Bundestag and requiring the 
consent of the Bundesrat. 
(3) The second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 115a shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect 
of the promulgation of such laws.  
 
Article 115e (Status and functions of the Joint Committee) 
(1) If, while a state of defence exists, the Joint Committee determines with a two-thirds majority 
of the votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of its members, that insurmount-
able obstacles prevent the timely meeting of the Bundestag, or that there is no quorum in the 
Bundestag, the Joint Committee shall have the status of both the Bundestag and the Bundes-
rat and shall exercises their rights as one body. 
(2) The Joint Committee may not enact any law to amend this Basic Law or to deprive it of ef-
fect or application either in whole or in part.  The Joint Committee shall not be authorized to 
enact laws pursuant to paragraph (1) of Article 24 or to Article 29. 
 
Article 115f (Extraordinary powers of the Federation during state of defence) 
(1) While a state of defence exists, the Federal Government may to the extent necessitated by 
circumstances: 
1. commit the Federal Border Guard throughout the federal territory; 
2. issue instructions not only to federal administrative authorities but also to Land govern-
ments and, if it deems the matter urgent, to Land authorities, and may delegate this power 
to members of Land governments to be designated by it. 
(2) The Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Joint Committee, shall be informed without delay of 
the measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article. 
 
Article 115g (States and functions of the Federal Constitutional Court during state of defence) 
The constitutional status and the exercise of the constitutional functions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court and its judges must not be impaired.  The Law on the Federal Constitu-
tional Court may not be amended by a law enacted by the Joint Committee except insofar as 
such amendment is required, also in the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, to maintain 
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the capability of the Court to function.  Pending the enactment of such a law, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court may take such measures as are necessary to maintain the capability of the Court 
to carry out its work.  Any decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court in pursuance of the se-
cond and third sentence of this Article shall require a two-thirds majority of the judges present. 
 
Article 115h (Legislative terms and terms of office during state of defence) 
(1) Any legislative terms of the Bundestag or of Land diets due to expire while a state of de-
fence exists shall end six months after the termination of such state of defence.  A term of 
office of the Federal President due to expire while a state of defence exists, and the exercise 
of his functions by the President of the Bundesrat in case of the premature vacancy of the 
Federal President’s office, shall end nine months after the termination of such state of de-
fence.  The term of office of a member of the Federal Constitutional Court due to expire 
while a state of defence exists shall end six months after the termination of such state of de-
fence. 
(2) Should the necessity arise for the Joint Committee to elect a new Federal Chancellor, the 
Committee shall do so with the majority of its members; the Federal President shall propose 
a candidate to the Joint Committee.  The Joint Committee can express its lack of confidence 
in the Chancellor only by electing a successor with a two-thirds majority of its members. 
(3) The Bundestag shall not be dissolved while a state of defence exists.  
 
Article 115i (Extraordinary power of the Land governments) 
(1) If the competent federal organs are incapable of taking the measures necessary to avert the 
danger, and if the situation imperatively calls for immediate independent action in individ-
ual parts of the federal territory, the Land governments or the authorities or commissioners 
designated by them shall be authorized to take, within their respective spheres of compe-
tence, the measures provided for in paragraph (1) of Article 115f. 
(2) Any measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of the present Article may be revoked 
at any time by the Federal Government, or in the case of Land authorities and subordinate 
federal authorities, by Land Prime Ministers. 
 
Article 115k (Grade and duration of validity of extraordinary laws and ordinances having the 
force of law) 
(1) Laws enacted in accordance with Articles 115c, 115e, and 115g, as well as ordinances hav-
ing the force of law issued by virtue of such laws, shall, for the duration of their applicabil-
ity, suspend legislation contrary to such laws or ordinances.  This shall not apply to earlier 
legislation enacted by virtue of Articles 115c, 115e or 115g. 
(2) Laws adopted by the Joint Committee, and ordinances having the force of law issued by vir-
tue of such laws, shall cease to have effect not later than six months after the termination of 
a state of defence. 
(3) Laws containing provisions that diverge from Articles 91a, 91b, 104a, 106 and 107, shall 
apply no longer than the end of the second fiscal year following upon the termination of the 
state of defence.  After such termination they may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, be 
amended by federal legislation so as to lead up to the settlement provided for in Sections 
VIIIa and X. 
 
Article 115l (Repealing of extraordinary laws, Termination of state of defence, Conclusion of 
peace) 
(1) The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time repeal laws enacted by 
the Joint Committee.  The Bundesrat may request the Bundestag to make a decision in any 
such matter.  Any measures taken by the Joint Committee or the Federal Government to 
avert a danger shall be revoked if the Bundestag and the Bundesrat so decide. 
(2) The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time declare the state of de-
fence terminated by a decision to be promulgated by the Federal President.  The Bundesrat 
may request the Bundestag to make a decision in any such matter.  The state of defence 
must be declared terminated without delay when the prerequisites for the determination 
thereof no longer exist. 
(3) The conclusion of peace shall be the subject of a federal law. 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 80a, 115a–115l (F.R.G.) (provisions cited were inserted by federal law in 
1968), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
 
  
May 2004] STATES OF EXCEPTION 67 
 
To see why the Schmittian logic of exception has much less attraction 
for American allies in much of Europe, it is necessary to briefly revisit the 
historical period in which Schmitt claimed that a state of exception could 
and should have this transformative effect on ordinary politics.  When 
Schmitt wrote, parliamentary government was teetering on the brink of 
breakdown not only in Germany but in much of continental Europe, and the 
democratic republic established by the Weimar Constitution was fraught 
with internal inconsistencies, irreconcilable differences, and a growing 
sense of crisis.  The Weimar Constitution’s Article 48 seemed to Real-
politik theorists like Schmitt to be the constitutional way out of the mess.  
Schmitt had advocated the strengthening of executive power against the 
weakness of parliamentarism as the only strategy that would ensure the 
maintenance of the republic.  History knows what happened later:  the rise 
of fascism, the destruction of democratic government, war, the camps.  
Schmitt was himself a convert to and justifier of the fascist cause; many 
have seen in Schmitt’s idea of the exception the seeds—even the seedlings 
and whole forests—of fascism. 
But however powerful we believe ideas can be in the world, they only 
can be played out on the world stage if there are other historical and mate-
rial circumstances that allow them to be realized.  And there were many 
features of both Weimar Germany and inter-war Europe that allowed 
Schmitt’s exceptional justifications to take hold at that time.  I will not re-
hearse them all here—there has been plenty of scholarship on the point.281  
But I will mention just a few of the elements.  While constitutional monar-
chies were more stable in Europe at that time, republican governments es-
tablished in inter-war Europe were generally fragile.  The conception of 
executive power in the new republics had generally not made a complete 
practical or intellectual transition from the model of the monarchy to the 
model of a democratically accountable head of state.  The settlements at the 
end of the First World War had left resentment in their wake among the 
losers and leaders could whip up popular sentiment by promising a return 
GERMANY (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1974).  For a discussion of these provisions, 
see C. C. Schweitzer, Emergency Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 22 W. POL. Q. 112 
(1969). 
 281 By now, the literature on Schmitt, his historical moment, and the political and theoretical debates 
surrounding him is enormous.  Some of the most recent book-length contributions in English include 
JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT:  THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983); RENATO CRISTI, CARL 
SCHMITT AND AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM:  STRONG STATE, FREE ECONOMY (1998); DAVID 
DYZENHAUS, LAW AS POLITICS:  CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM (1998); DAVID 
DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY:  CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN 
WEIMAR (1997); HEINRICH MEIER, FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SCHMITT, 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Marcus Brainard trans., 1998); CHANTAL 
MOUFFE, THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT (1999); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT:  THE 
END OF LAW 181–251 (1999); GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE EXCEPTION:  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF CARL SCHMITT BETWEEN 1921 AND 1936 (2d ed. 1989).  
Special issues of journals have been devoted to assessing Schmitt’s legacy—see, for example, 10 
CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE (1997), and, the exposition dedicated to Schmitt that started the 
modern debate in English, Special Issue on Carl Schmitt, 72 TELOS 3 (1987). 
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to the pre-War status quo.282  The Russian Revolution created enormous 
sympathies both toward communism and toward revolutionary change in 
the rest of Europe, while also inspiring strong reaction against such revolu-
tionary movements.283  Anxiety about national belonging was easily chan-
neled into nationalism, and nationalism was at that time in Europe prem-
ised on the idea of a “people” whose boundaries of membership were 
inflexible because they were tied to birth and ethnicity.  Law, in conse-
quence, was national law, and the devices and justifications for sovereignty 
were national justifications. 
Against this background, Schmitt’s idea of the state of exception can be 
seen as a distinctly national and nationalist idea.  He imagines a sovereign 
of a nation, one who (as we learn in some of Schmitt’s other work)284 has 
as a primary job defining who is inside the sphere of protection (the friend) 
and who is outside (the enemy), locked in perpetual and mortal combat.  
The idea of the exception is related to this fundamentally agonistic concep-
tion of politics; the exception is what allows the sovereign to strike out 
against the enemy with the rationale that he is protecting the friend.  But 
this conception of politics presupposes that all that is relevant about sover-
eignty can be captured in a single person who is sovereign of a nation that 
provides a first approximation of the universe of friends.  The nation-state 
is the only sort of entity from whose perspective such clear dividing lines 
can be drawn.  As democratic constitutional governments have replaced 
monarchies, and as immigration has become common in states once de-
fined primarily by ethnic affiliation, Schmitt’s idea of sovereignty no 
longer reflects facts on the ground.  Nationalism is no longer an ideology 
that attracts sympathies outside the sphere of the nationalists themselves.285
The negative lessons of fascism, and also the negative lessons of Stalin-
ism, were taken on board in the construction of new national governments 
and new transnational institutions after World War II.  The horror of the 
camps, the unspeakable destruction of total wars, even the later shadow of 
nuclear catastrophe—these living nightmares constituted the new forms of 
destruction that appeared simultaneously with the abolition of empires and 
monarchies, with the rise of both democratic and republican governments, 
with the ever-widening victory of constitutionalism and with the increasing 
appeals to the idea of universal human rights.  Much of the first two-thirds 
 282 See generally SALLY MARKS, THE ILLUSION OF PEACE:  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE 
1918–1933 (2d. ed. 2003) (tracing the effects of the post-war agreements on European politics from the 
signing of the peace treaties to the collapse of the Weimar Republic).  
 283 See generally DONALD F. BUSKY, COMMUNISM IN HISTORY AND THEORY:  THE EUROPEAN 
EXPERIENCE (2002) (documenting how the Russian Revolution made communism attractive as a theory 
and present as a live political option in European politics for much of the 20th century). 
 284 CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (J. Harvey Lomax trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 
1996) (1928). 
 285 See generally ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONALISM (1997) (providing a theoretical account of what 
nationalism believes itself to be); ANTHONY SMITH, NATIONALISM:  THEORY, IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY 
(2001) (describing the rise of nationalism, its consolidation and its critics).    
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of the twentieth century286 was dominated by the simultaneous develop-
ment of two contradictory trends—the headlong rush to new forms of in-
ternational destruction alongside the development of new forms of the pro-
tection of the individual as a political subject.  The new human-rights 
promoting democracies that emerged in Europe in the shadow of the world 
wars are far from perfect, but they improved on the records of the govern-
ments that had been destroyed by World War II. 
During the Cold War, Realpolitik foreign policy dominated interna-
tional developments led by the United States and the Soviet Union.  Serious 
conflict in this period was typically recast as a proxy war among super-
powers whose self-interest served as their primary motivations.  But while 
international relations were dominated by prospects of superpower conflict, 
international law was growing in the shadows among powers that were less 
“super.”  Institutions that were to the superpowers merely symbolic debat-
ing clubs developed both institutional stability and defining sets of princi-
ples that struck out in directions different from the guiding ideas of the su-
perpowers.  The development of the U.N. system outside of the Security 
Council, of international conventions and their non-coercive monitoring 
frameworks, of regional human rights bodies and the increasing human 
rights orientation of the successive waves of new constitutions that 
emerged following the Second World War were all largely ignored by the 
realist-driven superpowers.  But develop they did.  By the time the Cold 
War ended rather surprisingly at the end of the 1980s, the Schmittian 
framework of friend and enemy that had oriented world politics among the 
superpowers for decades after the last total war simultaneously collapsed. 
The result was the rise to real prominence of what had been thought by 
the superpowers to be merely symbolic institutions.  The U.N. and its sys-
tem of international human rights protections assumed new powers and 
new status precisely because the old order had vanished.  The regional hu-
man rights bodies (backed up in the case of Europe with an ever-increasing 
union) provided order that substituted for the old Cold War orientations.  
Out from under the constant threat of nuclear catastrophe and the sense that 
only sovereigns with “realist” views could manage the bipolar world, the 
international institutions that had developed with the luxury of having the 
sources of real power ignore them suddenly became sources of real power 
themselves.  International law, disparaged by realists throughout the Cold 
War,287 suddenly became more law-like, at least in the sense that more 
countries were willing to take its principles as binding on domestic deci-
sions. 
 286 My argument here applies primarily to those countries that defined themselves as world powers; 
obviously, in much of the less-powerful world, the concerns and trajectories were somewhat different.   
 287 The ultimate realist, Henry Kissinger, famously taught a course on international politics at Har-
vard.  One class each term was devoted to international law.  As legend would have it, each year Kiss-
inger sent one of his research assistants to that class to announce that Professor Kissinger did not be-
lieve that there was such a thing as international law and that therefore the class was cancelled. 
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But even in the absence of transnational bodies that could enforce prin-
ciples of international law, new constitutions (particularly those written as 
soviet communism and other repressive regimes collapsed) often include a 
prominent place for international law in domestic constitutional law.288  In-
ternational law is, then, increasingly viewed as a species of domestic law—
as binding legal norms that are integral parts of the domestic legal system 
and that give fundamental provisions of the domestic legal system their 
meaning.  Part of this international law is the law of war, including the 
U.N. Charter, the Geneva Conventions and, most recently, the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court.  While the United States may have 
been oblivious (or opposed) to these developments since international law 
is still not considered part of a basic legal education in the United States 
and not widely respected either by U.S. courts289 or U.S. politicians,290 
many other countries have been eagerly learning, adopting, and elaborating 
this system. 
As a result, regimes of law and regimes of war are no longer opposed 
conceptions for many of the United States’ constitutional-democratic allies.  
Instead, the increasing density of international norms in the period since 
 288 The Constitution of Hungary, for example, is typical in this regard: 
Article 6  
(1) The Republic of Hungary repudiates war as a means of dealing with conflicts between na-
tions and refrains from the use of force against the independence or territorial integrity of 
other states.  It also refrains from making threats implying recourse to force. 
(2) The Republic of Hungary is working for co-operation with all peoples and countries of the 
world. 
 . . . . 
Article 7 
(1) The legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the universally recognised of interna-
tional law, and shall harmonises the internal laws and statutes of the country with the obli-
gateons assumed under international law.   
A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] arts. 6–7 (Hung.), translated in 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  HUNGARY (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995). 
 289 This may be changing with the rather sudden appearance in the case law of the U.S. Supreme 
Court at the end of the 2002–2003 term of nontrivial references to international law in two of the judg-
ments.  The most visible is the reference to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Law-
rence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), where the majority opinion uses those decisions to show that 
Western civilization has not had a uniform or unchanging view of homosexuality.  Id. at 2481–83.  The 
other was the reference in the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 
2325, 2347 (2003), where she indicates that the affirmative action principles upheld by the majority in 
that case also are supported by two international agreements, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (which the United States has signed and ratified) and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination against Women (which the United 
States has signed but not ratified).  For more along these lines by another distinguished commentator, 
see Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 40 (1994) (not-
ing that certain constitutional touchstones like the “evolving standard of decency” standard require ref-
erence to the practices of other countries). 
 290 Recently, several resolutions have been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives caution-
ing federal courts not to use foreign law.  See, e.g., Constitutional Preservation Resolution, H.R. Res. 
446, 108th Cong. (2003) (“Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Supreme 
Court should base its decisions on the Constitution and the Laws of the United States, and not on the 
law of any foreign country or any international law or agreement not made under the authority of the 
United States.”). 
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Schmitt wrote has produced a conception of war that is almost entirely 
filled with legal content.  Precisely in response to the horrors that Schmitt 
saw coming (and perhaps assisted in producing), much of the international 
community has pulled back from the brink of catastrophe and realized that 
the very idea of war had to be governed by law. 
Of course, creating a law of war no more ensures that wars follow the 
law than creating a criminal code ensures that there is no crime in a society.  
But the legal framework, if agreed upon widely, provides the basis for con-
demnation of individual country practices in the same way that a domestic 
criminal code provides the basis for the condemnation of individual acts.  
The United States has not been in the forefront of the development—or for 
that matter the adherence to—these international norms.  In fact, even be-
fore 9/11, the United States was already one of the primary outlaws in this 
field.291  But virtually no other country, with the exception of truly brutal 
dictatorships, denies the binding applicability of international law in the 
way that the United States does.292
This is why the United States has received so much criticism for the 
way that it has conducted its foreign policy after 9/11 when its small public 
vestiges of support for international norms collapsed entirely.  The Iraq 
War and the Guantánamo camps, to take the two most egregious cases, vio-
late the now-well-established principles of international law so thoroughly 
that the US position in taking exception them succeeds not in deeply recon-
stituting international politics, but instead in branding the United States as 
the attempted wrecker of the international system.  With few exceptions, 
other countries have failed to recognize the legitimacy of the positions that 
the United States has taken.293
Even in its domestic policy, the Bush administration has drawn both in-
ternational and domestic criticism.  As we have seen, American domestic 
 291 The United States’ adherence to the death penalty is one of the leading causes of consternation 
among its constitutional allies.  In 2003, the United States placed third in the world in the number of 
people it executed, behind China and Iran, and with Vietnam and Saudi Arabia in close pursuit.  Slight 
Fall in Capital Punishment,  GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 7, 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1187137,00.html.
 292 By saying this, I am of course not implying that the United States operates like a brutal dictator-
ship.  Instead, I want to make the point that many constitutional democracies now embed principles of 
international law in their own constitutional orders not just in symbolic ways, but as real backstops for 
domestic abuses of power.  Because the United States by and large ignores international human rights 
law as a source of legal authority, more pressure is placed on the U.S. Constitution to be the one and 
only line of defense against serious assaults on rights.  If the Constitution fails, the United States as a 
legal matter goes into free fall apart from the potential protections available through state constitutions.  
When countries whose constitutions and international commitments bind them to international law fail 
their own internal obligations, the international law system provides a second line of defense. 
 293 In another article, I attempt to show that most of the other constitutional democracies in the world 
have responded to 9/11 by using their domestic court systems to prosecute terrorists, much as the 
United States did before 9/11.  As a result, there have been trials of al Qaeda members in Germany, It-
aly, France, Spain, and the U.K.  Even Russia, which faces a terrorist threat (or civil war) from Chechen 
rebels, has reaffirmed its commitment to the maintenance of constitutional criminal procedure even as it 
has prosecuted a war against the province.  See Kim Lane Scheppele, Other People’s PATRIOT Acts, 
LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
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courts, while initially more constitutionally alert, have since become quite 
deferential to the Bush administration’s rationales for the declarations of 
exception to states of normal legality.  At times of crisis, the system of 
separation of powers and the system for protection of human rights seem to 
collapse into the one constitutional clause that gives the commander in 
chief his powers.  This, as constitutional historians are quick to note, gener-
ally does happen during wartime in the United States.294
But this sort of general collapse of constitutionalism does not generally 
happen during wartime anymore in many of the world’s most respected 
constitutional regimes.  New constitutions often explicitly draw from the 
failure of the Weimar Constitution in hedging their own states of exception 
with legal guarantees.  As we have seen, Germany’s constitution builds in 
substantial and detailed protections against abuse of emergency powers.295 
Later constitutions in other countries recovering from “regimes of hor-
ror”296 in the 1990s were even stronger on this point.  It has now become a 
matter of standard constitutional drafting practice to constitutionally regu-
late states of emergency within the constitution, so that the state of emer-
gency—like the idea of war itself—has become an idea filled with legality.  
One of the strongest protections among recently drafted constitutions can 
be found in the South African Constitution, which allows a state of emer-
gency to exist, but protects basic human rights and requires constant par-
liamentary review of related executive decisions.297
 294 Perhaps the most alarming of the defenders of the practice that the law is silent in war is Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist.  See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:  CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN WARTIME (1998) (tracing the history of civil liberties during times of national emergency). 
 295 See supra note 280. 
 296 Scheppele, supra note 45. 
 297 The legal regulation of the state of emergency is so exemplary that it is worth quoting the South 
African Constitution at length: 
(1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only 
when—  
(a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natu-
ral disaster or other public emergency; and 
(b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order. 
(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in 
consequence of that declaration, may be effective only— 
(a) prospectively; and 
(b) for no more than 21 days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly 
resolves to extend the declaration.  The Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of 
emergency for no more than three months at a time.  The first extension of the state of 
emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the 
members of the Assembly.  Any subsequent extension must be by a resolution adopted 
with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly.  A resolu-
tion in terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following a public debate in the As-
sembly. 
(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of— 
(a) a declaration of a state of emergency; 
(b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or 
(c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state 
of emergency. 
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(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may dero-
gate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that—  
(a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and 
(b) the legislation—  
(i) is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to 
states of emergency; 
(ii) conforms to subsection (5); and 
(iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possible after 
being enacted. 
(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation 
enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise—  
(a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act; 
(b) any derogation from this section; or 
(c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable 
Rights, to the extent indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table.  [This is 
followed by a detailed list of which rights must be protected even in a state of emer-
gency.] 
… 
(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting 
from a declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must be observed: 
(a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasona-
bly possible, and informed that the person has been detained. 
(b) A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days of the 
person being detained, stating the detainee’s name and place of detention and referring 
to the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been detained. 
(c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a 
medical practitioner. 
(d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a legal 
representative. 
(e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 
days after the date the person was detained, and the court must release the detainee 
unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order. 
(f) A detainee who is not released in terms of a review under paragraph (e), or who is not re-
leased in terms of a review under this paragraph, may apply to a court for a further re-
view of the detention at any time after 10 days have passed since the previous review, 
and the court must release the detainee unless it is still necessary to continue the deten-
tion to restore peace and order. 
(g) The detainee must be allowed to appear in person before any court considering the de-
tention, to be represented by a legal practitioner at those hearings, and to make represen-
tations against continued detention. 
(h) The state must present written reasons to the court to justify the continued detention of 
the detainee, and must give a copy of those reasons to the detainee at least two days be-
fore the court reviews the detention. 
(7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds 
unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person. 
(8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who 
are detained in consequence of an international armed conflict.  Instead, the state must com-
ply with the standards binding on the Republic under international humanitarian law in re-
spect of the detention of such persons. 
S. AFR. CONST. § 37, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  REPUBLIC OF 
SOUTH AFRICA (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. & Patricie H. Ward assoc. ed., 2004). 
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Another more typical example is the 1993 Russian Constitution,298 
which also requires both that a state of emergency be legally declared, and 
also that a long list of rights be protected during the ongoing emergency.  
These provisions have become typical of the new constitutions so that the 
very idea of a state of emergency has become a constitutional idea and not 
an extra-constitutional one.  Rather than defining the edges of the sovereign 
regime, as Schmitt argued, states of exception are now in practical terms 
defined as states inside, not outside the constitutional framework.  States of 
emergency, like states of war, have been filled with legal content. 
This is not to say that a Schmittian world view is impossible post-9/11.  
The Bush administration has seemed to proceed from the presumption that 
exceptional times demand exceptional means and that it is either naïve or 
suicidal for a state to follow the rules in the current state of affairs.  Perhaps 
because other countries have experienced the horror of the collapse of the 
rule of law firsthand in more extreme ways than has the United States in 
the last century, much of the international community (and particularly 
those democratic rule-of-law countries that count themselves among the 
United States’ traditional allies) definitely rejected the Realpolitik pre-
sumptions underlying the Schmittian analysis of the state of exception. 
The outrage and repulsion with which Schmitt’s views have been re-
ceived in recent years299  provide some measure of the extent to which the 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and his proposed solutions to liberalism’s 
weaknesses have been rejected.  Schmitt’s anti-liberalism has either been 
attributed to his fascist conversion, which is then taken as answer enough to 
the intellectual challenges he may have posed, or it has been met with the 
rule-of-law defenses of liberalism that, to Schmitt’s defenders, only serve 
 298 Article 56 of the Russian Constitution reads: 
1. Under conditions of a state of emergency in order to ensure the safety of citizens and protec-
tion of the constitutional system, individual restriction of rights and freedoms with the identi-
fication of the extent and term of their duration may be instituted in conformity with the fed-
eral constitutional law.  
2. A state of emergency throughout the territory of the Russian Federation and in specific areas 
thereof may be introduced in circumstances and in conformity with the procedures defined by 
the federal constitutional law. 
3. The rights and freedoms specified in Articles 20, 21, 23 (part 1), 24, 28, 34 (part 1), 40 (part 
1), 46–54 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation are not subject to restriction. 
KONST. RF art. 56 (1993), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2002). 
 299 For an early example of the controversy,  see the intense debate that erupted in the journalTelos 
when Ellen Kennedy first attempted a discussion of Schmitt’s intellectual legacy in modern German 
political theory.  Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS 37 (1987) (arguing 
that Schmitt is one of the intellectual sources of the Frankfurt School but showing that many of the 
members of that school attempted to hide his influence after Schmitt’s association with fascism became 
clear).  The responses published in the same issue include: Martin Jay, Reconciling the Irreconcilable? 
Rejoinder to Kennedy 71 TELOS 67 (1987); Alfons Söllner, Beyond Carl Schmitt: Political Theory in 
the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS 81(1987); Ulrich K. Preubeta, The Critique of German Liberalism: Re-
ply to Kennedy, 71 Telos 97 (1987). Kennedy responded, Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frank-
furt School: A Rejoinder, 73 TELOS 101 (1987).  .   
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to reinforce the point that liberals are bad at dealing with political crises.  
But over the last several decades, there is a growing condemnation of the 
legitimacy of suspending the rule of law in order to defend a country—at 
least not in “advanced” constitutional democracies.300  In fact, there has 
been an expansion of the rule of law to cover more and more situations 
previously judged to be practically and perhaps even morally extra-legal.  
Instead of following the logic of the exception, the rule of law has become 
coterminous in both the intellectual debate and in the public mind in most 
constitutional democracies with the democratic political order itself.  The 
rule of law has become an article of faith and not a controversial or inter-
nally fraught idea that needs public philosophical attention.301
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have tried to explain why the logic of Schmitt’s analy-
ses no longer work as a practical matter to justify states of exception, even 
when it is clear to the international community that something fundamental 
has changed in the world system since 9/11.  The institutional elaboration 
of a new international system that has occurred since Schmitt’s time make 
his ideas seem all the more dangerous, and yet all the more dated.  There 
are simply fewer states in the world willing to tolerate either Schmitt’s 
conception of politics or his conception of the defining qualities of sover-
eignty.  Schmitt’s philosophy has, in short, been met with a different soci-
ology.  For his ideas to be either persuasive or effective, they must be more 
than internally coherent or even plausible; they must be loosed in a context 
in which they can win against other competing ideas.  Precisely because of 
the horrors of the twentieth century, much of the international community 
that has entrenched both democracy and the rule of law has turned away 
from these extra-legal justifications for states of exception.  Instead, such 
states have attempted to embed exceptionality as an instance of the normal, 
and not as a repudiation of the possibility of normality.  .  Only the United 
States, with its eighteenth-century constitution and Cold War legacy of ex-
ceptionalism, seems to be soldiering on in this new legal space of conflict 
unaware that the defining aspect of the new sovereignty is that even the 
new sovereign is bound by rules. 
 
 300 For a discussion of the developing comparative constitutional jurisprudence on the rule of law, 
see Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn’t Count:  The 2000 Elections and the Failure of the 
Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1370–85 (2001). 
 301 This obviously does not apply quite as fully to political theorists and legal philosophers for whom 
such debates are their main stock in trade.  Such debates have probably had a more and more “aca-
demic” quality because it has been hard to imagine them breaking into the public discourse without se-
rious misunderstanding. 
